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THE CARTOGRAPHIC REASONING IN THE ARCTIC.
Modern Territorial Representations of the State in the Arctic
Strategies of Norway, Russia and Finland.

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In the late 2000s, the renewed interest of the Arctic States over the Arctic has been seen with international concern as a revival of hard-core geopolitics towards an area that became an example of cooperation among states and minorities. This apprehension is based on a simplistic conception of territory as the natural material manifestation of the State over the Earth, typical of classical geopolitics and the realist school of International Relations (IR). The scope of this thesis is thus twofold. Firstly it aims at problematizing the often academically neglected concept of *territory*. It is only adopting Wendt's social constructivist approach and the notion of the state "as-a-person", which rationalizes its personhood and agency on the international scene, that I assume it is possible to understand the contemporary situation of the Arctic, where the Arctic States are intentionally acting as the legitimate actors, within the socio-cultural framework of the current International Legal System. Moreover, with the analysis of the sources of international law and how they manage and resolve territorial disputes, it will be argued Carl Schmitt's previous conceptions of territorial sovereignty and geographical Order, described in the *Nomos of the Earth*, which is also at the roots of IR realism. My point is that, following Stuart Elden's insight, territory is indeed a political technological tool, whose technological aspects are represented by cartography which influences subtly the way we relates to the World and eventually even the patterns of the modern nation-state through what Franco Farinelli calls the *cartographic reasoning*. Such logic is best expressed by the three characteristics of *continuity*, *homogeneity* and *isotropy*, that 'stemming from the map' are the attribute themselves of the modern state. The categorization of these three features through the methodological means of Norman Fairclough's Critical Discourse Analysis will provide an initial analytical framework for the Arctic Strategy documents of Norway, Russia and Finland. Considering them as the performative territorial representation of the state, it will be possible to prove whether the Arctic States are actually turning back to hard national interest-based policies, or some post-modern spatial aspect is predominating. The findings are promising on the analytical side, showing the appropriate flexibility for texts and maps, and illustrate that the Arctic States are 'still on the Map', managing to adapt global phenomena in the terms of cartographic reasoning, reaffirming thus their leading role in the determination of political space.

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INTRODUCTION

The Arctic has been in the last years a rather significant topic in international politics, where national interests and global concerns seem to be clashing with a diffuse worry for the military and ecological stability of the region and the globe. Despite the increased scientific and environmental cooperation of the 1990s (a process of international integration that spilled over many political and social aspects and brought to the establishment of the Arctic Council, a high level intergovernmental forum to provide a means for promoting cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic States), the conspicuous untapped natural resources, hydrocarbons in particular, and the opening of new ice-free routes caused by the warming global climate are fostering a new commotion regarding the militarization of the area and the determination of territorial boundaries. Mesmeric expressions such as “Arctic Rush or Frenzy” recall frontier’s sceneries and epic races, and are frequently appearing in media broadcasts and academic publications, advocating a revival of the most *realpolitik* geopolitics.

Being mostly an ice pack covered sea, on whose shores and ice nomadic people had been living for thousands of years, and settled by nation-states only in the two centuries, the Arctic¹ is indeed one of the last extensions of the World to be explored and settled, and still maintains the exotic aura of a legendary place. This conception drastically changed in the last decades. In particular the publishing in 2004 of the ‘*Arctic Climate Impact Assessment*’ (ACIA), followed the next year by its scientific report, increased even more the ecological awareness of the frailty of the area. These documents were a decisive turning point in the general perception of the Arctic and global warming in general: the ice-pack and permafrost layers are sensibly reducing and hazarding traditional ways of living, damaging infrastructures, reducing food stocks both on land and in the sea. The Arctic is not a symbol of unconquerable natural wilderness, but the human activities are irreducibly destroying it. This fostered a new wave of ‘protective’ environmental discourse, yet, at the same time, there has been increasing political and economic interests in the area, whose causes are various and contingent: the melting of the ice opens shipping routes that shorten drastically circumnavigation times, and easier conditions for oversea drilling. Moreover, unresolved territorial disputes among the coastal Arctic brought to spectacular symbolic acts, such as the posting of the Russian flag on the North Pole on bottom of the Arctic Ocean in August 2007. Yet, these phenomena are all on the surface; the real change happens unnoticed.

¹ Etymologically, the word Arctic comes straight from the Greek ‘*arctòs*’, ‘of the bear’, implying the region where the constellation of Ursa Minor, the Little Bear, is zenithal. Consequently, Antarctica, is its antipode.

Research questions and outline.

Despite this apparent reassertion of national interests towards the North pole, I had a hunch that the already established experience of international cooperation enhanced by the Arctic Council on one hand, and the example of European integration on the other could have influenced some of the Arctic States and international organizations toward a less competitive and hard-security driven policies, enhancing networking at all levels, from intergovernmental to local. Thus, the first hypothesis was to analyze the recently published Arctic Strategies of Norway, Russia and the European Union, to investigate their main themes and discourses. Yet, similar researches had been already undertaken, so I decided to change completely perspective, as I noticed that in the discipline of International Relations (IR) the notion of ‘territory’ was never truly problematized, but always taken for granted. Being influenced by the critical thought that the ‘unsaid covers the dominant ideologies’, I strongly felt this was the new topic of my thesis, helped furthermore by the insights of political and critical geography and especially the works of the Italian geographer Franco Farinelli, who theorized the logic underlying all the modern thought and the formation of the nation-state: the *cartographic reasoning*. The Arctic Strategy policy papers became thus the perfect research material in order to discover whether the approach the Arctic States had towards their territory and the Arctic followed this modern reasoning or some hints of post-modern governance were to be found, with the help of Fairclough’s Critical Discourse Analysis insights, especially in the investigation of written texts.

The main questions of this work are thus two, and the second cannot be answered without the background set up by the first, which is “*what state territory actually is and how to analyze it within the discipline of international relations?*”. This is the thread that connects the first three chapters, which uncover and build up the analytical model through which the territorial representations of the Arctic Strategies will be then investigated. In light of this model construction, the adoption of Wendt’s constructivist approach, and his justification of the “State-as-person” theory was essential in order to validate state’s intentions and therefore also the policy papers as states’ projections and projects over territory. Moreover, the state as “legal person” is one of the basilar concept of the International Legal System), that, taken in a broader sense than Wendt’s, could represent the constructivist concept of ‘international Culture’, both in constitutive and behavioral terms.

In fact, territory had usually been carefully defined only in legal terms, stemming from specific principles, mainly the concept of absolute sovereignty. It is no surprise that the first political theorist to pro-

blematize territory, Carl Schmitt in its *Nomos of the Earth*², was a legal scholar and his dissertation is based on the development of jurisprudence in the last four centuries. The *Nomos* is an important work also because it draws its conclusions from the development of the legal system in modern Europe (and consequently of the contemporary international Culture too) and also because it will later influence also the realist school of IR. The confutation of Schmitt's theories, especially in regard to the contemporary development of international law concerning territorial sovereignty through the continuous reference to its sources and jurisprudence (e.g. international conventions, treaties, arbitral reports and judgments) will bring to a new and analytically more feasible point of view: Elden's approach of territory as a legal-technical political tool, thus unifying the contemporary legal notion of effective sovereignty and the technical means of territory, the geographical and cartographic techniques used to represent it and their underlying logic.

The geographical description of territory in cartographic terms is indeed a powerful tool both for descriptive and cognitive relevance. Only considering it as a political 'symbol' it is possible its mediation between individual places and the totality of the World through *uniform space*. This space is the result of a real "cartographic revolution" that occurred in the same centuries that saw also the development of the modern nation-state (16th-19th century). The increasing accuracy in the graphic representation of maps as the factual copy of the World, induces the "graphic bias", a cognitive misconception that assuming the perfect identity between the object (here the World) and the representation (the Map) conceals the original selective mechanisms and perspectives that transforms the relation with reality from a simple reflection into a constitutive correlation: we tend to shape the World according to the maps and their patterns. Such obfuscation is mirrored by the pervasivity of what Fainelli calls the *cartographic reasoning* that extends into the formation of the modern nation-state through the three Euclidean characteristics of space: *continuity*, *homogeneity* and *isotropy*.

Therefore, it is only unifying Elden's and Farinelli's insights, namely considering state territory as the political tool of the modern nation-state described in legal and cartographic terms (expressed in particular by the presence of the Euclidean characteristics), that it is then possible to pose the second question, already introduced by John Ruggie in the early 1990s: *are globalizing tendencies of any form, leading to post-modern patterns of territorial space, namely in signs of a discontinuity in the territorial representations of the states?* If so, this divergence should be reflected also in the states' policy documents which have state territory as object of their course of action. The Arctic Strategies released in the last

² Schmitt, 2003.

decade by the 8 Arctic States³, are thus an unique opportunity to uncover, through the means of Critical Discourse Analysis, the presence and possible discursive variations of the Euclidean characteristics of the modern nation-state expressed in textual form, in a region of the world that lately has been changing rapidly, affected by environmental, economic and cultural global effects.

Despite the fact that the analytical framework developed in chapter 4 could be extended to all the Arctic Strategy policy documents released by the Arctic States (possibly in a future research), I decided to reduce the current analysis to the strategies of three Arctic States: Norway's, Russia's and Finland's. The justification for this choice is that all these three documents have been forerunners of some kind. Norway was the first country to release an Arctic Strategy policy already in December 2006, followed by Russia in August 2008 (though it was made publicly available only in late March 2009), and Finland is the first European Union member state to have published its Arctic Strategy in a definitive form, in July 2010. Though the initial rationalization was for a mere temporal categorization, the results of the textual analysis of the three Strategies actually showed three very different territorial approaches, and moreover uncovered an interesting evolution that occurred even in such a short period: a real shift in *perspectives* that confirms the presence of some signs of new, post-modern configurations of the territorial space (in the case of the Norwegian Strategies reflected even in cartographic form, as well as in form of text), which however may not be as remarkably present as to substantiate a factual spatial revolution in the predominant modern cartographic reasoning.

³ Traditionally these are the member states of the Arctic Council. See Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council. Ottawa 19 September 1996. Article 2: "*Members of the Arctic Council are: Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden and the United States of America (the Arctic States)*".

CHAPTER 1 – Constructivism in IR and State Personhood

Every scientific research, and social science research in particular, relies on principles which describe and order the way we relate with reality, how we perceive it: our ontology. The specific approach of any analysis is in essence that the experience one has of reality, may it be material or ideal, is never direct, but always mediated by mental processes, which are respectively influenced by the socio-cultural conventions one lives by. These conventions can be compared to colored lenses, which accordingly color or limit perceptions to determined categories or procedures the social context constructed. This becomes problematic, whenever one forgets that these lenses are on most of time. The general risk is that, without realizing this continuous socio-cultural mediation of experience, those conventions can be considered as natural and permanent, becoming an ideology. Territory, the geographical expression of the state, is often taken for granted as an incontrovertible evidence, mostly for its materiality and the confusion caused by naturalistic and organicist point of view.

The purpose of the first three chapters is, therefore, to recognize the existence of these “lenses” through the presentation and discussion of the different theoretical layers of our study. Firstly, it is necessary to set the foundations of this scientific approach, which among the social sciences it is called social constructivism, and its influence over the field of international relations. In this case, I will mainly follow the scheme delineated by Alexander Wendt in his book “*Social Theory of International Politics*”¹ (from now on referred to simply as the *Social Theory*), assessing the strengths and weaknesses of his model for this specific analysis. At this phase, it will be particularly relevant his elaboration of the State as ‘as-a-person’ and as corporate actor within the international system and their mutual inter-action. Defending these constructivist assumptions is particularly important for only the conception of the state as a complex system, with the appearance of emergent phenomena as, for example, some sort of self-consciousness (i.e. Wendt’s corporate agency) can explain both the states’ *perceptions* of territory and their *intentional aspects* expressed in the Arctic Strategy policy documents. Thus, following the previous metaphor, it will be discussed how the “lenses”, or culture within which the social constructs are generally formed, affects the actors while interacting with reality, and Wendt’s perspective will help to narrow the range of analysis to a state-centered model.

¹ Wendt, 1999.

Secondly, coming to analysis of the “lenses” themselves, the focus will move from the ontological premises, to a very specific concept of international culture: the ‘International Legal Culture’, which in the last centuries shaped and justified the existence of modern nation-states and their behavior, through customs, conventions, treaties and academic debates. The principal thread of this part will be how the nation-states developed the concept of sovereignty and territory in legal terms. In fact, most of the contemporary tensions expressed about the Arctic and the supposed ‘rush for resources’ are mostly legal issues, on the determination and legitimacy of the coastal states to project their sovereignty over the oceans. The first scholar to tackle extensively the concept of ‘territory’ through the development of the international law, the consequent dynamics connected to it and the consequent division of the World in geographically distinct units was Carl Schmitt in his work “*The Nomos of the Earth*”². Thus an overview of Schmitt’s worldview is unavoidable for it spilled over the discipline of International Relations, through Morgenthau’s thoughts. The next step will be the examination of the validity of Schmitt’s premises and categories and whether this ‘international spatial order’ had actually collapsed with the end of the European era, as he assumed, or transformed into a global and more pervasive system.

Finally, the last layer or theoretical perspective is analyzing territory from the point of view of political and critical geography. The heuristic point of departure here is that Schmitt pointed out that state territory and sovereignty are all concepts that developed in the centuries which roughly characterized the birth of modernity (i.e. 15th-19th centuries) and that they are unequivocally linked with the modern notion of nation-state. Stuart Elden’s will develop this insight further defining territory as a political tool expressed in legal-technical means. The legal means are delineated through the international jurisprudence. The technical relates to geography and cartography, and a deeper exploration of this conceptual connection, what Franco Farinelli defined as “*cartographic reasoning*”³, will uncover the characteristic patterns that identify a modern perception and projection of territory. These patterns will form the analytical categories for the investigation of the contemporary Arctic policy papers of Norway, Russia and Finland.

1.1 Constructivism in International Relations

During the period of the opposition of the Communist and Western bloc during the Cold War, the international system seemed more than ever before, distinctly structured and balanced on ideologies and the

² Schmitt, 2003.

³ Farinelli, 2003, 2009.

possession of specific weapons (namely nuclear weapons), on military power and its projection, on national interest(s) and rational decision-making. These assumptions were at least the fundamentals of the dominant International Relations theories of the time, such as structural Realism, neo-Liberalism and Marxism, which observed the contemporary World and for many reasons, may that be strictly theoretical, methodological or ideological, considered the *structure*, in which conditions the states acted or reacted in relation with each other, to be the determinant factor, the variable to be examined. Individuals or governments could only follow, within certain limits, the established patterns of behavior, being constrained by the objective and material power and logics.⁴

Constructivism is a social re-interpretation of the dynamics of the international relations, a scientific current, which rose within the academic debate on international relations already in the 1980s, but became more and more pervasive in the 1990s after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of international bipolarity⁵. As its name suggests, constructivism's main postulate is that any social actor, whether individual or a group, actually 'constructs' his own interpretation of reality through the interaction with other actors and the material world itself. Thus, ideas and intentions, essential aspects of agents, regain relevance to some extent. They are not solely influenced by the material forces of the international structure (as spatial, historical or social contexts), but, on the other hand, the agents can decide, more or less intentionally, whether to support or modify these patterns. The ontological view of constructivist reality is, therefore, the one where Agency and Structure are mutually constituted in a continuous *interactive* relation between 'what people do' and 'what society shapes'.⁶

Meanings and ideas, through the formation of rules and their institutionalization in specific spatial historical and social *contexts*, can provide the foundations of a social order, yet, at the same time, some of them can challenge the existing one. It is these coexisting meanings what permits social structures to evolve in time more or less rapidly, and *Power* emerges not as the possession of material capabilities (how many strategic weapons as a structural realist would consider it), but rather through the relation-

⁴ Concerning structural realism the main factors are power balance and rational competition among states, see Mearsheimer, 2007, pp. 71-86; for neo-Liberalism the distribution of interests among international organization and the solutions of collective action problems, see Martin, 2007, pp. 109-124; and for Marxism the historical determination of societies and states through the development of capitalism, see Rupert, 2007, pp. 148-164.

⁵ Fierke, 2007, p. 167.

⁶ Klotz and Lynch, 2007; p. 2 and p. 6.

ships among the social actors and the hegemonic discourse(s) or logics they are sustaining (or challenging) within the international system.⁷

Therefore, constructivist ontology is based on these three factors: intersubjectivity, contexts and power. The first factor, intersubjectivity, permits interaction among social actors and the understanding of their dynamics, customs and habits, which consecutively tend to regularize into norms and institutions, influenced by the socio-cultural context they develop in. Finally, the study of power relations among co-existing values permits to assess the relative stability or fluidity of the social structure.

Considering the scope and extent the research, the ontological framework will follow one of the most influential academic works within the constructivist wave in International Relations: that is Alexander Wendt's "*Social Theory of International Politics*"⁸. The rationale for this choice is mainly methodological, because Wendt recognizes the excessive breadth of the constructivist approach in itself, embracing societies and individuals altogether, and decided to narrow it to a state-centered perspective, in order to assess a 'structural idealist' approach of international relations able, to recognize as well the value of the ideational aspects, which mostly affect states' identity and behavior in the international system⁹.

Thus, the relevant three points which will be developed in the following paragraphs are that Wendt's constructivism

- still presupposes States as the main (even if not only) actors in the International system;
- their behavior is mostly affected by interests and ideas, which, however, are not absolutely decisive,¹⁰
- since the Culture, the social context they operate in, influences as well their actions.

His state-centered approach is not to be considered as a normative preference, i.e. states should be regarded as the only existing and legitimate actors in the international system. It acknowledges them a primacy for authority and capability of action. Nonetheless, this assumption raises a delicate theoretical

⁷ Ibid, pp. 10-11.

⁸ Wendt, 1999.

⁹ Ibid, see Chap. 1 "Four sociologies of International Politics".

¹⁰ Faithful to the 'scientific realist' approach (see ibid, chap. 2 "Scientific realism and social kinds") material aspects such as geography and resources maintain their importance, though it is the relation with the contemporary context and the function we give them what actually makes them relevant in the international system.

question: how to justify the state as a unitary actor? What nowadays we experience of the state is a constellation of different institutions and bureaucracies, and the simple decision-making of a political leader is not exhaustive in describing the complexity of the State's action. Wendt tries to resolve this challenge by an approximation: as a social system like a society is composed by people, also the international system can be considered as composed by states as "international persons". This could be partly reduced to mere anthropomorphism, but it would not entail the actual existence of the state.¹¹ It is actually a deeper question which is entwined with Wendt's scientific realist point of view¹², and examines the idea of the State in its essential attributes.

1.2 The problem of State Personhood: Wendt's holistic approach

The question of the state as main object of analysis is an issue sprung from the development of the theory of International Relations and the widening of its research range to international organizations and institutions (e.g. neo-liberalism). Nevertheless, the doctrinal approach of the discipline of International Relations has been since the beginning limited to the state and states systems as the only actors able to regulate *organized violence* (i.e. war): original and main concern of international politics¹³.

The principal argument against the concept of the state as a decisive unitary actor in international politics, common to neo-liberal and postmodernist hardliners, comes principally from the fact that it is a mere organization of individuals and therefore a 'theoretical construct', which once deconstructed will prove its ontological inconsistency, its reduction to metaphors.¹⁴ This line of reasoning is very powerful indeed, it challenges the attribute of personhood of the state, essential aspect in international law, and, as described shortly below, it goes together with the language we use.

Yet, exactly when talking about social agents, it seems quite evident a common confusion about the meaning of two most used referring terms: *individual* and *person*, often considered as synonymous. The word *individual* (lat. *in-dividuus*) has the original meaning of "indivisible", referring to an element which further decomposed loses its characteristics, meanwhile *person*, very close to the English 'perso-

¹¹ Ibid, pp. 194-195. This is an apprehension common to diplomacy and the development of international law in general, and for this reason will also suits to our further investigation for the current international anxiety for the changing conditions of the Arctic.

¹² An approach which, reasserting the existence of material reality, it concedes also the existence of unobservable entities, whenever they have real effects; such can be the so-called social kinds. See Ibid, pp.60-64 and 67-77.

¹³ Wendt, 1999, p. 193.

¹⁴ Ibid, p.196. See also Wendt, 2004; pp. 289-90.

na', comes from the Latin word *persōna* meaning 'mask/actor', therefore an individual performing a role, emphasizing its 'social' aspect within a certain scenario or situation¹⁵.

1.2.1 Characteristics of a person

In these different connotations, is in my opinion to be read Wendt's analysis of state personhood, when he describes the internal and external determinants of personhood: its internal aspect is the 'individuality', the bodily/material composition which endows the object with certain qualities, meanwhile the external one is personhood commonly understood, its ideal/societal aspect, and for this reason always defined by social convention.¹⁶ His reasoning continues by pointing the three qualities of a person which are taken from Andrew Vincent's essay "Are group persons"¹⁷: *psychological*, possessing certain mental or cognitive attribute, *legal*, having rights and obligations in a community of law, and *moral*, accountable for actions under a moral code. The latter two are indeed intrinsically social, meanwhile the former, analyzing the more individual, contingently fluid and mixed features of persons, borders the realm of 'personality', which we will consider here fundamentally different from personhood¹⁸.

Affirming these distinctions, it is easier to justify the choice of later narrowing the dissertation to the legal/moral aspects of the state-as-person, namely because they are the features which followed the debate on the rationalization of the concept of state and its centralization, through its emergence during the 17th and 18th centuries of the modern era (though also the psychological aspects will be quickly treated in paragraphs 1.2.2 and 1.2.3). Moreover, analyzing historically the evolution of the modern state, we may noticed that all Vincent's three aspects of a "person" phenomenologically appeared in treaties and discussions of the time, though in the opposite order than presented originally in his essay, from the legal to the psychological one.

¹⁵ See Online Etymological Dictionary, entries "*person*" and "*individual*".

¹⁶ Wendt 2004, p. 293. Following the same reasoning it is questionable the assumption of the existence of persons "by nature": to be a 'person' there must be another subject watching at you as a 'person', with determined traits and expectations, otherwise it is an individual.

¹⁷ The same essay is often mentioned also as counter-argument to Wendt's Personhood of the State. I was not able to retrieve a copy of the volume of the journal *Review of Metaphysics*, where it is originally published, so at this point when citing his work, I refer to both its quotations in Wendt 2004, pp. 294-95; and Wight, 2006, pp. 193-4.

¹⁸ Mixed for the concurrence of internal and external factors which intrinsically determine each personality; *ibid*, p. 294. As Personality I understand the more psychological "*various aspects of a person, that combine to make them different from other people*", Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary.

In fact, the *legal* aspect of a person, the “*power and capacity of legal action and being a subject of duties and rights*”¹⁹ is perhaps the first modern social manifestation of the state as such, aspect codified in the Peace Treaties of Westphalia and reiterated in all the future international treaties; This attribution permitted the states to become basically the only referent for territorial and warfare issues.

The *moral/ethical* aspect, “*the capacity for rationality and responsibilities, or the ability to determine one’s own action by moral category*”²⁰ derived from the almost simultaneous philosophical debate of the decades encircling the Westphalia treaties on absolutism and the centralization of the political power in the hands of the European sovereigns’ power, relocating the concept of authority from universal institutions into the forming national states (to sovereigns first and later to governments and bureaucracy). Influential political philosophers and legal scholars (such as Hobbes, Grotius, Pufendorf to name some) indeed developed from each conception on the nature of humans and law different justifications on the existence of the state as social and political overarching organization and its drives or motivations in relation with other equals.

The *psychological* aspect, instead, is defined as (1) *the power and capability of self-consciousness*, (2) *the ability to form and perform intention*, (3) *the ability to determine a behavior on one’s own interests*, (4) *the capacity of unified and continuous reasoning and volition*.²¹ It is the most recent and less explored field of state’s personhood; it borders with identity and revealed to be a complex matter as every human being’s psychology. Our argument here is that the points 2, 3 and 4 can be found by deduction from the previous legal and moral aspects of the state, and are explained extensively by Wendt discussing the state corporate identity (see 2.2.3). The first point, however, remains the most mysterious in any discipline and still evades a clear definition. Yet, without entering that what could be an endless debate on the nature of consciousness, some interesting insight can be pondered reading Wendt’s later contribution “*Social Science as Cartesian Science: an auto-critique from a quantum perspective*”, with quantum and systems theories’ concept of *emergence*²², or exploring the thought of the externalist current in the field of the philosophy of mind, where consciousness itself is considered as a relational phenomenon²³, where consciousness could be regarded as the result of an “in-process” of relations bet-

¹⁹ See note 17.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Wendt, 2006, in Guzzini and Leander, *Constructivism and international relations*. See also Wendt, 2004, pp. 302-5; and paragraph 1.3.3 ‘Beyond Reductionism and Holism’.

²³ see also Alva Noë 2006, p. 412. “*Consciousness could be considered as a dance: is not to be found only in the muscle of the dancer, but also in the mind, in the music, in the partner ...*”.

ween specific conditions/formations/representations/schemas which make possible an identification with some of the process' material and ideational aspects.

Moreover, there is another relational aspect of personhood, implied especially on the international legal level, which is usually reduced to the mere concept of *recognition*: all the narratives created in the name of the state and constitute its historical self and memory are as internally determined, so also externally influenced. The reductionists' argument usually is limited to the internal aspect: the state is formed by rational individual human beings, exclusively entitled for intentional action, and therefore only they can be ontologically real subject; the state is only a metaphor. As it will debate later below, personhood is also defined by external factors and actors, fact that confers it more features than just the sum of its components, even though only by reflection.

Thus, leaving the legal aspect of the state personhood for later inquiring, we will examine in more depth its moral and psychological aspect with Wendt's concept of corporate identity, after a short definition of what Wendt considers the material "body" of modern state, the "essential state".

1.2.2 Wendt's justification of the State as unitary actor: the "essential state"

Wendt dealt with the question of state in the Chapter 5 of the *Social Theory* where it could be easier to understand his conceptualization of the 'essential' state as the individual, minimal and indivisible unit of analysis; the 'body' spoiled by all its contingent forms.

The definition of such essential state springs from three different sociological traditions: Weberian, Marxist and Liberal one, which respectively cover the state from its being independent from society, to an intermediate structure, to its complete identity with society. These are regrouped in Wendt's definition into five properties:

An institutional legal order; attribute of Marxist origin. This is the intermediate structure composed by institutions, law and regulations, that create the State-society complex.

The monopoly of legitimate use or organized violence; from the Weberian conception of the state, where for various reasons, usually moral, the state only possesses the legitimacy for the use of organized violence (i.e. Police and Army) in order to compel its society or other states toward specific goals.

Sovereignty; also a characteristic of Weberian origin, where the state is held as the supreme social authority, unfolding both internally and externally. Important point here is the localization of the supreme authority within an organizational structure “*invested with the internally non-rival unified authority*“. Wendt’s calls it the ‘empirical sovereignty’ especially in regards to the external sovereignty.

Society; pluralist attribute, commonly described as the people who both form and conform to the state. To define it is quite an arduous task for the fluidity of its various aspects (shared knowledge and boundaries; causal, bottom-up and top-down factors).

Territory; this is the feature on which most of our inquiry will concentrate upon. Firstly it is noteworthy that, reiterated also by Wendt²⁴, this characteristic is equally shared by all the previous three approaches. Indeed modern states first distinctive trait is that they are territorial: their authority is unlimitedly exercised over a delimited area. This distinguishes them from other past and present international subjects, as empires, churches or firms. However, he states that ‘territoriality stands for the state as spatial extension does for people’²⁵, as an external and natural quality, that questioned and scrutinized too deeply it would make loose the scope of analysis: the state essential properties. Beside the fact that at this point, he is clearly confusing territoriality (that is the relational aspect of the state towards the territory itself) with territory, nevertheless, he later affirms that there are important constitutive and causal aspects to be kept in mind while analyzing this aspect, such as how territories are ‘located’ and how they gain their meaning; issues that will be extensively treated in the next chapters²⁶.

Therefore, after this quick analytical listing of the characteristics of the essential state we reach a definition that is:

*“... an organizational actor embedded in an institutional-legal order that constitutes it with sovereignty and a monopoly on the legitimate use of organized violence over a society in a territory.”*²⁷

One of the main argument in the following chapters of this thesis, however, will exactly be that, by examining the evolution of territory and territoriality within the international system, the essential state

²⁴ Wendt, 1999, p. 202.

²⁵ Ibid, p. 211.

²⁶ Ibid, see also paragraph 2.2.1 for the ‘grounding’ of territory, its terrestrial origins. 3.1. for the etymology and meanings of the term.

²⁷ Wendt 2004, p. 213.

cannot be an exhaustive transhistorical model ‘of behavior’ as Wendt affirms²⁸, for their changing constitutional and causal aspect: only an historically and contextually grounded analysis could attempt some explanation, especially in regards of the contemporary scenario of the Arctic.

1.2.3 Wendt’s justification of the State as unitary actor: the “corporate agent”

It is in the second part of chapter 5 of the *Social Theory* that Wendt undertakes the explanation of the State as a coherent ‘corporate agent’, a “*structure of shared knowledge, or discourse which enables individuals to engage in institutionalized collective action*”²⁹. His stance here is particularly strong: by stating “States are people too” he assumes the states possess of the capacity of intentionality and responsibility³⁰. These capabilities, essential factors for agency are three. Firstly, the idea of person, or in this instance, a **group-self**, which articulates as a narrative, discursive and intellectual history; it is a social belief to which individual human beings accept or recognize the obligation to act jointly on its behalf³¹. The peculiar feature is that even those who do not submit to such obligation, eventually have to recognize that others do, thus implicitly recognizing the belief’s existence and effects. It is a relational characteristic. Secondly, there is a defined **internal decisional structure**, the process through which a common shared decision is reached and as affecting the whole group. Thirdly, **clear rules of authorized actions** permit the attribution of those acts to the group-self, essential for responsibility.³² These aspects clearly coincide with Vincent’s qualities of ‘psychological person’ described briefly above: the group-self as expression of group-consciousness (1.) and the internal decisional structure with rules of authorized action creates the conditions for unified and continuous reasoning and volition and to some extent the ability for determined behavior (4. and 3.). Only one point remains so far unclear: how the group-self is able to form and perform intentions (2.). It is a point of extreme importance for our research, because stating the state is not able to have intentions like in later critiques, is to deny its agency and possibility to even theoretically produce any strategy paper. Wendt deals with this issue in his first chapters when he discusses scientific realism as his main approach.

²⁸ Ibid, p. 214. The essential state is the sociological description of the modern state ‘body’, and it works as far as such ‘organizational actor’ is existing. See for example paragraph 3.4 ‘Alternative Geographies’ and the comparison with Imperial China.

²⁹ Ibid, p. 215.

³⁰ Wendt, 1999, p. 197.

³¹ Ibid, p. 218.

³² Ibid, pp. 219-20.

Where then does intention come into play? Intentions are defined as the “*agent’s specific purpose in performing an action or series of acts*” or, according to G. E. M. Anscombe, “*acting under a representation*”³³, therefore an appropriate explanatory relation between a belief and an action. This brings us to the concept of intentionality which is “*the power of minds to be about, to represent, or to stand for things properties and state of affairs*”³⁴. It will be discussed later in the last paragraphs whether is it right to assume the state having ‘a mind of its own’; nevertheless the ideational aspect of intentions (or desires, or interests), comes clearly to the fore. They are a specific kind of conception: the view *for* something; while beliefs are views *about* the world.

Traditionally, in the discipline of International Relations there is no doubt that states have interests, yet approaches on their nature and causation differ. As summed up by Wendt in chapter 2 of the Social Theory, the mainstream approach, Rational Choice Theory defines intentionality in a simple equation:

$$\text{Desire} + \text{Belief} = \text{Action}$$

It is, therefore, the particular supposed need for something that, mediated by a general view of the World, which consequently sets the conditions for the action: Desire is not a separated entity from the other Beliefs, as the simplistic equation would seem to imply, but all evidences in social sciences point to the fact that is mostly the former that constitutes the latter. The insight comes from social anthropology which puts the basis for a Cognitive Theory of Desire, where “*motivations, desires or interests should be seen as “schemas” (or “scripts”, “frames”, or “representations”) which are knowledge structures that “make possible the identification of object or events*”³⁵.

The belief of belonging to a specific group-self of the state then forms its identity, embodied in the state complex and institutions that are endorsed with the authority of action. The interests, the drives which such identity implies, refer then either to the reproduction requirements of this identity (objective interests) that collapses if not achieved, or more closely related to the founding belief of identity, which reinforce its secondary aspects. Wendt recognizes therefore 4 main identities: corporate identity (overlapping with the above-mentioned group-self), type, role and collective identities. At this point,

³³ Both the quotations come from Setiya, Kieran, “Intention”, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)

³⁴ Jacob, Pierre, “Intentionality”, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2010 Edition).

³⁵ De Andrade in Wendt 1999, p. 122. Though, this relation Desire/Belief is observed in human individuals, nevertheless the cultural aspect influences not the individuals alone, but also their associations in what Wendt calls the ‘group-selves’.

we will not further expand the conception of these last three identities, which are mostly relational³⁶. An important aspect here is however to be remembered: these identities are used as analytical categories, but they remain first and foremost *beliefs*. The relevant argument here is that, while the last three identities are basically multiple and inter-relational, that vary from state to state, the personal identity is an essentially internal belief, intrinsic to the concept of the modern state and it is constituted by the shared ideas, the Culture of the International system.³⁷

It follows logically that the interests linked to this specific identity are universal and common to all states and to some extent coincide with what are traditionally called “national” or objective interests, the requirements for the reproduction of the corporate identity. Wendt identifies four of them: physical survival, autonomy, economic wellbeing and collective self-esteem³⁸. The first three, already listed by Weber, can be related to the five properties of the essential state (see above 1.2.2): physical survival with territory and institutional legal order; autonomy with sovereignty and the monopoly of organized force; economic wellbeing with society³⁹. The fourth, collective self-esteem, is introduced by Wendt and comprises personal identity with all the other three relational identities, role in particular, and thus related to more subjective interests.

One of the main arguments of this research will be that these principles are indeed common among all the states; however, they are not absolutely universal or unrelated to the international system, or even preceding it, as Wendt maintains. Before the creation of the international system with the treaty of Westphalia (1648), there was no entity clearly presenting all the characteristics listed in the essential state. As we will explain shortly in the next chapters, they are the result of modernity and the aspect of international relations happening on a different level than domestic policy, as we understand it today, formed simultaneously together with the assertion of the modern states as territorial delimited entities.

³⁶ Type identity is related to the regime of a state; role to the social position of the state in the international environment *vis à vis* the other states; collective identity is the grade of ‘solidarity’ with the latter.

³⁷ Ibid, p. 125. Wendt later categorizes such Cultures into three labels, Hobbesian, Lockian or Kantian, according to the degree of internalization of the Other within the system. However, we will later consider this concept of ‘International Culture’ in a very broad sense, in order to grasp perhaps the more subtle structure of the international system expressed through the international legal system.

³⁸ Ibid, pp. 235-38.

³⁹ Here society could be understood as the group considered as participating in the political process: with democracy the overlapping is usually coherent, though in autocratic regimes, in spite of the fact that their rhetoric stresses the wellbeing of all the people, it is most of the times restricted to the leading elites.

1.3 Critiques to the concept of State-person: pluralist and pragmatic approaches, and a possible synthesis

The question of state agency as a coherent entity is a powerful and contested theoretical issue. It implies a series of logical backfires, such as reductionism and structuralism. This paragraph will deal in particular with two critiques exposed in the *Journal Review of International Studies* in 2004,⁴⁰ which reported an extensive academic discussion on Wendt's assumption of State-personhood. These critical assessments hit two of the basic postulations of state's corporate agency: Wight's pluralist approach, which challenges the coherence itself of the corporate agency, and Franke and Roos' pragmatic ontological model, which disputes its capability of intentionality.

1.3.1 Pluralist approach's critiques

The liberal/pluralist approach in international relation developed as a reaction to the neo-realist structural realism with Waltz as its most famous exponent, and diverted the focus of analysis from the constraints of the international system to the important capacities individual human beings and institutions. Colin Wight, belonging clearly to this school of thought, cannot theoretically allow that the state, as a collective of individual human beings, could be thinking or reasoning in such a self-aware manner⁴¹. Colin argues that states, though being agents, they are mainly institutional structures, constructed by human beings, who ultimately have the responsibility of social action. In his opinion Wendt's move of coagulating the state over the "idea of corporate being" is once again a reductionist view which forgets those individuals who do not identify with such idea. Moreover, Wendt's attempts of showing of group intentionality springs from the structured interaction of individual human beings, do not leave any conceptual room for a conscious human agency, being thus completely constrained by the structure, the idea of state, and therefore missing an important part of causal power expressed in state policies. The state can cross the 'ontological wall' only on the back of individuals⁴².

Wight's critique of the reductionism of the state as a single group and thus the relinquishment of those who do not accept it is a critical and important assumption which, however, does not refute the existence of the very same idea of state. Anarchists oppose to the state as structure of power, yet, nevertheless, have to confront with it and with the people adhering to it. Moreover, as we discussed above, state personhood is not only internally composed, but also relational and externally perceived on the internatio-

⁴⁰ Review of International Studies, Vol. 30, No 2; 2004.

⁴¹ "[E]ven if it is the individuals acting within the agreed idea of state, how can be the state thinking?" Wight 2006, p. 183.

⁴² Wight 2004, p. 279.

nal level by other people and states, as real. It might be that the legal fiction of state personhood triggered the widespread personification of the idea of state. Nevertheless, by habits and customs, this idea has become a belief far more complex and enduring than scholars would assume: it is easy to realize its existence and look behind the mask, but the others will still see ‘us’, either people or individuals (e.g. the Italian people or the Italian Prime Minister), belonging to it in each situation may occur. Thus, considering state personhood as the mask of the interactional play, it should not be of much of a bother the material by which is made of, it is real as far as it is recognized as having real effects in the play. The objective difficulty in such approach is that there is no external viewer: in different degrees everyone is actor and audience at the same time. The discrepancy between international and national level is indeed apparent exactly because, since their very establishment, only states have been assigned this specific role and no individual human beings, who in the end could represent or symbolize the state⁴³.

1.3.2 Pragmatic approach’s critiques and insight

As it is one of the main assumptions of this research, the state is much more of a mere social structure: it is an aggregate of specific conditions, social, geographical, functional and ideal ones; it is the process itself of the interaction of all these factors. The insight of the state as a process, a ‘third way’ between the strict reality of state’s personhood and Wight’s reductionism is the pragmatist⁴⁴ ontological approach of Franke and Roos as presented in their essay “*Actor, Structure, Process: Transcending the state personhood debate*”⁴⁵. It is a good working model which extends substantial coherence not only to states but also other social phenomena such as non-governmental, international or supranational organizations. Even though we will claim shortly below that the only weak point such model are the initial assumed preconditions, their exposition have inspirational aspects. Therefore, their reasoning will be firstly reported and then argued.

Starting from the state personhood debate of Wendt and Wight’s, a solution is given by Franke and Roos defining such social organizations ‘structures of corporate practices’, where people, in order to overcome problems otherwise impossible for individuals, created rules of actions for that purpose; “[they are] the totality of the rules made to work on a specific problem is the structure of corporate

⁴³ Though, also this historical cleavage seems to be slowly overcome by the recognition of universal human rights and crimes against humanity.

⁴⁴ With pragmatism, we define here the so-called Classic Pragmatism philosophical current, developed mainly in late 19th century United States, whose most influential exponents are Charles S. Pierce, William James and John Dewey.

⁴⁵ Franke and Roos, 2004.

practices”, where human actors are located in structured positions.⁴⁶ Later in their demonstration of the characteristics of such structures, conceived as spaces of (im-)possibilities, ‘rules for action’ are the constitutive properties that define: the problem to be solved and others structures; the configuration of the position of the human actors in the structure and respective relations; and the potential for action. Beliefs are reduced to solely the “*rules of action that guide an actor’s concrete action*”⁴⁷. Moreover, agency is also restricted to human beings only, as the only sentient nodes of the structure. This because, according to the classical pragmatic concept of agency, *corporeality* (or the reactive physicality of the agent, its corporal strivings and basic beliefs), *reflexivity* (or the competence to reflect on one-self) and the *aptitude for abduction* (or the ability to reach new beliefs by revising the rules of action), are exclusive properties of the human beings⁴⁸.

Finally in the last part of their essay, Franke and Roos present processes as the interrelation between actors and structures that changes their respective characteristics in time.⁴⁹ Analyzing then the driving forces influencing such processes, comes the synthesis of the pragmatic agency’s characteristics into a concrete model of causality (the Aristotle-Kurki synthesis as they put it, though it is not matter of discussion here)⁵⁰. However, immediately later there is one feature that, if changed, let all Franke and Roos’ argument turn on our reasoning’s advantage: the question of agency. Franke and Roos’ accepted since the beginning that agency is only human, and therefore it is “[g]iven that states – understood as structures – do not exhibit these qualities”⁵¹. Then, the further reasoning explained with the quotation of George H. Mead, that the self is divided into two separated stages the ‘I’ and the ‘me’ (read also ‘person’) and that the self “*is essentially a social process going on with these two distinguished phases*”⁵². Yet, what if the state is capable of a group-self and of intentionality, precursor quality of agency, as Wendt described in the previous paragraphs?

The two major arguments against Franke and Roos’ preconditions of their essay are thus two. Firstly the concept of actor/agency, which they asserted as their initial precondition, that pertains exclusively to the human beings. Considering instead the fact that the state is identified as group-self, suddenly also the pragmatic characteristics of agency suit also the group-self: ‘reflexivity’ and ‘aptitude for abduc-

⁴⁶ Ibid, p. 1066.

⁴⁷ Ibid, p. 1068.

⁴⁸ Ibid, pp. 1069-70.

⁴⁹ Ibid, p. 1071.

⁵⁰ Ibid, p. 1072.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Mead, *MindSelf and Society* quoted in Franke and Roos 2004, p.1072.

tion' has happened and one example is brought by Wendt in the Social Theory, when he analyzed the case of USSR and the change of policy of the new "New Thinking"⁵³; corporeality is then again a complex arguable aspect on the degree of internalization individual beings feels it which, however, recalls rather closely Wendt's essential state and consequently the "national interests" (indeed he defined it as the 'body' of the state).

Secondly, the fact that the state is considered as the mere sum and structure of people and rules of action, a definition that would work for a social organization in its initial stages, yet cannot grasp the complexity of the ideational range it reaches when the social organization becomes a dynamic self-organizing system, dependent yet autonomous from the initial conditions of its establishment. This complexity connects the identity of the state and many more aspects than just people or rules of conduct: it invests also material aspect such as buildings, means of transports, arms and land (how then could not still be nowadays a supreme offence for a nation to have an official building damage or a ship sunk. So far reaches the symbolism of the 'flag', so to speak). It is time, belief and habit which transform these otherwise unrelated objects in properties of the state, which is then usually reified, yet none of these properties alone, ideational or material, people or belief, can be defined as essential, because what make the state *real* is indeed the process of interaction of all these conditions and the internalized belief in its existence.

1.3.3 Beyond Reductionism and Holism: Complexity and the approach of Synergetics⁵⁴

A possible synthesis can be ventured at this point of our reasoning introducing some concept that has usually been utilized for mathematical modeling in diverse discipline from statistics to economics: complexity and complex systems. Although its empirico-positivistic origins, the concept of complexity has also relevant philosophical value especially, when dealing with philosophy of science, and this will be the approach of the next paragraphs: to outline the characteristics of complex systems and their frequency in social phenomena such as society and other associative grouping. So far, the state has been defined with some of the characteristics that are typical of complex systems, like self-organizing wholes, often not responding to linear causality. Yet, what is complexity? Roughly, "*systems with nume-*

⁵³ Wendt 1999, p. 76. When the Soviet apparatus realized that an aggressive attitude towards the West fed a constant hostility and military expenses. The more conciliatory course of the late 1980s brought to the end of the suspect and mistrust of the Cold War. However, though these moments of 'reflexivity' are possible, cannot occur too often otherwise mostly theory would influence reality (ibid, p. 77).

⁵⁴ The title of this paragraph is partly taken from the book of the proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the International Academy of Science 2001, Agazzi and Montecucco, 2002, and B. Kanitscheider's essay on synergetics, Ibid., pp. 39-44.

rous components capable of structured interactions that generate emergent phenomena [i.e. not reducible to any single components, but exactly emerging from their mutual interaction] may be called complex”⁵⁵.

To explain better this social reality of social process as a ‘whole’, and therefore a complex system, we could present an analogy which has even ancient precursors⁵⁶. Imagine a car. What is that makes it a car? If one dismantles it into pieces one will have the engine, the wheels, the steer, breaks, seats (even the driver) and so forth; yet even if we could define them as the car’s parts no-one of them actually represents the ‘car as such’. However, this is not to deny the existence of ‘car’ (especially when it actually brings you somewhere, or could hit you in a crossroad), but that the identity of the car is a not an independent entity, completely quantifiable or definable without considering all the internal relations and interactions that belong to the whole ‘car’ (one of the most decisive being indeed human beings, with their uses, modes of construction and meaning of cars).

Similarly at the social level, the state possesses an identity, a whole, as an emergent phenomenon that is not reducible to any of its material and ideational parts, a fact that does not however weaken its reality. One of the approaches lately used in order to complement social processes with complexity is the theory model of synergetics. Initially developed by the physicist Hermann Haken from the observation of the behavior of gas particles emitting laser light, with its three concepts of parameter of order, enslaving principle and circular causality, has more a new perspective about self-organizing social systems, especially in language and communication.⁵⁷ Circular causality is here the most important cha-

⁵⁵ “Complexity” entry in Scholarpedia. Or following the more semantic definition of Evandro Agazzi, which does not stress emergence:

“complex is a compound in which the relations among its constituents are significant, since they make this compound a whole endowed with identity and evincing analytical complexity” [Emphases in the text.]

Compound is to be considered here as a plurality of components, yet with no sensible structure. Analytical complexity means here exactly that is the multitude and structure of the internal relations that characterize the whole. Its relative synthetic simplicity instead (i.e. considering the compound as a whole limits its external relations) can be expressed in primitive predicates, composing it in a *unity*, which is however different from *uniqueness*. See Agazzi in Agazzi and Montecucco 2002, pp. 7-11.

⁵⁶ The first recorded is the speech of monk Nagasena to King Menander of the Bactrian Kingdom, where he argues with the king the existence of a self by presenting the very similar analogy of a chariot. Yet, without going as far as into psychological self’s definition, the point is once again there is no thing as an *independent* self, but the self is a relational quality of social complex systems. This analogy well explains the usual identification reification we apply with mental representations. See Rupert Gethin, 1998, p. 139.

⁵⁷ See Kanitscheider in Agazzi and Montecucco, 2002, p. 39-43; Parameter of order is the amplitudes of unstable modes determining the macroscopic pattern; the enslaving principle is then connected with the circular causality in the way that the components of the system influence and are equally influenced by the macroscopic variable: in our case either the state and its society, or on a higher level the predominant international culture toward the states.

racteristic, since it is the quality of social phenomena that has been ascertained in various way, in our field often under the name of interdependence where, in more deterministic wording “[t]he elements of the system generate their own organizers, and these variables react on the parts determining their behavior by forcing them into specific modes”⁵⁸. This applies both to the states as unitary social organizations and to their international interaction into a shared culture, which, as discussed below, we will argue to be slightly wider and at the same time stricter than Wendt’s specific description.

1.4 The States’ International Culture

The definition of ‘culture’ itself has been problematic since the first times it was utilized in the 18th and 19th century. However, for analytical simplicity we will start with the broader definition of the anthropologist Edward Brunette Tylor:

*“Culture or civilization, taken in its wide anthropological sense, it is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of a society”.*⁵⁹

What is relevant here is not much who or what actually acquires the complex whole of capabilities (nowadays, there is no major argument against the fact that also animals have their own cultures which are transmitted through learning and repetition; in the case of the undergoing dissertation, it would be enough to switch ‘man’ with ‘person’), but the fact that the component is part of a society, which presupposes an integrated and interactive group of individuals, and no IR scholar would deny the similarities between the behavioral patterns of states and some of the ones of people in society (even without going as far as the English School that theorizes such society). Restricting even more the range of the previous definition of ‘Culture’, Ruth Benedict described it as *“the sociological term for learned behaviour [sic]”*⁶⁰, which points straight to the causal aspects. Such patterns adapt well to D’Andrade’s cultural schemas described also as representations of prototypical events.⁶¹ Yet, it is important, especially considering a relatively short time lapse that culture has also constitutive aspects: such shared ideas or rules cannot be just consider cumulatively as “culture” because a simple summation would not explain its continuity over time, change in content or turnover in people sustaining those ideas. Such continuity and resilience to sudden changes supervene with the occurring of the socialization and inter-

⁵⁸ Kantischeider in Agassi 2002, p. 41.

⁵⁹ E.B. Tylor 1871, *Primitive Culture*, I 1; quoted in the *Encyclopedia of Social and Cultural Anthropology*, 1996, p. 137. Entry ‘Culture’.

⁶⁰ Ruth Benedict, 1943, *Race and Racism*, pp. 9-10; quoted in the *Encyclopedia of Social and Cultural Anthropology*, 1996, p. 139. Entry ‘Culture’.

⁶¹ Ibid. p. 145. Entry ‘Culture and personality’.

nalization of social norms,⁶² in a pattern of circular causality where individuals are shaped by culture through learning and simultaneously interpret culture by performing actions and rituals.

At this point returning to Wendt's definition of culture, stated in several places in the *Social Theory*, he describes it in its widest sense as 'shared knowledge', extrapolating common and collective shared knowledge in their respectively causal and constitutive aspects.⁶³ Yet a couple of sentences strikes for their appropriateness in describing such interconnection between social agents and structure "*There are no structure without agents, and no agents (except in the biological sense) without structures. Social processes are always structured, and social structures in process*"⁶⁴. Later on, when dealing with the "three cultures of anarchy" (Chapter 6 of the *Social Theory*) he states rather strongly that the structure of the International System is its "culture", conceding that, however, it does not cover the whole reality of its social structure. It is a statement, which is the basis of the following chapter of the dissertation. However, it is slightly puzzling at the same time that he then shrinks this characterization into culture as 'the knowledge or understandings shared by the states on the use of violence' (i.e. war); which is actually a description that echoes many of the first approaches of international studies of the international system, such as international law, diplomacy or the early theories of the discipline of international relations as well.⁶⁵ Yet, by describing the roles and different approaches states enact in their interactions, each pulled by different conceptions of the Other, seems more to be related to the behavioral, and therefore casual, aspects of culture which does not tell much on how the structure works as a whole, but as in the different modes of behavior or schemas. Our point here is that, conceded that Wendt explained very well some of the dynamics that structurally influence states behavior and positioning, there is a deeper and unitary level of culture, the states 'Culture', that defines their basic form and accepted modes of interaction.

My point is that in a centuries long process of socialization among the forming modern states, the Culture that emerged, and is consistent with the initial and most general concept of Tylor's, is a uniform International Legal System (see 2.1 for definition). It was not immediate, nor uncontested, yet it is possible to speak today of a homogenized system that has spread all over the planet, and equalized and in-

⁶² "[... T. Parson] views social actors as acting according to roles that define—through internalization and socialization—their self-identities and behaviors." Bicchieri, Cristina and Muldoon, Ryan, "Social Norms", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2011 Edition). Socialization is broadly speaking the adaptation also through learning of an individual to other's social expectations; internalization concerns the individual's worldview, role and possibly self-identity.

⁶³ Wendt 1999, pp. 159-61 for common shared knowledge; pp.161-164 for collective shared knowledge.

⁶⁴ Ibid. p. 186.

⁶⁵ See for example Cassese and Lowe for international law; Berridge for diplomacy.

tegrated all previous kind of human organizations that presented some of sovereignty's characteristics, into the legitimate agent's status of 'states'. Without going too far into any legalistic or normative assumption, neither 'linguistic turn': we are talking here about the general "rules of the social game", states come to agree to and play accordingly, where all the social aspects, masks and roles are implemented, each one then following their own strategies influenced by previous conditionings.⁶⁶

Such rules started as practices, custom and habits, often in form of rituals, that regulated the first contacts, the steadiness and reliability of communication between governing entities (e.g. inviolability of envoys), and example of written treaties goes back to Mesopotamic kingdoms. However, the novelty that brought the 16th century and the Westphalian treaties as an historical watershed is the crystallization into formally independent and territorially defined units⁶⁷. This system was indeed originally limited to Europe, yet, as we will see in the following chapter, it expanded over the centuries becoming the only one internationally accepted, with all its contradictions and paradoxes.

⁶⁶ As Wendt tries to explain the international structure through logics of anarchy (his famous essay '*Anarchy is what the States make of it*') my scope here is to explain it as stemming more subtly from a legal-cartographic reasoning, the topic of the next two chapters.

⁶⁷ See paragraph 2.1 as an example the definition of state.

CHAPTER 2 – The International Legal System and its geographical expression

In this chapter, will be analyzed what is here considered the subtler Culture of the international system: the International Legal System that nowadays has covered all-over the planet. Initially, it will be described in an asynchronic ‘snapshot’, i.e. the current situation with its constitutional and behavioral effects on the states (in particular following the ‘legal realist’ approach of the jurist Antonio Cassese) and later its parallel historical development and, more importantly, its geographical dimension described in Carl Schmitt’s work *The Nomos of the Earth*. The importance of Schmitt’s analysis, despite any ideological or cosmological divergence, is that it was the first linking, so openly the geographic dimension and ordering of human societies and the link with the customs and habits that later codified into the current International Legal System.

Moreover, Schmitt’s influence extended into the discipline of international relations in two significant ways, firstly influencing more or less openly one of the traditional exponents of the dominant realist school of thought, Hans Morgenthau, and secondly for a rediscovery of his works with their translation into English in the end of the 1990s. This revived interest, combined with an international scenario in the beginning of the 2000s that seemed posing again the “state of exception” as the fundamental political characteristic (terrorist attacks of September 2011, US invasion of Iraq). Nonetheless, keeping in mind all the relevant criticism on Schmitt’s work, we will accept his insight of the spatial dimension and ordering of the states, with some comment that we believe useful updates on the contemporary circumstances of the international system.

Lastly, through the insights of Stuart Elden’s essay “*Land, Terrain, Territory*”, it will be disclosed the fact that a fruitful analytical approach of territory could be to eventually consider it as a *political technology*, developed historically in the last centuries as a result of technical and legal practices that enhanced a more pervasive control and management of the earth. Namely the legal aspects are the main topic of this chapter, while the technical ones will be developed in the next.

2.1 The International Legal System as the international Culture

With International Legal System I refer here to the framework of the international norms, written and unwritten (including therefore also custom and protocol) that defines who/what acts on the international scene (i.e. primarily the states) and, as Kegley points out, for the norms’ “deontological content”, also what they are permitted and expected to do, thanks to the collective, and thus social, consensus on

proper conduct and consequent sanctions on deviations¹. Moreover, he continues underlining, that such norms are not only modal regularities reinforced by diplomatic rituals, but they are “*intersubjectively shared understandings which, when formed, communicate this consensus about the obligations of international actors to behave in a specific way*”². Defined in these terms, it is thus the Culture where the international agents act.

However, besides these behavioral aspects, there is hidden also the constitutive factor: such norms define as well what is to be considered an ‘international person’. After centuries of conventional understanding, the definition of state found expression in the 1933 Convention of Montevideo on *Rights and Duties of the States*, the first attempt to codify the customary law regarding the nature of states. Despite the controversy on the effects of the ‘recognition’ (see below), it is nowadays general jurisprudence to identify these main characteristics: 1) a residing population; 2) defined territory; 3) an effective structure of authority.³ Interestingly enough these three elements resume four⁴ of the five qualities of the more sociological “Essential State” of Wendt, and a defined territory is always present. *Sovereignty* is not stated here because it is generally considered as a founding principle of the international community which generates each state’s equality in right, not from their power, “*but upon the simple fact of its existence as a person under international law*”.⁵ Yet, it is exactly this principle of absolute sovereignty within one state’s jurisdiction and territory that work as a “ordering principle” sharply delimiting each one from the others and at the same time poses them on a horizontal and equal level among each other. Moreover, this very principle is nevertheless depending on another underlying condition that became decisive in international jurisprudence, the “effectiveness of authority”, that has more constitutive effects than other social practices as recognition.

2.1.1 The ordering principle of Sovereignty

The notion of sovereignty is a legal-political concept that only in the 20th century was attempted to be separated, but exactly in this double-nature it is the ‘organizational principle by which modern political systems are founded’, not only domestically, but also internationally; quoting Loughlin synthetic defi-

¹ Kegley 2002, p. 188.

² Ibid.

³ All these characteristic are common and present in textbooks, then one may emphasize as more relevant the internal political, economic, cultural ties, as Cassese, or more the effective capability of undertaking relations as in Lowe. See Cassese 2001 p. 3; Lowe 2007, p. 136 and following pages.

⁴ It is assumed here that an authority presupposes the monopoly of legitimate violence.

⁵ Montevideo Convention, Article 5. Good overview on Sovereignty as a principle of International Law in Cassese, 2001, pp. 88-91.

nition, sovereignty “comes about when a group of people within a defined territory are moulded into an orderly by the establishment of a governing authority which is able to exercise absolute political power within that community”⁶. Traditionally it is the connection with absolute power the characteristic that has been almost predominantly investigated both in political and legal sphere.⁷ Nevertheless, in my opinion, much more relevant in his definition are the patterns of ‘orderly cohesion moulded within a defined territory’.

Even though some scholar of international law argues the fact that the renowned treaties of Westphalia (1648) actually created abruptly the current international system out of the previous void (and they did not since they were in accordance with previous treaties and protocols), they did however pose for the first time clearly the concept of sovereignty of the state (and the corollary of “effectivity”) and at the same time stressed the universal equality of the all the state.⁸ These values had been progressively reiterated in following treaties and finally came to a codification with the UN 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations (No. 2625-XV), where the respect of the personality of other states and the inviolability of territorial integrity and political independence are declared.⁹ Despite the current good intentions, it is necessary to state that, nevertheless, such a horizontal footing between the states (or anarchical in more socio-political phrasing) did and does not prevent military conflicts when previous principles for the imposition of justice prevail. Since in principle no there is no authority superior to the state, it could any time recall upon itself the right to decide what was its paramount interest and to use any possible

⁶ Loughlin, 2000, p. 125.

⁷ Also a philosophical inquiry that brought to what is considered to be the “hard-core” *realpolitik* thinking of the realist school, as the Morgenthau’s quotation explains “[...] the preservation of sovereignty is seen as the foremost concern in international affairs”, *Ibid*.

⁸ See Lowe, 2007, p. 9, for the suspicion on the Westphalian relevance. It is true that single concepts of territory, sovereignty were to some extent theorized already before their codification into the Westphalian system and are present in other legal cultures; yet, they were scattered and never so tightly interrelated as in modernity.

See Kegley for the key components of the Westphalian normative order. Kegley, 2002, pp. 188-189.

⁹ UN Resolution 2625-XXV; p.124 “The Principle of Sovereign Equality of States”:

All States enjoy sovereign equality. They have equal rights and duties and are equal members of the international community, notwithstanding differences of an economic, social, political or other nature. In particular, sovereign equality includes the following elements:

(a) States are juridically equal;

(b) Each State enjoys the right inherent in full sovereignty;

(c) Each state has the duty to respect the personality of other States;

(d) The territorial integrity and the political independence of the State are inviolable;

(e) Each State has the right to choose and develop its political, social, economic and cultural system;

(f) Each State has the duty to comply fully and in good faith with its international obligations and to live in peace with other States.

Adopted by consensus by the General Assembly, though not legally binding, it sets, together with all treaties, state representatives’ declarations, diplomatic practice, the standards which may be considered overriding and permitting the international community; see Cassese 2001, pp. 88-89.

means in order to achieve it, war included (this is the traditional anarchic principle on which both the realist schools of international law and relations are founded). Such conditions were however slowly codified by international treaties and conventions, which gradually curbed the most violent and arbitrary expressions of this absolute sovereignty, until the UN Charter entered into force and became the foundation of a new regime (see paragraph 2.3.2).

2.1.2 Corollary: the underlying principle of Effectivity

Effectivity is the general rule that ‘permeates the whole body of international rules’ claims and situations are relevant on the international level only when they are implanted in real life and capable of implementing the acts of a sovereign authority, i.e. a durable and firm display of authority mostly over a territory or a population.¹⁰ However, this does not necessarily mean that ‘force was the principal source of legitimation’, as Cassese mentioned considering the case of the state against insurgents or invaders, but the only method to ascertain the actual exercise, or often even just the capability, of sovereignty over an area. This principle does not apply simply regarding occupied territory, but it is one of the very reasoning which guides the expansion of international law in most of the areas that were not covered before. This capability is nowadays closely linked with technology and is the guiding principle when considering sovereignty over open spaces (see paragraph 4.3).

Effectivity is also the reason why another supposed constitutive element, international recognition, that initially may be considered as constitutive, from a legal realist point of view has no actual relevance, as it does not affect the existence of the state in itself, but its relations with the other states. Recognition is traditionally an act, which can be instantiated by declaration or simply by initiating official diplomatic relations (i.e. sending of representatives), and this highlights the political nature of the act. It has the meaning that the recognizing state believes the other to fulfill all the requirements of a full-fledged state, and once stated such acts cannot be retracted, however, the principle itself goes against both the previous principle of equal sovereignty.¹¹ Some sort of ‘communitarian recognition’ has gradually taken place with the status of member to the United Nations, but it has not resolved the consequent and ever present contradiction between states *de jure* and *de facto* (respectively states only recognized as such or lost their territory, and those which present all the elements but lack recognition. Some well-known contemporary examples are the Tibetan Administration in Exile or The Republic of China in Taiwan).

¹⁰ Ibid.; pp. 12-13.

¹¹ How could indeed a single state decide if another fulfills all the requirements? Ibid. pp. 48-49.

2.1.3 The corporeality of the state: territory as necessary attribute

All interpretations of the state, from legal to sociological ones, require a territory, a delimited area of land where the authority and sovereignty of the state indeed takes place. It is an essential attribute which links the state with the materiality of the world. The necessity of this link is reflected in the fact that jurisprudence cannot conceive a state without territory, but describes portions of territory without population or in some cases even without a definite structure of authority.¹²

Moreover, most of the treaties and norms traditionally dealt with territorial delimitations or the settlement of territorial disputes. The instances of commencement, termination, secession or union of states themselves (each one affecting substantially their existence) are expressed in territorial terms. Lastly, the principle of inviolability of territorial integrity stated in the UN resolution 2625 on Friendly Relations¹³ (and earlier in the UN Charter itself, Chapter 1) shows the effort to protect these characteristics and stabilize the system. Territory has then been clearly charged with specific significance for the essence of the state, in such a way that it has become naturalized and unperceived no more as one of the factors composing the state, but reified as the state itself. Obviously, such state's corporeality is not completely exhausted by territory alone, but extends to many other aspects and items through the social process of representations. Yet, this specificity of territory, its very notion as a "space of possibility" for the state's action, is an important aspect that has been an underlying theme both in legal and international relations development in the last century.

2.2 At the geographical roots of IR realism: Schmitt and the *Nomos* of the Earth

Bearing well in mind his controversial definition of the political and the historical context he developed his theories in, Schmitt is relevant also in the contemporary analysis of territory mainly for two reasons: first of all, he is the first political theorist who patterned the terrestrial/geographical origins and outlines of the contemporary International Law and of the international system as a whole, and secondly he was the major source of influence for Hans Morgenthau (though such direct connection was never clearly declared by him¹⁴) and consequently also for the following realist school of international rela-

¹² The example is the approach of the international community regarding contemporary Somalia: even if it is considered to be a 'failed state' collapsed under a civil war and *de facto* divided into different and more or less extended chiefdoms, it is still considered as a 'state', nor the neighboring states try to fill the void as a mechanical realist would assume.

¹³ See par. 2.1.1, note 9.

¹⁴ He declared a case of plagiarism in the opposite direction. Hans J. Morgenthau, before emigrating to the United States and becoming their leading international relations scholar, was originally a German national, born in Coburg in 1904, studied Law in Munich and wrote his doctoral thesis discussing 'The Concept of the Political' of Carl Schmitt. He received a

tions. However, the fundamental pessimistic idea of human nature, the ideal of the Political as an autonomous sphere of action (independent of utopian legal, moral or economic values) and based on power and interest are the typical characteristics of political realism. By surveying and deconstructing his thought expressed in the book “*The Nomos of the Earth*”¹⁵, we aim at revealing the inspirational findings of Schmitt over the often uncovered connection between the State and its territory and finally at criticizing some of his anachronistic conclusions.

The book “*The Nomos of the Earth*” (hereafter referred to as simply the *Nomos*), work that collected a series of essays written in the early 1940s but published in its final version in German in 1950, was first and foremost an historical overview of the development of International Law until the 1st World War, exclusively from a juridical perspective. Schmitt’s academic background was on constitutional law in the tormented years of the Weimar Republic (1919-1933), and his sympathies and support with the German National-socialist party produced rather conservative and authoritative concepts of Law and its expression in a system of sovereign states¹⁶. His major intellectual concern had been to reconcile the problem of the modern state’s sovereignty in an international environment which was starting to limit this absolute sovereignty in the name of cosmopolitanism and the creation of the League of Nations. In the *Nomos*, Schmitt portrays the organization of the European modern states between the 17th and 19th centuries, as the first defined global Order, which, founded on the conceptual grounds of states agency and mutual equality, brought to a global equilibrium, and the ‘bracketing’ of war among equals. For the scope of the research, I will mostly overlook the more legal-moral aspects of Schmitt’s Earth division, which considers as first purpose of international law the one of limiting the destructive potential of war (typical assumption of jurisprudence as a discipline), and will concentrate instead on the geographical ones, which reflect the thinking and technology of his time, but, however, disclose some insight on the contemporary tendencies on the territorial expansion on the last undefined surfaces of the world.

2.2.1 Terrestrial origins of legal systems, the *Nomos*

According to Schmitt territory is basically is the social result of land-appropriation by any community, which constitutes the founding legal act taking control and distributing the essential resources based

praising letter and managed to meet him in person, an encounter that apparently disappointed him, as written in his autobiography. Afterward Schmitt actually revised his theory incorporating Morgenthau’s concept of ‘intensity of conflict’. Yet, the connection between the two, and especially on Morgenthau’s worldview, was much deeper. See William E. Scheuerman, 2007.

¹⁵ The version of the work we refer to is the English translation published in 2003.

¹⁶ Vinx, Lars, “Carl Schmitt”, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2010 Edition).

and originated by the Earth, and consequently it is expressed in three activity: *appropriation*, *division* and *production*; resumed in a word, divided in a *nomos*.

As described in the Appendixes of the book, *nomos* is an ancient Greek word, deriving from the verb *nemein*, which resumes the three functions mentioned above: its first meaning is to pasture, leading the herd and occupying portions of land; second meaning is to reap fruit (and thus indirectly to inhabit a place) points out to the productive side; the third and more used was then to distribute equally these fruits of human production. Another interesting aspect is that the substantive came to describe also the result of these practices, namely their institutionalization into custom and habits that eventually became a people's customary law (i.e. *oi nomoi*; to be remembered how the first Greek legislators were called literally 'nomos'-givers, i.e. *nomothetes*¹⁷), usually in opposition to an ideal law of nature, i.e. *logos*.

Nevertheless, the *nomos* remained linguistically confined in the household's domain, becoming later source of the economic activity (e.g. *oiko-nomia*, household's management), and expresses a form of power which does not comply with its traditional denominations: *imperium*, the supreme power, *potestas*, functional power, what one can do, or *auctoritas*, the social power, status¹⁸. Schmitt tries to connect it with the latter: in the same way the herder (*nomeus* in Greek) leads the flock, such is the good statesman. Moreover, extending the patriarchal link of the household to the state, whenever the state administrates totally the social welfare, then power is becoming again a *nomos* of distribution and production.

Yet, despite the interesting connection with 'redistributive' power (and eventual links to absolute sovereignty and totalitarianism) Schmitt's emphasis all over the book is nevertheless on land-appropriation as the primeval act and source of legal authority, which is followed by the immediate functional division of the land, that becomes consequently the measure of the order and the form of political activity. '... power formations of every sort [are] founded on new spatial divisions, new enclosures and new spatial division and ordering of the Earth'¹⁹. *Nomos* describes the whole process and the final effect: the politico-spatial order of the planet and the dynamics that bring it forth.

¹⁷ Greek – English Lexicon, Lindell and Scott, Oxford ed., 9th Edition, 1940. Entry ὁ νόμος, *nomos* p. 1180;

¹⁸ *Auctoritas*, Latin for authority, could be the most suitable candidate as the power form of the *nomos*, since they share the same semantic origin (*Auctoritas* comes from the verb *augere*: to augment, to raise); yet in Latin the material productive aspect was relinquished becoming a source of power in itself.

¹⁹ Schmitt 2003, p. 79.

As often myths describe the unconscious in a way that becomes evident, it is no wonder that Greek mythical narratives directly connect Law and Earth, as Justice (*Themis*) daughter of the Earth (*Gè*), re-affirming a materially geographical²⁰ origin which is often overseen. The event that produces the order and unity between land and law is land-appropriation that is grounded basically in two ways: internal, by the same appropriating community among its members, and external, by the relation between the different appropriating groups. Land-appropriation therefore precedes any distinction between domestic and international and basically constitutes it²¹. Moreover, since international law (i.e. *völkerrecht* in German or *jus gentium* in Latin, i.e. the law of people) developed as a way to permit a safe and coherent communication and exchange between these groups, Schmitt could claim with some degree of certainty that the traditional history of the international law is mainly the history of land appropriation, its division and consequent relations between these separated entities²².

One of main Schmitt's argument is thus that every human community creates its own spatial order and divisions, which are clearly terrestrial, because over the sea nothing could be fixed or marked. These distinctive orders are characterized by a center (or axis) and a direction (or usually by irradiation from the center). Nevertheless, even if each order believed to be the center of the cosmos, to some extent, already in ancient times a common concept of universality was also developed, which in European terms is expressed by the word *ecumene* (from the Greek *oikomene* [*gê*], the inhabited [earth]). These distinctions though pertained more to the religious and cosmological thought, where the relation between divinity, humans and the world is direct and the unity of law becomes either divine or natural. In the medieval European context this notion was embodied by the *Respublica Christiana* where secular and spiritual were intermingled and in the forms of the Empire and the Church, each divided in territorially overlapping subdivisions. Such mythological and universal order are typical of what Schmitt defines as the first epoch of spatial *nomos*, that characterizes all pre-modern human communities until the 15th century, when a specific shift in spatial awareness happened during the Age of Discovery, from 1492 onwards, and differentiated Europe from the rest of the World. Earth appeared not to be a finite totality anymore, but an infinite space open to discovery and exploitation, which brought to a more precise

²⁰ We use geographical here on purpose: see below *geography* according to Farinelli, Chap 3.

²¹ Schmitt, 2003, pp. 80-81.

²² Though also some aspect that we consider as belonging to the private sphere of Law were present, like the condition and status of aliens, the historical legal acts we can rely on are treaties and vows asserting peace and the control or influence over some territories.

consciousness of one's own territory in order to justify the land-appropriation of new land²³. This coincided with a weakening of the previous extra-territorial and more spiritual medieval authorities: religious disputes in 16th centuries led to bloody wars which undermined the unity of the previous social orders confuting also the unitary cosmological worldview that dominated until that time. The common solution developed to end the slaughter was the creation of a territorially determined and religiously neutral authority, the modern state, as the only entity able to wage war against an equally recognized state²⁴. However, in dealing with new concepts and dimensions, aliens to previous legal knowledge, scholars referred to previous legal systems, mainly Roman law, with its emphasis on categories of persons as agents and territorially based jurisdiction and authority, in order to explain the new reality of absolute monarchies²⁵.

2.2.2 The first global *Nomos*, the *Jus Publicum Europeum*

The European modern legal order which followed the end of the cosmological worldview was consequently based on absolute sovereign states behaving as rational individuals, defined in their power in a defined territorial area, whose only constraints on their sphere of action was the traditional motto *pacta sunt servanda* (i.e. agreements are to be observed). Though not disregarding it completely, Schmitt affirms that the only voluntary binding of the state to the agreement it undertook was too weak to describe the whole system, because economic, cultural and religious ties, created a more solid structure of patterns²⁶, being aware of the thicker social environment all social groups develop in and drawing closer to a constructivist structural approach. The states common identity and shared recognition as legitimate equals brought to the bracketing of war in a manner resembling a duel.

This regulated legal order was located exclusively among the sovereign Christian domains, whereas over non-Christian countries or empty territories the right of appropriation remained always possible. An *Amity Line*, was time to time individuated, within which the civilized rules of the European states permitted the bracketing of war, normed within the limits European landmass, while over the sea and

²³ This particularly important shift in perspective will be one of the main focus of next chapter, the 'beyond the map' par. 3.2.3.

²⁴ Ibid. pp. 141-42.

²⁵ 'The analogy between states and human persons became predominant in all international law considerations' and also commonly since the identity between kings and princes and the state apparatus was total. See Schmitt, 2003, pp. 143-44. Though Loughlin argues instead an "impersonalization of rulership" (Loughlin, 2000, pp. 128-129) which is actually not that contradictory, sovereignty is an 'earthly depersonalized authority' (Ibid., p. 130) and it was not Luis 14th *per se* being the state, but he as the King. The pervasiveness of this new belief hit also the philosophical sphere bringing to the 'Emergence of the idea of the individualized state' as Simons' essay wittily is entitled. Simons, 2004.

²⁶ Schmitt, 2003, pp. 147-151.

beyond, speed and force of military interventions ruled in extra-European warfare (a typical example is privateering). Therefore Schmitt's *Nomos*, typical of the modern era, was an expanding multi-layered territorial system with at its core the European Public Law system of sovereign states, delineated by *Amity lines*, where courtesy and probity regulated the states' interaction, and a increasing degree of freedom extending to the undiscovered territories and the open sea, which to some extent, balanced and stabilized this European core, letting completion, aggressive and expansive elements storming outside.

2.2.3 Freedom of the Sea: justification and development

Land in the modern *Nomos* was thus either belonging to European States or to those human communities of equal standing, otherwise it was to be occupied. The sea was completely outside of this order, clearly influenced by the contemporary geopolitical thinking of the time, as he states in the introduction thanking personally the insights of Mackinder, famous American geopolitical author, for its division between maritime and continental powers²⁷. What is relevant in this additional land/sea distinction, which he considered as essential in the system, was again a different conception of enemy, looting and war. The open sea, as the unoccupied land, becomes a safe space for the states aggressiveness to take place, and justified England's role as balancer of the continental Europe, as overwhelming maritime power. However, he himself discloses the historical development of such conception, analyzing the legal nature of the open sea.

As seen shortly above, the main legal concerns in the structuring of the European Public Law system in the 16th century sprung from concepts of Roman Law. The seas were no exception, but they presented an 'elemental' condition which prevented the stable exercise of power. Once the Europeans managed to tame the oceanic waves, the conundrum was whether the sea was to be considered legally as *res nullius* or *res omnium*: no one's or everyone's possessions. In the first case, the sea was free for occupation as the unoccupied land. In the latter, the sea becomes likewise a common, an area everyone is allowed to go to and exploit. Surveying Schmitt's contemporary legal scholars, the verdict was that in order to become a commonality, the sea had to be constituted as a condominium, a common property of all the

²⁷ Though this division goes much beyond the 19th century and had already an influence in ancient times with Thucydides. Yet, Mackinder's formal geopolitical model could claim a "grounding in the natural features of the Earth". See Agnew, 2003, pp. 28-29.

states: every state would have to ensure the rules repressing criminals such pirates. All conditions which were deemed not sustainable at the time²⁸.

Indeed the main problem in dealing with the concept of freedom of the seas is the clash between the states' freedom of sea-warfare and their freedom of trade/fishing. During the Age of Discovery, the quarrel was essential in order to break the maritime monopoly of the first discoverers, the Iberian kingdoms, or of the rising maritime powers, such as England. Grotius' *Mare Liberum* (1609), supporting the right for free trade of nations over the seas, and Selden's *Mare Clausum* (1617), advocating instead the sovereignty of England over the adjacent waters and narrow seas, represent the two opposite viewpoints on the issue²⁹.

A compromise was to be later achieved with the conception of 'territorial sea', a narrow strip, defined initially by the reach of the coast artillery (*ubi finitur armorum vis*, i.e. where finishes the strength of armies) and later to a 3 nautical miles range. Moreover, exactly the fact that this measure had not yet been reviewed at the time of the publishing of the *Nomos*, proved that, although terrestrial in origin, this was a convention which lost its original perspective (i.e. coastal defense) and served the wider concept of freedom of sea. Therefore, the sea was still considered as a 'a realm free for test of strength', and in particular this space of freedom balanced and permitted the stability of the European Core to last over 200 years³⁰. However, exactly the extension of territorial rights also over the seas will be one of the codifications and signs of the generalization of the overriding principle of effectivity (see paragraph 4.3.1).

2.2.4 The post-Versailles (dis-)Order and conclusions

The European geographical order as described by Schmitt was already crumbling in the end of 19th century: a considerable number of treaties were signed with non-state entities in extra-European lands in order to justify a legal title of 'effective occupation', i.e. sovereignty acquired by effective administration of a specific territory, especially regarding aspects of public order and external defense, rendering thus the practice more and more customary. According to Schmitt, this very principle undermined the solidarity and communitarian spirit that previously united the European states, because it rejected the social principle of recognition. Moreover, such the effective occupation basically equalized the

²⁸ Ibid. pp. 175-76. The situation has drastically changed nowadays, but this will be dealt below, see paragraph 4.3.1.

²⁹ Ibid, pp. 178-181.

³⁰ Ibid, p. 183.

status of colonial territory with the one of the motherland, displacing Europe from its central, or hierarchically superior, global position. Indeed he considered “*superficial [the] notion of a universalizing process that is naïvely seen as a victory of the European International Law. It mistook the removal of Europe from the center of Earth in international law for Europe’s rise to the center.*”³¹

Such critique springs apparently from his concrete order-thinking (statement that will be shortly argued in the next paragraph), as the concrete order of international order consists in his opinion in the uniting and blending of different several diverse orders (setting as examples the dichotomies spiritual/feudal law for the pre-modern period, dynastic/interstate law for the early Westphalian order, liberal-economic norms/interstate law for the 19th century). With the late 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, he sees no spatial structure left, no boundaries when the first symptoms of globalized economy appeared: the amity lines seemed to be drawn in human activities rather than on territories.

This process reached its climax with the end of the 1st World War and the Paris Peace Conference (1919-20) which created a provisional international system with the League of Nations. Schmitt’s critiques on the criminalization of Germany and the puny normative attempts for criminalizing internationally any kind of war, dissolving thus the distinction of *just enemy* in their total annihilation, are important claims on the resulting concept of total war which was to break out in the 2nd World Conflict, another symptom of the ‘dis-Order’ of the inter-war period. Yet, not entering this intriguing arguments on the bracketing of war which display the tragic metaphysical perspective of Schmitt,³² his most definitive assessment is that “*the League of Nations was unable to develop an internally consistent and unifying principle of the territorial status quo*”, since every *nomos* (here as unity of order and orientations) presumes property guarantees³³. There was no legal principle that govern the existing territorial state of affairs, and therefore condemned to the following breakdown and holocaust.

After having considered the conditions that brought to visible confusion of the interwar period and the critiques of the excessively utopian idealist strive of that time, Schmitt concludes his book with a last appendix, reflecting on the possibility of a new *nomos* given the contemporary circumstances (as for the year 1954). He comes to three possibilities: the victory of one of the contender of the Cold War, able then to appropriate, divide and share the World (‘according to his ideas’, a dreadful case in Schmitt’s opinion); the restoration of the previous *nomos* adjusted to the contemporary technological

³¹ Ibid, p. 233.

³² Ojankangas, 2004, pp. 11-12.

³³ Schmitt, 2003, p. 245.

means and dimension (US becoming the sea-air power able to balance the land-based USSR); the combination of several independent *großräume* (i.e., roughly translated, ‘areas of influence’) internally homogeneous, which could then balance themselves and precipitate in a new order.³⁴ Of particular interest here is Schmitt’s anxiety on the possibility of the World’s unification under a single domination: it seems the simplest solution to the problem of lack of order, a possibility enhanced by modern technological means; yet he already foresees also the possibility of self-destruction and the leveling of human plurality. He clearly leans to one of the latter two prospects, yet we leave the assessment on the accuracy of his conclusions and analysis after almost 60 years to the readers themselves.

2.3 Commentary and criticism of the worldview of the *Nomos*

Schmitt’s historical reconstruction of the development of a legal-geographical order of the Earth in the last centuries holds great authority and fascination, which after his late translation into English in the late 1990s, has brought a revival of his ideas in the wave of neo-conservatism of the beginning of the 2000s.³⁵ Yet, some critical assessment is due for a more objective understanding of his thought.

The first more consistent comment is the significance of the socio-historical conditions when Schmitt composed his major works: he developed most of his political theories in the interwar period, characterized by continuous domestic and international instability (communist revolution and unrests, criminalization of Germany after the Paris treaties). He wrote his most influential works on politics and sovereignty in response of what at that time seemed the crisis of the liberal parliamentary state, threatened by extremist political tendencies (communism on one side, and national-socialism on the other). His early works, such as *Political Theology* (1922) and *The Concept of the Political* (1932) defined a clear critique of the liberal ideals of the first half of the 20th century, setting the roots of a stable domestic political community reasserting two fundamental principles of political activity: firstly the primary role of decision-making and the deepest meaning of sovereignty, (i.e. “*Sovereign is that who decides in the state of exception*”) and secondly the identification of the political group that essentially can be reduced to the distinction enemy/friend. Both Schmitt’s *Decisionism* and the *distinction Enemy/Friend* springs from a rather pessimistic anthropological view of human nature, violent and unrestrained, that can be brought under control only through the fear of self-destruction.

³⁴ Ibid., pp. 352-55. Part V, chapter 3. “*The new Nomos of the Earth*”.

³⁵ An extensive critique of Schmitt’s “*Fatal Attraction*” on contemporary international political and legal theory can be read on his essay, Teschke, 2011. Specifically in our case, it is clear that this research is clearly influenced not merely by the fact of the existence of an international order, but by the fact that this order is possible and actually it conflates with the idea of an international legal system/ international culture expressed geographically.

With this view he strenuously opposed the late modernity's liberal ideology that 'dissolves the political struggle and conflict into a neutral sphere of the technical, transforming society and the state in an 'administrative mechanism' imposing an immanence that sterilizes any plurality and possibility of change. Also at the international level he believes that the imposition of a unanimous and a-political universal society is the justification of the most violent imperialism. In order to counter-balance such fearful absolutist tendencies he promotes a return to the concreteness of life. And when the concrete of reality strikes in the social world where all standardized procedures risk to narcotize social and political life in a mindless mechanism of technocratic bureaucracy? Schmitt's answer is in the extremes: in all the cases when normality is contradicted by the exception, which is a rupture, 'a contingent and conflictual foundation and a foundational contingency' of collective human existence; therefore, his main objects of analysis during his career become all borderlines, exceptions that starts a new order: the state of exception, revolution, the enemy as existential threat, and importantly in our case, land-appropriation.³⁶ There is everywhere a fundamental act of distinction, act of discernment that is at the basis of the autonomous sphere of politics and also solidifies into the line separating physically two communities. As Ojakangas has ingeniously pointed out, what is axiomatic in all Schmitt's thought, in the meaning of revolving around an axis, is the juxtaposition inside/outside,³⁷ and taking this process under a pure cognitive approach, it is indeed inevitable: in order to define/determine something (lat. *de-finis, de-terminus* "from the limits/borders") one has to divide, to limit the extent of knowledge into a coherent unit.

Yet, these extreme events listed by Schmitt can be, and often are, sudden and violent, but not necessarily: on his behalf and there is never any appraisal of violence. War is indeed a horror that need to be bracketed and the conflict regulated in order to let the essence of the Political be fully expressed (the elimination of the enemy is the elimination of politics too). Schmitt has a negative, tragic view of human nature and the world, deeply influenced by the same religious bias he tries to separate politics from, but eventually falls back into, recognizing the dogmatic approach in accepting the truth of the distinction of the extremes as a 'leap of faith'.³⁸ Even though such a drastic approach could seem a definitive closure towards transcendence, seeing the danger of liberalism becoming in his opinion an absolutized immanence, Schmitt's systems are never permanent: although the founding act of each order

³⁶ Ojakangas, 2004, pp. 23-29; "*Philosophy of the Extreme*" and especially pp. 26-8 for Schmitt's counter-balancing of immanence.

³⁷ Ibid, p. 12.

³⁸ Schmitt's negative theological view of mankind can be resumed in a sentence 'Man is a sinner'. Vinx, Lars, "Carl Schmitt", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2010 Edition). And Ojakangas, 2004, pp. 19-23, for the 'psychological' analysis of the pessimist Carl Schmitt.

remains the same, the configurations of the units continuously change, so in an apparent paradoxical manner they are a characteristic of *openness* towards changing historical context.³⁹

2.3.1 Major critiques on the *Nomos* and Schmitt's 'international theory'

Criticism on Schmitt's philosophical anti-liberal thought are numerous and the very first is his support to Nazi-fascism, dictated either by personal conviction or calculated opportunism, and therefore also its theoretical justification, when, even declaring impartiality on the political ideologies proposed, one cannot deny that eventually he promoted the same total warfare he was criticizing liberalism for. Secondly, his undisguised Eurocentric and hierarchical worldview, based primarily on the supposed primacy of the European civilization could be an argument brought forth by a post-colonialist school of thought, paired by arguments of a 'Westphalian nostalgia' on Schmitt's behalf, point out to a not so well-hidden normative standpoint when "things really worked out, back in the days", even when he himself states that the conditions that made that specific order appear were not present anymore.⁴⁰

Notwithstanding Benno Gerard Teschke's criticism on Schmitt's consideration of the Westphalian treaties as an historical turning point (an opinion that according to Teschke was lacking at the same time any critical analysis of the treaties themselves)⁴¹ does not hinder the fact that, though scattered and not clearly stated, Schmitt has presented all the major characteristics and innovations introduced by the so-called Westphalian legal systems, that Kegley lists in his historical, political and philosophical analysis of the treaties and their negotiation procedure. Setting sovereignty as the recognized fundamental principle, states were entitled with rights and duties: rights of self-preservation, political independence and of equality; the duty of non-intervention in others' internal issues and the obligation of good faith.⁴²

However, the most pugnacious arguments usually involve the normative aspects of Schmitt's analysis, of the dangers and the violence of a universal and moralistic liberalism taken up again by neo-conservatives and opponents alike in the nowadays uncertainty on the concept of humanitarian intervention and "just war", defined by Teschke as a "*fatal attraction*". He strongly argue that Schmitt's is no

³⁹ See *ibid*, p. 26; Ojakangas reports here Carlo Galli's analysis where, even if Schmitt's thought of this *openness* towards transcendence, it is eventually the possibility itself toward continuous contingent adaptation of the system. The only possible critique at this point, as we will also present soon afterwards, is the clear subjective nostalgia of the primacy of the pre-war *Jus Publicum Europaeum*.

⁴⁰ Scheuerman 2007, pp. 7-8; Vinx, Lars, "Carl Schmitt", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2010 Edition), see 1. Biographical Sketch, 2nd paragraph.

⁴¹ Teschke, 2011, pp. 202-03.

⁴² Kegley, 2002, pp. 190-191.

international historical theory or sociology, for it lacks any real dynamic of the spatial orders, ruling out any social aspect, thus reifying geopolitics, privileging the political over the social: there is no description of what process actually drives these fundamental acts (land-appropriation, enemy-declarations, world-ordering), ‘a curiously non-geopolitical stance’⁴³, when he clearly admit the debt with Sir Halford J. Mackinder, considered to be one of the founding fathers of geopolitics⁴⁴. The critique that Schmitt presents a “semantic geo-mythological legal history” is though not completely off the mark. Schmitt admitted already in the introduction of the book that myths are a possible rationalization of otherwise inexplicable phenomena, such as in our case the complex socio-historical events that connect law and land, and are expressed in the principles of Roman Law, a territorial legal system mostly of private property, that later expanded its notions providing the bases and the vocabulary of the international interaction itself. The frequent mistake here is the misunderstanding of power identical to its geographical extension over the earth (Agnew’s ‘territorial trap’, see par. 2.4). Territory is more and less of that: less because power has many more dimensions than the geographical one, and more because it is the result of different social practices and technologies in which power may have a limited role.

2.3.2 Effective sovereignty as the primary title in contemporary international law

However, pointing only to the act of land-appropriation as the original, ‘radical’ legal title of territorial sovereignty looks nowadays anachronistic, or rather in clear contrast with another legal principle, which at the time was abhorred by Schmitt: what he called ‘effective occupation’, but it is in the end the effective sovereignty, i.e. ‘the actual, continuous and peaceful display of state functions’ over a defined area of the world.

Schmitt’s anachronism comes from the fact that he focused primarily on the first function of the three-folded meaning of *nomos*, i.e. land-appropriation (evidently for historical contingencies and opportunities), dismissing the ones of division and administration. In his opinion, only land-appropriations could happen within and, most importantly, outside the international legal order, and exclusively in the latter case they “*uproot the existing spatial order and establish a new nomos*”⁴⁵. It is evident here that at the time he had in mind the exceptionality of the case of a sudden unilateral land-appropriation done with

⁴³ Teschke 2011, pp. 214-215.

⁴⁴ Schmitt, 2002, p. 37; Mackinder is famous for its heartland theory, which presents the fundamental geographical distinction of the World into land and sea, a contrast that is present in Schmitt as well, though the first geographer displaying this “terrestrial order of our planet” was the German Carl Ritter, in Farinelli 2003, p. 96.

⁴⁵ Schmitt, 2002, pp. 81-82.

the clear purpose to override an iniquitous *status quo* (as for Germany in the 2nd World War), yet it does not become an ‘order and orientation’ as far as such extra-legal action is accepted and incorporated at least as customary, and therefore fundamentally and continuously changes the state of things, justifying anarchy instead of a new Order.

The normalization of the exceptional act as such, as an arbitrary and sovereign decision, unconditioned by any constraint would be indeed an unpredictable social environment, yet the very nature of the sovereign decision is never completely absolute or unconditioned: it is taken under conditions by which the agent has to choose between alternative not described in previous norms. The Sovereign has no formal freedom; it is forced to choose by circumstances. In order to become ‘order and orientation’ it has to become recognized as a new norm and requires some concept of property guarantees and of status quo⁴⁶. Such conditions for stability realized within the legal system enhanced by the United Nations with the declaration of territorial integrity of the states and the mechanisms of the principle of the *uti possidetis* (lat. “as you possess”) that regulated the de-colonization process especially in the African continent. Territorial integrity has been confirmed and reaffirmed throughout a series of regional and international treaties, starting from the Covenant of the League of Nations (1920, Art. 10), or the already mentioned Montevideo Convention on rights and duties of the States (1934, Art.11), to the United Nation Charter (1945, Art.2(4)), to most of regional organizations⁴⁷. Yet, what is considered internationally and politically most relevant was the Helsinki Final Act (1975, Point III and IV) which helped thus stabilizing the territorial disputes in the Cold War Europe. The *uti possidetis* was originally a legal principle of the Law of War, by which a territory and all the property within remains with its possessor at the end of a conflict if a treaty does not provide otherwise, that later evolved, through the independence of the Spanish American colonies in the 19th century, in the ‘doctrine that old administrative boundaries would become international boundaries when a political subdivision achieves independence’⁴⁸, giving thus precedence to the right of precedent legal title (*uti possidetis juris*). This principle

⁴⁶ Ibid, p. 245.

⁴⁷ These are explicitly the Organization for African Unity (OAU), the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), just to cite some. For a comprehensive list with the distinction on the intensity of the territorial integrity provision see Appendix I in Hensel, Allison and Khanani, 2006, pp. 33-36.

⁴⁸ Quotation from the Black’s Law dictionary cited in Hensel, Allison and Khanani, 2006, p. 8.

has unquestionably become globally recognized when it was accepted as the leading criterion in resolving territorial disputes also in Africa and Europe⁴⁹.

What about when there were no legal title to be produced? Different legal theories had defined this original legal title of territorial sovereignty, such as discovery or symbolic annexation. Schmitt believed all of them were reducible to land-appropriation, a term that could coincide with the current legal terms of *apprehension* that includes both the significations of *occupation* and *conquest*.⁵⁰ Yet, as stated in the Island of Palmas Case (Netherland/U.S.A.), even if the single act of occupation was accomplished, effective and declared it was not sufficient. As the International arbitrator Max Hubert stated in the Island of Palmas case (1928):

*"[The fact that t]he occupation shall be effective would be **unconceivable**, if effectiveness is required **only for the act of acquisition and not equally for the maintenance of the right**. If the effectiveness has above all been insisted on in regard to occupation, this is because the question rarely arises in connection with territories in which there is already an established order of things. Just as before the rise of international law, boundaries of land were necessarily determined by the fact that the Power of the State was exercised within them, so too, under the reign of international law, the fact of peaceful and continuous display is still one of the most important considerations in establishing boundaries between states".*⁵¹

This is because independence, and therefore sovereignty, has indeed been expressed geographically as the 'exclusive right to display the activity of the State', as a situation recognized and delimited in space. The interesting aspect in nowadays jurisprudence on territorial disputes, that demonstrates at the same time the very conservative nature of international law and its tendency towards a *status quo*, is that, even though it is recognized the importance of the display of territorial sovereignty, and Hubert himself advocated for the primacy of the principle of effective sovereignty over the single legal title of acqui-

⁴⁹ See the *Case concerning the frontier dispute (Burkina Faso / Republic of Mali)* 22. December 1986 III.2. "[...] Although this principle was invoked for the first time in Spanish America, it is not a rule pertaining solely to one specific system of international law, it is a principle of general scope [...]"

The Arbitration Commission of the Conference on Yugoslavia (1991-1993) recognized the international relevance of the International Court of Justice and directly refers to the Burkina Faso / Mali case when reporting in Opinion No. 3 on Borders the application of the *uti possidetis iuris* (being the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia undergoing a process of dissolution, not secession, see Opinion No. 1).

⁵⁰ The terms are used depending on the fact whether the land was inhabited or not, and whether the population had significantly resisted. They both are included in the wider umbrella of *acquisition* which however comprehends also the peaceful transfer of territorial sovereignty from a state to another through *cession*, or by the geological extension of a territory, i.e. *accretion*. See Island of Palmas Case (Netherland/U.S.A.), 9 April 1928, Reports of International Arbitral Awards; p. 839; and Malcolm Shaw's Lecture, "The International Legal Principles Relating to Territorial Disputes: The Acquisition of Title to Territory".

⁵¹ Ibid. My emphases.

tion⁵², nevertheless previous legal titles of acquisition still retain predominance. As explained by Malcolm Shaw, effectivity is confirmative, it completes and confirms, but not contradict previously valid legal titles⁵³.

Therefore, in absence of any legal title, what decides the territorial sovereignty could be relevant geographical factors (eventually *contiguity*), but in the end, if present, it is the ‘display of actual, peaceful and continuous activities of the state’, i.e. effectivity. Whenever, a prior legal title exists and recognized then this title has predominance, since the need of stability of the international system lets the principle of territorial integrity prevail and protect any form of legal possession. Otherwise indeed land-appropriation and any invasion or occupation would be immediately effective and destabilizing any order. According to these principles, the contemporary International Legal System fulfills even Schmitt’s requirements of property guarantees and status quo for necessary for ‘order and orientation’.

2.4 “Territory” as a Political Tool

It is comforting and frustrating at the same time to find an article which discloses most of the same reasoning one had spinning in the head for a long time. Such sensations came reading Stuart Elden’s article “*Land, Terrain, Territory*” (2010), that skillfully presents and summarizes the arguments by which the concept of territory is best approached as a ‘political technology’, as an open question to be addressed on every occasion more than an absolute definition, that helps understanding its different historical and geographical aspects.

Elden’s first argument is basically the same as my heuristic point of departure: territory as such has been constantly ignored and never critically analyzed because it is just so ‘obviously universal’. He points to several reasons, one being the recent post-structuralist mistrust of the last decades for anything that is limited into clear-cut limits, temporal or spatial boundaries (though epistemologically a certain degree of coherent knowledge requires some kind of boundaries). Another motive is the traditional approach of geography towards politics and state power, that Agnew calls the “*territorial trap*”,

⁵² Ibid. “If a dispute arises as to the sovereignty over a portion of territory, it is customary to examine which of the States claiming sovereignty possesses a title – cession, conquest, occupation, etc. – superior to that which the other State might possibly bring forward. However, if the contestation is based on the fact that the other part has actually displayed sovereignty, it cannot be sufficient to establish the title by which sovereignty was validly acquired at a certain moment; it must also be shown that the territorial sovereignty has continued to exist and did exist at the moment which for the decision of the dispute must be considered critical. This demonstration consists in the display of State activities, such as belong to the territorial sovereign.”, Island of Palmas Case (Netherland/U.S.A.), pp. 838-39.

⁵³ Malcolm Shaw’s Lecture, “*The International Legal Principles Relating to Territorial Disputes: The Acquisition of Title to Territory*”.

i.e. a three-fold assumption of the “conventional understanding of the geography of state power”, according to which: sovereignty requires delimited territories; that there has to be a distinction domestic versus international; and that the territorial state is the natural ‘container’ for modern societies. Agnew’s arguments are critical ones, which had never been tackled, but often avoided altogether.⁵⁴

The probably most relevant cause for this misconception, Elden continues, is that people and scholar in particular use and confuse the word ‘territoriality’, conferring to it a more active flavor than its original meaning: as for ‘spatiality’, territoriality is a property of territory, its status, rather than a mode of action toward the territory. Such confusion stems from the fact that territory is a concept which has been treated in different disciplines and acquired two main aspects: a biological and a social one. In Elden’s opinion, neither of these offers a solid ontology of territory, since, although they grasp the volitional, biological driven and behavioral aspect, and its consequent social construction for human beings, they still deal with territory too narrowly, missing completely the historicity and geographical unevenness of the concept.

Elden’s method is thus to consider territory as a concept of its own, separated from any consequent behavioral or social approach, for the reason that territory is logically prior to territoriality, thought it often materially created in a second moment, by the different qualities one thinks of it. A working definition to start with is then the one of the geographer Edward W. Soja of territory as “*the political organization of space*” whose main purpose is to enhance societal solidarity through the processes of competition, conflict and cooperation which are eventually expressed territorially; and as politics presupposes power these processes can be analyzed in three different perspectives: 1) as control over the distribution, allocation and ownership of scarce resources; 2) as the maintenance of order and the enforcement of authority; 3) as legitimacy of authority through societal integration.⁵⁵ These standpoints of analysis of territorial expression of political power cluster in fact around three words: land, terrain and territory.

2.4.1 Land / Terrain / Territory

The term “land”, as the Latin *terra*, refers specifically to the ground, the soil, the dry land, as the basis that nurtures and sustains human existence. It displays its material aspect as a scarce resource, and therefore its **economic-politic quality**, immediately expressed through **property**. All elements already recognized and discussed above by Schmitt (see also par. 2.2.1), although in a way somehow excessively

⁵⁴ Elden 2010, p. 801. and Agnew, 2003, pp. 53-54.

⁵⁵ Quoted in Elden, 2010, p. 803-4.

tragic and definite, nevertheless ‘land possession has always been a determinant of power, and conflict over land has been a key indicator for power struggle’⁵⁶, yet all the potential of social space in relation with the earth does not end there.

Even considering only the conflictual dimension of such relation, there is an immediate peculiarity of the earth/land from all the other objects of struggle: it is at the same time *site* and *stake* of the conflict. ‘Terrain’ is the term that draws together the material strategic aspects of the land that can be related both to the military and productive aspects. It is indeed a word mostly used by physical geographers, geologists and agronomists that explains the ‘form’ and composition of the earth, but also the immediate rapport between the physical aspect and human interaction, and the combination of these physical features and the human labor creates the landscape (another extremely interesting concept in human geography that however goes beyond the scope of the research). The terrain thus expresses the **politico-strategic** understanding of the earth, where its physical conditions enhance or hinder human action.

Both the concepts of land and terrain predate the state and territory collects the characteristics, adding however a new dimension and perspective that is distinctive of modernity. Elden’s point is that the appropriate approach able to grasp the historic-geographical development of the concept is indeed to recognize how it is dependent on certain techniques, mathematic and cartographic ones in the first place, and the law. The legal correlation between territory and sovereignty has been already revealed and examined in the previous paragraphs, yet they were made conceptually possible also thanks to geometrical and cartographic advances that brought to a major change of perspective, and made mapping and control over large portions of the earth possible. Elden relates these developments to a ‘calculative grasp of the material world’ where the modern concept of *space* expressed through cartography ‘not only represents the territory, but it is actively complicit in its production’.⁵⁷ Territory is therefore the **politico-technological feature** of the earth, enhanced by calculative techniques and politico-juridical developments, that “*it is more than merely land, and goes beyond terrain, but is a rendering of the emergent concept of ‘space’ as a political category: owned, distributed, mapped, calculated, bordered and controlled*”⁵⁸.

⁵⁶ Ibid, p. 806.

⁵⁷ Ibid, p. 809. This modern shift of worldview perspective through the introduction of abstract space is what the Italian Geographer Farinelli calls the “*cartographic reasoning*”, which will be the major topic of the next chapter.

⁵⁸ Ibid, p. 810.

2.4.2 Territory: a political technology

Territory is thus a complex mode of social-spatial organization that cannot be understood only in one of the three elements presented above, and moreover as a historically and geographically conditioned and dependent concept, constantly and almost unconsciously used as a political instrument for measuring and controlling parts of the earth.

Territory is a technology, a tool, because it includes all the techniques for measuring the land, and controlling the terrain: measure and control. It is conditioned because as an historical conception it is produced by specific events and ideas that inevitably and fluidly modify it in time. It is simultaneously a geographical notion because it orders the world, yet at the same time it is not the only one and it is dependent on the conditions it emerged which have been unevenly distributed over the globe. It is exactly considering these elements that Elden poses two necessary caveats of this approach: firstly it is the analysis of a ‘conceptual lineage’ derived from and directed toward a Western philosophical thought; secondly, though this approach endeavors a more comprehensive insight over territory, it is nonetheless *partial*, for territory is ‘at the same time juridical, political, economic, social, cultural and affective’ and most of these important features are intentionally set aside by Elden in order to focus on the political one.⁵⁹ After having analyzed the politico-legal aspect in this chapter (with a short follow-up for the contemporary situation in Chap. 4) my further step is to take into consideration the technical, cartographic aspects of territory, which had a major role in shaping territory and the modern state, following a specific logic that pervades the relation with the World. Such *cartographic reasoning* is at the roots of modern thinking and understanding its inner logic will help grasping also the subtler ways state asserts and project itself through territory.

⁵⁹ Ibid, p. 811. As it is also the scope of this thesis, though in the next chapters some connection to the cultural and affective aspect could be the topic of further research.

CHAPTER 3 – The ‘Cartographical Reasoning’ of Modernity

Certainly one of Schmitt’s most remarkable contribution, despite criticism or objective inaccuracies, was to spot a general historical pattern that developed all over modernity and categorized the Earth into a orderly defined state and non-state territorial configurations, with the *terra nullius*, ‘nobody’s land’ free for appropriation. The concept of territory itself remains however unquestioned, quickly dismissed; even in legal terms it is just the geographical expression of the peaceful activities of the state. Yet, this very reluctance in questioning this specific characteristic of the modern state reveals a hidden and essential feature of modernity: the underlying logic that shaped the territory and the state simultaneously, that the Italian geographer Franco Farinelli calls the ‘*cartographic reasoning*’: a subtle intrusion of the geometric-mathematical notions habitually used to produce accurate maps, that eventually modified our relation with the Earth.

As Elden ingeniously discussed in the previous chapter, a useful approach to analyze the concept of ‘territory’ is to consider it as a political technology. The argument of this chapter will be to explore its technical/cartographic techniques and their effects, as the legal devices have been already exposed above (i.e. the definition of a state, and to some extent its recognition; the principles of territorial integrity and non-interference, all deriving from the principle of sovereignty). The cartographic ones, such as perspective and projection, have instead geometrical and mathematical origins and the presumption of absolute accuracy and scientificity of these techniques brings to the ‘graphic bias’ through which geometrical characteristics typical of the Euclidean space are eventually transferred by analogy to the social world and influenced the very structure of the modern nation-state and its notion of territory.

3.1 The Ambiguities of ‘Territory’

Most of the confusion about the nature itself of territory comes however primarily from its etymology. *Territorium* is originally a Latin composite word, where the ending *-tor(ium)* implies an agency, and the ambiguity stems from the very first particle *terri-*. One line of thought is to connect it directly with the land, lat. *terra*.¹ Another origin stems from the verb *terĕre*, to plow up, and therefore the word *territorium* would mean the piece of cultivated land, a field, meaning that later extended to all the fields belonging to a town or a city.² Lastly, links the word with the verb *terrĕre*, to frighten, and it is the defini-

¹ Etymological dictionaries Italian and English entry ‘territorio’ and ‘territory’. *Territor* is then the land owner.

² Farinelli, 2009, p. 14. And Grotius’ quotation in Painter, 2010, p. 1102.

tion given in one of the fundamental text of Roman and subsequent legal system, the *Corpus Iuris Civilis* ordered by the Emperor Justinian in the 6th century CE:

*“The word “territory” means all the land included within the limits of any city. Some authorities hold that it is so called, because the magistrates have the right to inspire fear within its boundaries, that is to say, the right to remove the people”*³

The two main meanings that the word conveys refer then mostly to either the productive or even forceful control of land. Yet, it is the latter definition that will prevail in the *Corpus Iuris Civilis* and definitely influence later jurisprudence and political thought and the new concept of sovereignty⁴.

3.1.1 Caressing the geometrical Texture

It is nevertheless noticeable that one of the possible etymologies of ‘territory’ points to the management of a delimited area, as does Jacques Lévy in his encyclopedic entry for the *Dictionnaire de la Géographie*⁵, where, out of the eight possible ‘usages’ of the term, he ticks two as particularly relevant for scientific research: territory as ‘regulated and bounded space’ and ‘ethological metaphor’. What unifies all these definitions is, according to Lévy, the fact that they refer to a space that is *metric* and *continuous*, territory as a “metrical topographic space”⁶, an extremely interesting intuition that will be developed shortly below.

Yet, first of all it is important to clarify my position regarding the term: Painter draws attention to the fact that the discourses on the concept change from language and literature of reference, when for example in Anglo-Saxon cultures has a more defined political edge than the ones of Romance origin.⁷ Similarly, as Elden warned above, territory is clearly a notion developed in a European setting, and therefore one could argue it would be irrelevant to extend such concept globally. My standpoint is instead to assume the fact that the political administrative attribute is predominant in international relations, spread globally and was adopted by all the members of the international community (i.e. modern states), in legal terms of the place of ‘peaceful and legitimate state action’. This postulation,

³ Quotation from the *Digestum* 50, 16, 239 of the *Corpus Iuris Civilis* in Painter, 2010, p. 1102.

See also Farinelli, 2009, p. 14.

⁴ First as a subjective concept (the magistrate’s authority shapes territory) and then as an objective one (authority, or sovereignty, stems directly from the territory).

⁵ Quoted in Painter, 2010, pp. 1098-1099.

⁶ Ibid, p. 1110.

⁷ Though the argument that in romance languages ‘territory’ is often replaced by terms as ‘region’, ‘province’ or ‘district’, is not sufficient because they all imply either the exercise of administrative or political power ‘Region’ comes from the Latin verb *regere*, i.e. to govern; ‘province’ is the conquered land, lat. *pro- vincere*, i.e. to win in behalf of somebody; ‘district’, lat. *de-strictus*, i.e. enclosed, contained.

however, does not mean in any way that territory and state power are equivalent or that territory is the complete geographical expression of power, even if the double etymology could hint in this direction. According to Farinelli territory is more precisely the cartographic symbol of power.⁸

3.1.2 Triangular Thinking: a Cartographic Epistemology

Farinelli uses the word ‘symbol’ on purpose: the term etymologically means ‘put together’ and it was originally in Ancient Greek culture the two halves of a previously broken object, given to two persons, that later proved the existence of a relation, a bound, between them; and had meaning only in the reunification of the two halves.⁹ In this sense Farinelli, following Charles Pierce’s levels of the logico-semiotic relations among objects, defines it a cartographic symbol: the first level is the *iconic* relation that is given thanks to mutual similarity among objects; the *index* is then the relation between iconic relations, and finally the *symbolic* relation is given when two indexes are related together by an iconic relation of similarity. *Place* is iconic for the repetitive relation of similarity with the everyday life earth, ‘the circumstance one lives and works in habitually’; putting a name or a sign on the map there is a crystallization into a relation with two systems of reference, the world we live and the world on the map, through a common index relation where *space* is created and becomes the common denominator.¹⁰

Eventually, however, he does not explain plainly what is the other index system space is related with in order to compose the symbol of territory. Interpreting his further thinking, we could assume quite safely that the second index system is the World itself, assumed here as the Wittgensteinian ‘totality of the states of affairs’ or, in a more etymological point of view, the “Age of Man”, everything related to the human, the social life.¹¹ In this way should be understood the logico-semantic




Figure 1. The logico-semantic triangle.

⁸ Farinelli, 2003, p. 27.

⁹ Ibid, p. 28.

¹⁰ Ibid, pp. 35-38.

¹¹ For Wittgenstein see *Tractatus logico-philosophicus* 1966 p. 7, proposition no. 1 "The World is all that is the case", 1.1 "The world is the totality of facts, not of things" and 2. "what is the case – the fact – is the existence of states of affairs". O.E. woruld, worold "human existence, the affairs of life," also "the human race, mankind," a word peculiar to Germanic languages (cf. O.S. werold, O.Fris. world, Du. wereld, O.N. verold, O.H.G. weralt, Ger. Welt), with a literal sense of "age of

triangle in figure 1, though the graphic representation there is a personal translation of the instructions that Farinelli suggested, according to which the triangle should be drawn by the reader himself.¹² However, what we could infer from Farinelli's first analysis is that the cartographic logic is actually more pervasive than we could imagine and follows the technique of triangulation: dividing the Earth (or the World in a cognitive sense) into smaller triangle/units and given a single denomination as points on a geometric plane. This process requires specific practices that likewise entail consequences, as the selection or loss of information by which it is not possible to have the map as a comprehensive copy of reality, and yet it pretends to represent it accurately. This correlation reality-representation is crucial in understanding the modern illusion of the perfect equivalence between the two. A theme already tackled indirectly in ancient myths.

3.2 Exiting the Myth through Projection: the birth of Space

Indeed, all over his two books, Farinelli's analysis of geography is a complex one and it starts from the assumption that geography, the description, the writing of the earth (geo-graphy), is simultaneously a way of understanding the world; an epistemology, as more powerful as it is hidden or unperceived by those utilizing it, and it permeates all aspects of human culture, from myths, to politics, arts and literature. Meanwhile the main focus of the discussion will remain on its technico-political aspects, a short digression on the first mythical records already gives some important argument expressed through metaphorical language.

3.2.1 Myth and the Map: the forgotten Moral of the Story

Myth is present also at the birth of geography as it was for the origins of law, exactly because philosophy and geography developed hand in hand, unfolding the myths and the cosmologies that had previously described reality. According to Farinelli, geography is an 'instantaneous extract, the clip of an

man," ... later extended to the known world and to the physical world in the broadest sense universe, Etymological dictionary, entry *World*.

¹² Farinelli, 2003; pp. 34-35. 'Usage instructions'. *"If the equivalence between world and image nowadays fails, if the former is not reducible anymore to a map and consequently the cognitive process is not adaptable to the triangulation as we know it we are back to the feet of the pyramid. On its peak we draw a 'W' for world. Below, corresponding to the lower vertices of the triangle facing us, we draw a 'P' for place and a 'S' for space. Moreover, always below and coinciding with the last farther vertex yet to be named, that of the lateral triangle whose side is in common with the first and therefore is comprised between 'W' and 'S', we draw a 'T' for territory. It is important that is the reader that sketches the figure with one's own hand because as already Edmund Husserl already warned, every geometric construction implies a causal system of causes and effects."* My translation from the Italian original text.

unchanging reality, the sectioning of the World and recomposing it through a *measure*.¹³ The first myth we come across is the one of the so-called ‘Wedding of the Earth’ by Pherecydes of Syros (6th century BC) who described the first sacred wedding between the Earth (Chthon/Ge) and the Sky (Zas). The interesting aspect is that the veiled bride (Chthon in her maiden name which represents the soil that gives birth and receives burials) receives from the Sky an embroidered cloak depicting rivers, mountains and cities; only when the Earth wears the wedding cloak, the ceremony is concluded and she adds to her name, *Ge*, implying its visible surface.¹⁴ Other myths like the Dionysian mysteries, describe the process by which this totality is com-prehended and reproduced. The World, represented by Dionysus¹⁵, is killed and torn in to pieces. It is later his brother Apollo, the shiny solar god, representing here reason and measure, that recompose him on a plane table and bringing him back to life¹⁶.

Both these mythical indications point to a couple of very important claims which remain fundamental to geography and sometimes are forgotten: firstly the Earth, *Ge*, is visible only when covered by her wedding cloak, the *map*; secondly this process is undertaken through the subdivision of the World into separate logical independent units that in a second moment are brought together on plane surface, the paper, or *linear space*; this operation is eventually possible only through *measure*, *perspective* and *projection*¹⁷. Yet, a last note of caution is that this very process of reproduction is at the same time changing the nature of the Earth itself, from Khthon to Ge, and therefore even if the object of knowledge is recomposed in order to be completely understood, the means and logic of this process limit it in many ways.

3.2.2 Place versus Space

In more secular terms, the same act of comprehension was blamed on one of the first philosopher of the Western tradition, the Greek Anaximander (c. 610 - 546 BCE), when he drew the first world map re-

¹³ Farinelli 2003, pp. 8-9.

¹⁴ Farinelli “*L’invenzione della Terra*” (*The invention of the Earth*) 4th episode from the RAI radio broadcast program “Alle 8 della Sera”.

¹⁵ See above chap. 4, note 11, for the wider meaning of World. Dionysus stands here for the “*life without interruption and limits, life as infinite and indistinguishable process*” Károly Kerényi [*Dyonisos. Bild des unzerstörbaren Leben* 1976] cited in Farinelli, 2003, p. 9.

¹⁶ Ibid. Interesting enough are also the similarities with the Egyptian myth of Osiris. Osiris, god of agriculture was killed and torn in pieces by his brother Seth. Later recomposed and brought back to life by his wife Isis, who generates Horus, the falcon-god, often represented simply as an eye, as the ‘God who sees from above’, like the external eye of projection.

¹⁷ All these elements are represented by represented respectively either by Apollo, Zas (the Sky), or Horus. All the three deities have more or less close connection with the firmament and this is a significant hint to the modern projection that uses astronomic standards for cartographic representation.

presenting the known world of his time on a plate. He was soon accused of blasphemy and hubris by his own citizens for such an act. No one could reduce the sacred World in on a plate. Yet it is only through projection, and the space it creates, that is ‘possible to exit the myth, transforming something that is not possible to define into something whose nature we can control and identify’.¹⁸ However, with a price to be paid. The cartographic projection is the transformation of a three-dimensional unity (in this case the Earth, a spherical, closed and finite area) into a two-dimensional map (plane, open and theoretically infinite)¹⁹, an element that brought eventually to a revolution in the spatial understanding that will be more or less evidently omnipresent in modern thinking (see next paragraph).

The puzzle here is also between *place* and *space*. Place is a part of the Earth surface, that is not equivalent to anyone else for its inherent qualities. Space is a geometrical abstraction, coming straight from the Greek word ‘*stadion*’, measure, where all included parts are equivalent to each other thanks to the uniformity created by the linear scaling of all objects through projection. The mythical geography is a collection of places, often overlapping, yet never interchangeable. It was the geography of what you directly see, the copy of the World, representing simultaneously the relations between the objects and places. Modern geography, instead, starts with the conception of the Earth as ‘space’, described by the three principles of Euclidean geometry, where all the objects represented are characterized by *continuity*, *homogeneity* and *isotropy*²⁰. These qualities were applied geography through the techniques of projection and linear geometric perspective, theorized exhaustively for the first time by the Imperial geographer and astronomer Claudius Ptolemy (c. 90 – 168 AD) in his work *Geography*. The volume transcribed and preserved by Arab mathematicians during the Middle Ages, was returned to Europe in the 15th century, influencing greatly the European Renaissance, transforming the physical representation of all images. In Ptolemy’s work, geometrical projection has capital importance: in the drawing of his map of the Ecumene the viewer is abstracted to a simple eye that observes the World from above, able to see everything in one sight.

The same techniques of projection and linear perspective will be studied used by Renaissance artists and engineers to represent places and areas with an accuracy that permitted an action over the territory

¹⁸ Ibid, p. 20.

¹⁹ “[T]he cartographic projection is based on a mathematical rule that permits to determine the correspondence on a plane surface of the paper of one and only point for any other point determined on a globe by the intersection of a meridian and parallel.” Ibid, p. 12.

²⁰ These three characteristics will be explained in more detail in paragraph 3.3, but for now they can briefly paraphrased thus: *continuity* means that the space in-between is uniform and never interrupted; *homogeneity* that all objects are qualitatively homogeneous; *isotropy* that all the objects are directed in the same direction.

that was considered at the time unconceivable. There was indeed a general mistrust of such abstractions, as the comment of the Florentine people during the war against the city of Lucca in 1430, when, among many learned people Filippo Brunelleschi, Donatello, a plan to flood the city by deviating the waters of the river Serchio:

*“who suggested and proved with their geometry liar and false (not in itself but for the others’ ignorance) that the City of Lucca could be flooded, and they were drawing it by arts not well understood, so that the foolish multitude cried that thus be done, and said “we are indeed touching what these observing theorist are drawing us.”*²¹

Thus since the beginning, cartography and its techniques were powerful means that permitted the transformation of the variegated Italian and fragmented political realities into the ‘first prototypes of modern state territoriality’. Yet, it took another century for these cartographic techniques to replace the previous ones and be continuously utilized in official maps. This is not only the result of the economic revival of the early 15th century that generalized typographic reproduction of a texts and images, but of a real spatial revolution, a cognitive shift from a still cosmological perspective to the cartographic vision of reality.²²

3.2.3 The Revolution of the Cartographic Reasoning

The transformation of the cartographic reasoning in the general is briefly described as the reversal of the relation between the World and its representation. Until the 16th century there was no doubt that maps were a representation of the World, though in its widest sense, portraying not only those geographical features that later will be considered natural (mountains, rivers), but also that it was inhabited, with buildings and ships, humans, animals and fantastic creatures: a collection of places, and therefore a unidirectional relation, a reflection of the World describing a totality, both in time and space, which transcends what is seen²³. In the cartographic representation, this correspondence changes nature: due to the translation into a regime of perfect equivalence between the World and its representation (the regime of the Euclidean space), this relation became a one-to-one correspondence, pretending to present

²¹ From the chronicler Giovanni Cavalcanti (1381-c.1451) quoted in Farinelli, 1997, p. 46.

²² Ibid, p. 53 and pp. 46-47. With ‘cosmological’ we mean here a specific view of reality, the universe (*cosmos*), that underlines its orderliness and logics (*logos*) which is reflected in all its aspects, micro and macro, the same laws govern from the individual human being to the structure of the universe, though on different levels; this approach is typical of pre-modern societies. The cartographical is instead the typical reasoning that characterizes the modern age (see 4.2.3).

²³ Though this process of secularization/objectivation did not happened abruptly, and some hint of spirituality remained in the attitude some Renaissance Princes maintained toward the sacredness of the World. It was the later commoditization of the 17th century which brought the popularization and secularization of ‘modern’ cartographic maps. See Kagan and Schmidt in Woodward, 2007; p. 678.

everything in one sight, therefore enabling a bidirectionality through which the characteristics of space started infiltrating the World itself: the map and territory became the main model through which modify it. The process is not a simple one and caused by several consecutive factors.

Following Woodward's categorization in *History of Cartography (vol.3)*, this revolution happened with specific changes in relations between:

- The internal structure of the graphic syntax of the maps;
- The maps and the observed World;
- The maps and society.²⁴

Farinelli addresses in different moments to all these three areas, but the focus of this analysis will be mainly in the first area of the internal relationship of map's structure, its internal logic, for the main argument is indeed that this very structure influences the way we usually relate to the World, taking for granted the map as a natural product, 'a transparent window on the world'²⁵, and eventually even organize into political units.

Woodward argues in his introduction to Renaissance cartography that since the very beginning map-makers had a certain degree of self-awareness of the constructed-ness of maps they created. Quoting as an example the description of the cognitive process express by Nicolaus Cusanus, 15th century philosopher and astronomer, 'the cosmographer as a man in a five-gates city (the gates represent here the five senses) through which come continuously messengers. He gathers all their information and "*compiles it into a well-ordered and proportionally measured map lest be it lost.*" He then shuts the gates, sends away the messengers and turns to the map, meditating on God, as the creator who existed prior to the entire world, *just as the cosmographer existed prior to the appearance of the map.*'²⁶ Cusanus later even underlines the concept: "*in so far as he is the cosmographer, he is the creator of the world*".' Yet, in my opinion this initial self-awareness of the contingent construction of the map was lost in the same subtle arrogance later expressed by Cusanus: the cosmographer creates the map in the same way God rationally created the world, 'well-orderly and proportionally', forgetting thus in the comparison some

²⁴ Woodward, 2007; pp. 12-22.

²⁵ J. B. Harley in Sullivan, 2011; p. 83.

²⁶ Woodward, 2007; p. 18. Cusanus quotations are from his *Compendium*, 1464. My emphasis.

important aspects of the mapping process and its cartographic logic that, if overlooked, bring to the ‘graphic prejudice’ and the illusory identity between map and the world.

The first step of the reasoning is a fundamental problem of cartography, the **process of selection** of the information to be represented, which found its basis in the expression of the “*perfect imperfection*”. Such principle follows the rationale that in any pictures should represent only what is substantial and essential, omitting what is secondary and could distract from the message of the pictorial work. (It is the equivalent of the rhetoric figure of *aposiopesis*, the ‘sudden becoming silent’); the deliberate absence of certain information on behalf of what is considered important and essential. Indeed privileging qualities as ‘naturalness, verisimilitude, proportions and the perfection understood as the standing out of the essential over the inessential’ set an algorithm able to select the items to be represented.²⁷ This selection, or **elision** as described by Robert Sullivan, can be technical, functional, more subtly ideological or evidently political. Whatever the case, it is an arbitrary choice.²⁸

With the selection occurs thus the creation of the first system of reference of the triangulation (see 4.1.2), which is then projected over the abstract plane of space, the map or the sheet of paper. What we tend to forget here is that the abstract **Euclidean space** is by itself a system of reference, with its own characteristics and rationality: *homogeneity* of the objects, that means their equivalence in nature once referred to in identical signs, so their reduction into ‘standards’; *continuity*, meaning that the spatial extension is not interrupted and therefore the simple contiguity can extend the objects’ qualities; lastly *isotropy*, is the property of having the same qualities no matter the direction they extend. All these properties will eventually influence the structure of the state itself, once it will be given to the state its own geographical symbol, the territory, and the relation between the physical territory and its representation is rendered bidirectional. Moreover, the **projection** on a plane permits a couple more relevant cognitive shifts: it detaches the viewer from the representations, as were flying over them; and the progressive shift from oblique view to orthogonal perspective, combined with the use of coordinates, empowered the apparent immediate, full ‘visual’ knowledge of the model from above (yet again, of only what was previously selected). Moreover, even if it is reproduced on a delimited material support, the map with clear borders of the page, conceptually it implies the virtual extension of the represented space into in-

²⁷ The phrase “*imperfect perfection*” is taken from Cardinal Gabriele Paleotti’s “*Discussion on the sacred and profane images divided in five books*”, 1594, quoted by Farinelli as the exhaustive contemporary description of the underlying logic that brought the supremacy cartographic image over any other visual representation in the 16th century, before it became subtly absorbed in the general thinking. Farinelli 1997, pp. 47-49.

²⁸ Sullivan, 2011, pp. 83-86 and p. 96.

finity, “beyond the map” so to speak, enabling and to some extent thrusting of a movement of expansion forward.²⁹

3.2.4 Ideology and the ‘Graphical Bias’

The importance of this cognitive shift is often underestimated, and thus unconsciously cartographical projection truly becomes an ‘ontological device’: it changes the nature of the object, as the relation between the map and world, from unidirectional, from the sensible to the intelligible, becomes bidirectional, with abstractions influencing the world. This happens also thanks to the illusion that, as J. B. Harley exhaustively put it, cartography is considered as a ‘factual science’ and its basis is that maps are a ‘transparent window on the world’³⁰. This apparent factuality justified by the scientific rationality and positivist approach helps what Lucien Febvre defined as the ‘graphic bias’, i.e. the tendency of considering everything that presents a formal resemblance as equal in nature³¹. This process is indeed enhanced by means of the ‘perfect imperfection’ and projection described above and the general characteristics of the Euclidean space that give the illusion of the map as the accurate representation of reality. Such illusion is the underlying ideology that conceals the patterns of the cartographic reasoning that initially forms the maps and eventually, thanks to this formal equivalence on the cognitive level, modifies also reality (see also par. 3.1.2).

3.3 Continuity, Homogeneity and Isotropy: the three characteristics of the modern state

Farinelli, analyzing in several chapters of the *Crisis of the Cartographic Reasoning* what he calls the “mystery of the State”, uses the cartographic terms of the Euclidean characteristics in order to underline the analogical inference of the map on the structure of the modern nation-state, for the same features have been detected with different name in other social sciences³². These three characteristics indicate the presence of the cartographic reasoning and are thus the typical features of the modern territorial approach of the nation-state.

²⁹ Such limitedness of the space and its simultaneous potential infinity beyond the edges could also have helped conceptually the Age of the Discovery and the European oceanic explorations (see Farinelli, 2003, p. 13) and even though we cannot enter the rulers’ heads of the time, there definitely were conceptions of expansionism related to maps: see Kagan and Schmidt in Woodward, 2007, p. 665, and the quotation from Christopher Marlowe’s play *Tamburlaine the Great*: “give me a map. Then let me see how much / Is left for me to conquer the world”.

³⁰ From his quotation in Sullivan, 2011; p. 83.

³¹ “*Pregiudizio grafico*” from the Italian translation quoted in Farinelli, 2003, pp. 129-30.

³² The Portuguese jurist and historian A. M. Espanha, when dealing with the development of absolutist monarchies in early modernity from a History of Law’s point of view, uses the terms “unity, polarization and homogeneity”, which eventually refers to the same phenomena. Farinelli 2009, p. 100.

3.3.1 Continuity

The first and more evident is *continuity*, referring to the assumption that the simple *contiguity* of similar objects creates a uniform space where a property is transmitted or a function operates evenly. Historically, it is a development that clearly followed the formation of the nation-states, with the regular incorporation of different political units with the limits and jurisdiction of one single state and Farinelli brings as example the expansion of the Muscovite state from the 15th century, that spread over the contiguous steps eastward, regardless of the geographical conditions or different ethnic tribes.³³ In its first stages, the common unifying property of the state is here authority, that will turn into sovereignty, when political power from its personal attributes will be rendered more and more impersonal and reified. Continuity and delimited space nevertheless imply also a discontinuity ‘at the edges’ and the concepts of frontier and border. In chapter 2, we have seen already the importance of contiguity in the legal determination of the state territory, continuity, as the presumption that ideally no other condition than **distance** (or better the inclusion within a certain distance, i.e. within borders) is important in the exercise of state’s authority/sovereignty. It becomes also one of its cartographic preconditions.

3.3.2 Homogeneity

Continuity creates already a physical *homogeneity* that Farinelli identifies initially with the physical removal of ambiguous terrains such as swamps and marshlands. Indeed, in this perspective, extensive land amelioration works undertaken by state authorities had been for many countries (Germany and Italy as example) the first national common efforts as a unified state as territory-shaping activity, and the transformation into manageable dry land of inaccessible and unproductive areas is the material homogenization of the territory. This conceptual physical homogeneity, however, has theoretical spill-overs: a double qualitative transformation, that unfolds the analogy with the cartographic image of the state on a map: firstly the conceptual shift from territory as the limits within an authority is expressed (as in the *jus justinianus*) to the authority/sovereignty becoming an intrinsic characteristic, part of the soil itself, and thus extends its properties over extensions that had been naturally excluded before, the seas³⁴. Secondly, homogeneity has then been historically associated in the field of political science as

³³ Ibid, pp.78-79.

³⁴ Sovereignty as an intrinsic characteristic is also described as the ‘objectivistic concept of territory’, Farinelli, 2009, p. 87. The shift from authority to impersonal sovereignty is reflected also in titles when kings of people became kings of lands: e.g. the king of France in the 12th century from *Rex Francorum* (of the French) became *Rex Franciae* (of France). Kagan and Schmidt in Woodward, 2007, p. 667.

the ‘similarity in habits and customs’ and Farinelli clearly states to refer it to the concept of nationality, which certainly helps mobilizing the population as a whole, unifying every one as the nation³⁵.

3.3.3 Isotropy

Isotropy is then the final result of the previous features plus the projection of linear perspective. The term traditionally used in physics defining the uniformity in all directions or as defined by Farinelli “*the equality of the parts [of a whole] as regard the direction*”³⁶. This could be too general a definition, which, one could argue, wrong-foots the reasoning done so far. Quite the opposite, it helps in deepening the effects of the analogical inference “map-state”. Until now the characteristics of continuity and homogeneity are more qualitative relations, dealing with qualities of the parts. Isotropy instead affects the structure directly, indeed directing the previous elements in a typical pattern. Cartographically, the configuration is the one of linear perspective: all the points and lines are directed towards the vanishing point. Similarly, in the case of the state, it is **centralization** where all the elements are functionally oriented towards the capital³⁷, once again in a bidirectional way, either from the parts to the center or from the center to the parts³⁸. It is exactly isotropy that transforms the particular homogeneity of each state into the institutional uniformity common to all the modern nation-states, once they have assimilated the implicit structure of the map-state pattern.

3.3.4 Alternative cartographies: the example of Imperial China

However, a clear example of the non-consequentiality of the presence of mathematical cartographic techniques alone and the development of the cartographic reasoning and the nation-state is the unfolding of cartography in China throughout its imperial history. It is beyond doubt that already in ancient times the Chinese were advanced in mathematical calculation that permitted them accurate astronomical estimations and developed already from the Han dynasty (206BC-220AD) and especially during the Song dynasty (960-1276AD) scaling, an abstract sign system and accurate grid system for topographic

³⁵ The ‘similarity in habits and customs’ that makes the Prince’s administration easier on territory is an expression used already by Macchiavelli and Guicciardini, Farinelli, 2009, p. 80.

³⁶ Farinelli, 2003, p. 12. The etymology of the word is then from the Greek composed word *hisos* “equal” and *tropos* direction.

³⁷ Farinelli, 2009, p. 86.

³⁸ An excellent example is what the 19th century Italian political philosopher Carlo Cattaneo (1801-1869) described as the ‘*Richelieu’s Principle*’: where the new centralized state structure made France and her people “*understand an only language; adore an only standard; [...] keep their eyes fixed on an only city; which wants and thinks for all the others; which for all the others rebels or for all the others surrenders*”, quoted in Farinelli, 1997, p. 54. My emphasis.

maps³⁹, which were utilized for the usual military and administrative purposes. For these mathematical/cartographic, along with printing techniques, and actual artifacts, the Chinese cartography was considered advanced and the step to the introduction of European cartographic techniques in during the Qing Dynasty (1644-1912AD) was short. Yet, nothing as a cartographic revolution ever took place.

Reasons for this are certainly a different conception of space, where distance was not considered in an exclusive sense in boundaries, but inclusive, where authority irradiated from the center (capital city/Emperor) and integrated the other countries into the Chino-centric cosmologic worldview⁴⁰. Another argument brought forth by Cordell D. K. Yee is that despite the quantitative and mathematical aspects of some maps, they were never systemically produced and there is no support for the argument of a continued tradition of measured mapping. Moreover, they represented a small portion of the wider range of graphic representation of space painted on silk or engraved on wood, which were clearly pictorial.⁴¹ Therefore, two parallel traditions were equally present, one we could call scientific and one descriptive; and yet accuracy, distance and narrative description were held as equally important. There has always been a complementary relation between image and text, or even between image and the word itself⁴², that persisted also in more recent times during the last dynasty and permeated all social strata, bureaucratic elite included although they had more frequent access to European cartography⁴³.

It is only with the decline of the imperial system of the late 19th century, that cartography and the geographical image of China blended with nationalistic ideas creating an 'emblem' which everyone could identify with⁴⁴. Nonetheless, if this identification would remain on the nationalistic scheme, it would fall on the characteristic of homogeneity, discussed above. The Euclidean characteristics are the signs of the presence of wider conception of nation-state that instantiates both the cartographic and legal

³⁹ Cordell D. K. Yee, 1998a, in Harley and Woodward, figure 3.1. and 3.13. p. 36 and p. 48.

⁴⁰ Such attitude has been popularized by the sentence "[One] under Heaven", and the very same name *Zhonghua / Zhongguo*, "Middle Kingdom", reveals the traditional Sino-centric worldview.

⁴¹ Cordell D. K. Yee, 1998a, in Harley and Woodward, pp. 53-55.

⁴² Ibid, pp. 58-63. Ideograms indeed blend the visual and conceptual aspect of wording in a way that remains mysterious for alphabetical languages.

⁴³ "The history of cartography in China was not the imposition of science on a weaker recipient. [...]" Mapmakers, like astronomers "were member of the elite imbued with traditional values, who supplemented and strengthened indigenous science, not to discard it, and their loyalty remained with their ancestral worldview". 'Traditional Chinese Cartography and the Myth of Westernization', Cordell D. K. Yee, 1998b, in Harley and Woodward, p. 200.

⁴⁴ Wachman, 2005; pp. 34-37.

techniques, which definitely took place also in China together with modernization and the end of the Empire⁴⁵.

The fact that the nation-state would have prevailed as the political structure was not a certainty at all: in the early modernity there were in Europe many competing political structures that contradicted one or more of the three Euclidean features: Empires (which traditionally ignores cultural homogeneity) or trading cities confederations (which, despite any contiguity, worked on the basis of an open network rather of a centralized unity). In Farinelli's opinion, what helped in the process is definitely the conceptual progression from absolute monarchies to nationalism, but first and foremost the "ontological machine" of the system map-state, because it provides the mental, conceptual support for the abstraction of the state.

3.4 The possible post-modern territorial discontinuity in IR: the multi-perspectival polity

After having analyzed historically the legal and cartographico-technical aspects of territory as political tool, comes easily the conclusion that the cartographic reasoning is indeed a pervasive logic that developed all over modernity and helped the conceptualization of the modern nation-state. This understanding has been a crescent concern also in the discipline of International Relations since the beginning of the 1990s, when globalization and international integration processes showed that the strict pattern of territory could not explain unilaterally anymore the socio-economic practices occurring. John Ruggie actually criticized already in 1993 the lack in IR of the possibility to study such discontinuity in the international system, "*that is, [...] addressing the question of whether the modern system of states may be yielding in some instances to post-modern forms of configuring political space*"⁴⁶. This is actually the original heuristic point of departure of this research, when the evolving situation in the Arctic is in my opinion a topical event where two conceptions of cognitive representations of the World are co-existing: the modern cartographic and the multi-perspectival post-modern one. The question is to which degree are they present and whether one is dominating the other.

⁴⁵ A shift that is reflected in the sudden emphasis on the integrity of the motherland rather than on the irradiating unquestioned prestige of the Empire.

⁴⁶ Ruggie, 1993; pp. 143-44. As Ruggie points out it is important also to remember that 'modern' in its original sense means 'pertaining to what now exists', and only with the 18th century started extending to a specific time frame including the Enlightenment, the Renaissance and capitalist relations, i.e. the very period of the transformations that created the modern mode of political space organization, the system of territorial states. Ibid, p. 148.

Though I understand that the concept of event entails endless philosophical discussion, I will adhere to its most general meaning: event is what is topical and happening (see also par. 4.2.1, note 11).⁴⁷ I consider here “event” as the manifestation of a changed perception, expressed in a divergence from typical representational characteristics and behavioral patterns. “*Yet, what is the universe of discourse and practices to which [this divergence] pertains?*” asks Ruggie. The argument presented in the next chapter is that this particular universe of discourse and practices is the specific *order of discourse* of the cartographic reasoning, expressed mainly in the terms of the three Euclidean characteristics (par. 4.2).

However, if we want to express the ‘post-modern discontinuity’ there are, in Ruggie’s wording, numerous possible answers, yet not all are of equal interest. An easy theoretical point of departure could be the logical inversion of the cartographical features (e.g. the presence of disjointed, heterogeneous and decentralized sub-national entities). Another possible approach could be Vollaard’s essay “*The Logical of Political Territoriality*”, where, skimming Robert Sack’s 24 facets of territoriality, he comes to four political implications⁴⁸, that resemble the concept described above: geographical fixity (the symbolic aspect of territory⁴⁹), impersonality (homogeneity as the *tabula rasa*), geographical exclusivity (continuity) and centrality (isotropy). Using them as variables, he theorizes a good analytical tool in order to avoid Agnew’s territorial trap (see 2.4), yet each aspect can be derived in various ways that often intermingle: e.g. the sense of belonging to an area can be triggered by personal relations (kinship or dynastic territoriality) or functional; pre-existent multiculturalism contrasts the territory as an ‘emptiable’ space, regardless of people and phenomena’, ideal for planning; the openness/closeness of borders can affect centrifugal or centripetal (cross-border or exclusive policies).

An exhaustive classification of all these possibilities and the theorization of some coherent representation of these global post-modern dynamics, which would form a comparative model to the cartographic reasoning, would be useful for a more complete analysis but it lies beyond the scope of this investigation, and could be the topic of future research. I would thus adhere to Ruggie’s “*multi-perspectival*

⁴⁷ Casati, Roberto and Varzi, Achille, “Events”, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2010 Edition).

⁴⁸ Vollaard, 2009, pp. 693-98.

⁴⁹ Adding more to this aspect, Thongchai Winichakul, in his book “*Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation*”, conceives the state as a *geo-body*, ‘a territorial entity produced by the new conditions of knowledge-production’, and this geo-body ‘becomes naturalized and its soil endowed with primordial sentiment’; the map becoming a “meta-sign” bears and creates meanings of its own’, and increases blending with other powerful nation-building discourses. Yet, the concept of ‘geo-body’ is again just the description of the recursive self-generating process of the state as a complex system described in Chapter 2 (See 2.2.3 and 2.3.3). Unfortunately I was not able to retrieve the book so I had to rely on featured reviews of Winichakul’s work. Especially Prasenjit Duara, Featured review of “*Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation*”, 1994, in the *American Historical Review*, Vol. 100, No 2, p. 478.

polity". He convenes as well that what he calls the 'differentiation' (i.e. the separation in individual properties of what was common to all humans) in territorial sense as the result of changes in several domains of social life, material, social and cognitive. The latter he calls "social epistemes", including political doctrines and metaphysics and spatial constructions and act as specific social carriers and practices: one in particular to which he attaches special attention is that 'the specificity of modern territoriality is closely link to the specificity of single-point perspective (i.e. the cartographic technique of projection, see 3.2). Moreover, the post-modern refusal of positivistic methods of research, it does not impede the investigation of 'change', when analyzing either structures or preferences (or constructions in this case) as 'forces', or simply as social facts⁵⁰ (in the same way described in framework of Wendt's scientific realism) or likewise as 'social events' (see Fairclough's Critical Discourse Analysis, par. 4.3.1).

Proposed examples of multi-perspectival polity are then: the European Communities (nowadays European Union) with their patterns of collaboration and integration through neofunctionalism (and more importantly in my opinion the concept of *subsidiarity*, that dealing with specific problems empowers the 'closest', most appropriate local authorities, and the consequent *new regionalism*⁵¹); the non-territorial region of action of the economy, i.e. the World (where movement, of money in particular supersedes localization, the local production of wealth); and what Ruggie calls the 'transformative potential of global ecology', that could compromise a new set of spatial, metaphysical and doctrinal constructs through which a global awareness could be based on.⁵² All these new global patterns are present in the contemporary Arctic, where the global dimension of environmental threats (global warming and pollution) triggered forms of cooperation among states (namely the Arctic Council), and world-wide economic drives call for the exploitation of untapped natural resources, making of the new territorial awakening of the last decade an exceptional opportunity to examine in the states perceptions of territory (i.e. their Arctic Strategies) whether such divergence in the modern territorial representations is actually taking place and to which degree.

⁵⁰ Ruggie, 1993; pp. 168-70.

⁵¹ See Hörnström, 2010, Chap. 2 "From centralist redistributive policy to new regionalism", pp. 9-26.

⁵² Ibid, pp. 173-74.

CHAPTER 4 – Critical Discourse Analysis and the contemporary Arctic

According to the premises of the previous chapters, states are then complex social processes, that emerge possessing *personhood* and *intentionality*, and ‘as persons’ they have organized themselves into a common Culture, the International Legal System, that, besides defining their existence, regulates their means of communication and action between each other. State territory is also defined as one of its essential part, yet not as a natural attribute caused by the mere appropriation of land by a community, as Schmitt theorized, but as the result of legal and technical practices: the principles of sovereignty and effectivity on the one hand and the cartographic reasoning on the other.

It is only considering all the legal, historical and philosophical aspects underlined above, it is possible to reframe any geopolitical discourse regarding territorial disputes. One could examine all the political, military, economical motivations behind territorial claim, however they would eventually explain why it happened in that certain moment: they would be the contingent cause. The overarching idea is that the state, acting as an international person within the International Legal System, while disputing new portions of territory, is communicating perceptions and intentions over that area. These intentions will reflect the state’s approach towards that territory and region, and therefore express whether it adheres to the practices of the international Culture, and it should present simultaneously the peculiar patterns or perspectives, typical of the modern nation-state.

4.1 The ‘Arctic Strategies’ as performative and territorial representations

Within these conceptions, the contemporary political situation of the Arctic is an ideal situation for a dynamic analysis of the states’ approach towards territory. Their Arctic Strategies have an international relevance as they are issued exactly during that period of time when discourses on the Arctic changed drastically, from the Arctic as cooperation ground, to the general apprehension of a renewed rush for natural resources that could endanger international peace and stability. Although, as it will be explained in the following chapter, it is clear that this commotion is eventually by a misperception of the process of normalization of the legal status of the Arctic Ocean after the commitment of the Arctic States to the United Nations Convention on the Law Of the Sea, and therefore the *territorialization* of the seas. However, there is more to the mere legal aspect. The Arctic Strategies published by the Arctic States are also a concise textual synthesis of what each state considers of its territory and the Arctic region in general, and at the same time they perform the role of conveying these intentions to the widest audien-

ce, domestic and international, as part of the concept of ‘Public diplomacy’ in a strict narrow diplomatic framework¹, but also in a geographical sense they have a high performative value, both to the domestic and international level. Using Woodward and Lewis’ explanation of Non-Western Spatial thought and expression² (see table 1), although being material, in my opinion the Arctic Strategies clearly belong to the category of performance cartography as they are the written form of a *process*, i.e. the state’s policy over the territory, and realize the internal experience of spatial constructs, that is ‘territory’ as the product of the legal-technical practices described in chapters 2 and 3, in particular it is shaped by the three characteristics of the cartographic reasoning (par 3.3). Though their performance is not yet complete, they do declare the states’ *intentions* on a long term and, by hypothesis, describe in the most concise and yet articulated way the states’ perception and projection of their own territory.

INTERNAL (Inner Experience)	EXTERNAL (processes and objects that realize or externalize the internal experience)	
COGNITIVE CARTOGRAPHY (thoughts, images)	PERFORMANCE CARTOGRAPHY (performance, processes)	MATERIAL CARTOGRAPHY (records, objects)
Organized images such as spatial constructs	<i>Non-material and ephemeral</i> gesture, ritual, song, poem, dance, speech. <i>Material and ephemeral</i> model and sketch	<i>In situ</i> Rock art, displayed maps <i>Mobile comparable maps</i> Paintings, Drawings, Sketches, Models Textiles, Ceramics.

Table 1, Categories of Representations of non-Western Spatial Thought and Expression, Woodward and Lewis, 1998.

The Arctic Strategy Papers are thus relevant research material from both the perspectives that see them as the performative territorial expression of the states of a broader internalized cognitive logic (i.e. the extension of territory and the ‘cartographic reasoning’ over the sea through space,) and the simulta-

¹ ‘Public Diplomacy’ in broad term is ‘a political advertising’ conducted by diplomats, and could be conducted by the embassies, but also by the Foreign Ministry itself. Berridge, 2002, pp. 125-26. The same procedure is to be found in the publishing of most of the Arctic Strategies, coordinated by the Foreign Ministries, at least in the cases of Norway and Finland in particular. In this light the Strategies belong also to another of the conventional diplomacy’s aims: ‘Clarifying intentions’. Ibid, pp. 121. Without doubt these additional international purposes influence the *genre* of the Arctic Strategies towards the promotional aspect of governance *genre* (par. 4.3.2).

² In Woodward and Lewis, 1998, p. 3. Even if the table is referring to so-called non-Western cultures, the anthropological frame of the categorization permits the comparison also with the International Culture as “[t]he elements of thought and meaning which lie at the base of any logical integrated system of culture may be considered under two aspects: the internal and the external” Sorokin in Woodward and Lewis, 1998; p. 3 note 6. He continues saying the internal is more important to study for the student of Culture, who is nevertheless constrained by material evidences to study also the external. Thus the internal, cognitive cartography is state territory defined through the cartographic reasoning, which the Arctic Strategies are the procedural expression of.

neous product of the agency of the state that expresses in textual form through a specific *genre*, the ‘governance genre’ of Policy documents (see par. 4.3.1 ‘Genre’).

Being these documents the written form of a communicative act, the methodology of analysis of the material will be based on a specific kind of Discourse Analysis, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), for its analytical effectiveness in determining the presences of discourses, understood here as representations and perspectives of part of the World (par. 4.3.1 ‘Discourse(s)’), and its decisive critique of ideologies and their unperceived effects on the construction or reproduction of social practices. Some of the concepts already expressed in the previous chapters will be repeated here using a linguistic/discursive terminology.

4.2 Discourse and Critical Discourse Analysis

The interest in language, what and the way people interact between each other and reproduce habits and social practices, was the heuristic starting point for what in Social Theory is called the ‘linguistic turn’.³ Various utilized in many different disciplines, Discourse Analysis (DA) is a useful tool for the qualitative analysis of any form of communication: from simple conversations, to interviews, ethnographic reports, newspapers or even short exchanges at the shop. Its importance comes for the realization that language does not only depict reality as usually perceived but in any social context determines the context and the action of the social actors, according to certain patterns⁴. The detection of such patterns and the consequent relations between social agency and structure are the most relevant findings of this approach. In particular, it challenged the individualistic and utilitarian rationality of previous IR theories, which crystallized categories and human/social behavior on oversimplified rational models, lacking of any insight on the contextual environment where the social actors and the theories themselves developed in. For these reasons, DA is widely utilized in different IR theories (from Critical Theory and Constructivism to post-colonialism and feminism), with a peculiar trend towards a post-structuralist approach, which emphasizes the social construction of meanings, the linguistic construction of reality and the historicity of knowledge⁵. It can be said in other words, it emphasizes the social creation of the various representations of the World (discourses), on their transmission and effects on societies, identities and actions (social practices).

³ Entry Discourse in the *Encyclopedia of Social Theory*, 2005; pp. 203-4. Starting already with de Saussure’s works in the first half of the 20th century, the linguistic turn had its momentum especially after the 1970s with Foucault’s theorization of Discourse and the Critical Theory in social sciences.

⁴ Gee, 1999; p. 11.

⁵ Campbell, 2007; p. 209.

The innovation of Critical Discourse Analysis is that, following neo-Marxist critiques on the Gramscian concept of 'hegemony', it is a renewed degree of investigation that does not stop on the level of meaning alone, but also on that of assumptions. From this approach there are principally three themes: first that ideologies⁶ are mainly placed in the 'unsaid', whenever the so-called 'background knowledge' (naturalization) can be used as an obfuscation of ideological processes; secondly that also norms of interaction, the 'context, can be ideological; thirdly, a theorization of Power in discursive terms, that is the capability to shape *orders of discourse* (see par. 4.3.1) and arrange themes in a more or less consciously desired order of importance.⁷ This degree of analysis is also stressed by Neumann, who state the appropriateness of Discourse Analysis (the adjective Critical is omitted here, but it could be easily assumed) for the search of the hegemonic patterns and alternative representations. The identification and the search of asymmetries of these representations make possible the assessment on the 'openness' of the discourse (i.e. whether only one or more discourses are present and which one is dominant) and their layering and problematization of the dominant ones enable the investigation on the scope or the degree of social construction in the relationship between 'fact' and 'representation'.⁸

Here is then evident the assumption of *ontological realism*, i.e. the supposition of the existence of an external reality, which eventually affects the social constructions (coherent with Wendt's scientific realism). Through this precondition, CDA sees language and particularly its discursive practices (later defined as social practices) as the mediation of the social events with the material reality and social constructions.⁹ What is happening with the re-nationalization and politicization of the Arctic is not just the revival of Geopolitics, but the ideological struggle of different visions/representations on what the

⁶ Originally theorized as a 'system of beliefs that naturalized inequality through false consciousness', nowadays it is agreed to have a more dynamic definition where meanings became patterned, stabilized and objectified; and once institutionalized they conversely affect the meaning making of individuals. These processes do not only hide the ways Power realize inequality, but also constitute it. In short, reifies and deceives, what is historically and socially constructed. See the entry 'Ideology', by Susan Silbey in *The Cambridge Dictionary of Sociology*, 2006, pp. 278-79.

⁷ Fairclough, 1995, p. 23-24. Or as Torfing describes it, "[d]iscursive practices are said to be ideological in so far they contribute to the naturalization of contingently constructed meanings" and ideological discourses are produced "in order to maintain their hegemonic power or establish a counter-hegemony"; Torfing, 2005, p.7. The importance of the CDA approach in this research is indeed to detect and challenge the "normality" of the hegemonic status of themes or discourses represented in political and in our case strategy policy documents.

⁸ Neumann 2008, p. 70-74.

⁹ See Fairclough 2003, pp. 14-15; Wendt, 1999, pp. 51-64.

There are however relevant critiques to this assumption: as Torfing points out that to rely too heavily on this 'critical realism' is a risk in reducing possibilities on an overwhelmingly independent social structure; Torfing, 2005; p.7. I partially agree with his argument, in the sense that symbols and meanings belonging to this structure, do change. Yet, an accurate analysis of the dynamics of these changes would require not only an historical investigation on the formation of the role and identity of the State as social actor in general, as tentatively was done in the first chapter, but also of each individual states taken under investigation, on a broader time-lapse and research material.

Arctic in particular and territory in general, actually is or should be. Being one of the leading scholars of this critical approach, the analytical framework will be based on two works of the British linguist Norman Fairclough, *Critical Discourse Analysis* and *Textual Analysis for Social Research*.

4.2.1 CDA Framework and Vocabulary

Framework of textual analysis

According to Fairclough's 'critical realist' philosophy of science¹⁰, social reality is a continuous mediation of practices between established social structures and individual agency. *Social structures* are very abstract entities (such as an economic structure or a language) that define what is possible. *Social events* are 'what is topical/what is happening'¹¹ and texts are parts and often expression of these occurrence. The mediation between the potential of structure and the actual of the event are the *social practices*, called also *order of discourse*, which in discursive terms are the 'particular combination of genres, discourses and styles', or the social structuring and control of language variation: the possibilities where choice is socially structured.

In these terms, the *social structure* under investigation is the contemporary International Legal System, which structured as a society of rational and recognized people (the states), with its own customs and practices that defines the existence and space of actions of its members. The *social event* occurring is the modern states' relatively late territorialization of the Arctic, and the question such event rises is whether this occurrence is following the traditional *social practice* of the cartographic territorial approach sketched in the previous chapters, or some variation is happening at the level of this *order of discourse*, i.e. the states' territorial approach. The Arctic strategy papers befall in this event as they are the most explicit textual form of the states' perception of their own territory, in politico-technological terms. I realize that I am considering linguistically the sole combination of genre/discourse/style, and a more complete analysis would require a similar research for all official document and declarations regarding the state's territorial approach, yet the particular genre of the Arctic Strategies belong to (see

¹⁰ Fairclough, 2003, p. 22.

¹¹ Fairclough never gives a clear definition of what he implies with the term "social event", expect in the glossary: "*Social structures define what is possible, social events constitute what is actual, and the relationship between potential and actual is mediated by social practices. Language (more broadly, semiosis) is an element of the social at each of these levels — languages are a type of social structure, texts are elements of social events, and orders of discourse are elements of (networks of) social practices. One consequence is that rather than starting from texts, one starts from social events (and chains and networks of events), and analyses texts as elements of social events.*" Ibid, p. 223, my emphases. Thus, I remain with the interpretation of term as the as the manifestation of a changed perception, expressed in a divergence from typical representational characteristics and behavioral patterns.

below) in my opinion makes them especially apt for the initial analysis of this work, that can be broadened in a successive research.

Of particular importance is also what Fairclough defines as the “Background Knowledge”: the orderliness of social interactions depending on what is seen as non-ideological, normal ‘common sense’.¹² This ‘naturalization’ of discourses can be part of the subject construction (in this case the property seems to be part of the institution), or is a notion of the dominant ideological formation (which in this case is perceived as a skill or technique necessary for the subject to assume a status).¹³ The ideology at work here, concerning territorial approaches, is the unquestioned, state-centered mono-perspectival nature of state territory, discourse that developed simultaneously with the formation of the modern states and followed the logic of cartographic reasoning through the three cartographic characteristics of continuity, homogeneity, and isotropy.

Genre

Genre is defined by Fairclough as ‘a way of acting in its discourse aspects’¹⁴. It thus represents agency expressed through texts. It may have different degree of abstraction (e.g. Narrative, Report, News Interview), but in the individual genre of a text can be analyzed in terms of: *activity*, what people are doing; *social relations*, the interaction between the social actor (hierarchical or solidaristic); *communication technology*: mediated or not, two ways or not. This classification is particularly important because policy documents, category which the Arctic Strategy Papers belong to, are considered a specific kind of genre, a *governance genre*, specialized in regulating and controlling other social practices, and therefore a relevant expression of Power in discursive form¹⁵.

The Arctic Strategies are thus official plans that, concerning the state’s *action*, declare the intentions and project each state is determined to realize. As for the *social relations* they stand for, the declarations have a quite wide audience: as a self-imposed commitment, it has a political weight both on the domestic and international level, yet, bearing in mind the international framework of the thesis, the most important aspect here is the assertion to the other social agents of the international scene (i.e. mainly other states) of the announcer’s plans and prerogatives. The *communication technology* is one-way and mediated as they usually take form of printed booklet or electronic communicate.

¹² Fairclough, 1995, p. 28.

¹³ Ibid, p. 41-42.

¹⁴ Fairclough, 2003, p. 215.

¹⁵ Ibid, p. 68 and p. 141.

Discourse(s)

At this point is better to distinguish the two main meanings of the term 'Discourse': abstract and specific discourse. Discourse, considered in its most wide and abstract sense (and written with capital 'D'), is a 'particular view of language in use'. In its specific sense, utilized as countable noun, 'discourses' are "different perspectives associated with different relations people have with the World, which in turn depend on their position in the world, their social and personal identities, and their social relationships in which they stand to other people"¹⁶. This comprehends also (geo)political representations. Assuming the 'ontological realism' of the existence of a reality external from the subjects or social actors (Fairclough's and Wendt's common assumptions, see note 9 above), these representations do not only represents the World as it is perceived, but project a vision, an ideal, representing a 'strategy' to change the world in particular directions. "Discourses are part of the resources people deploy to in relating one another, keeping separate, competing, collaborating, dominating and in seeking to change the way they relate"¹⁷. Discourses can be defined as different ways of representing: a) a part of the World, b) from a particular perspective. Thus, the identification of the main "themes" of the text and their perspective are the essential part of the research and of particular interest is also the spotting of the cartographic perspective signaled by the presence of the three Euclidean characteristics. Moreover, Harley's insights on the representation of space and time could be relevant for the territorial *order of discourse*.¹⁸ In short, the specific 'discourses' expressed all aspects delineated above will be the main object of research of thesis, which will be detected and analyzed in the different strategy papers.

Style, Modality and Evaluation

Though divided into different chapters, style, modality and evaluation are features of the text related with its author: *style* is the discursal aspect of ways of being, the author's identity; *modality* and *evaluation* are then the relation between the author and the representation, what one commits to, either on level of truth, obligations, necessity or values.¹⁹ These aspects 'texture' the identity of the author and it is possible through their analysis to extrapolate nuances on their attitude on particular issues. It is at this level that assumptions are more or less overtly expressed²⁰. Style and modality give thus a deeper insight in the manner the state not only expresses its intentions, as its territorial approach over the Arctic,

¹⁶ Fairclough 2003, p. 124.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid, p. 129.

¹⁹ For Style see ibid, p. 159. For Modality and Evaluation, ibid, pp. 162-63 and p. 166.

²⁰ See ibid, p. 170-71 for the modalization's markers and p. 173 for assumptions.

but also its opinion about itself and the World. Particularly the different styles of the publications show whether each Arctic State sees the management of the Arctic mostly as an internal affair or as an act of ‘clarification of intentions’, or as a promotional possibility.

Recontextualization, genre mixing and intertextuality

Elaborating on these three aspects of Discourse, genres are an important feature as they sustain the institutional structure of society²¹. Governance genres (typical of policy papers as the Arctic Strategies, governing and influencing how social practices happen, how ‘things are done’) are usually characterized by specific aspects of *recontextualization* (i.e. how elements of a social practice are relocated in the context of another). According to Fairclough, especially in the governance genre there are two general effects that are both present in the Arctic strategy papers with some relevant consequence. The first is the incidence the ‘*promotional genre*’ as a result of the ‘new capitalist’ order of discourse and of strategic action within an instrumental rationality²²: the promotional genre ‘represents, advocates and anticipates whatever it refers to’, hybridizing, mixing different generic features in order to reach and communicate to wider audiences and possibly obtain desired outcomes. The second is ‘globalization’ intended here as ‘a change of the scale of relationship’: governance genres have thus the property of relating and sustain the coexistence of different scales (local, national, regional, global and general).²³

Recontextualization as representation of the different discourses then works as a filter, the inner logic that through mechanisms of ‘exclusion/inclusion/prominence’ and ‘abstract/concrete representation’ shape the structure of the text. The principles of presence, abstraction, arrangement and addition will guide the analysis of the discourses, and particular attention will be spent on the means of *nominalization*, i.e. the usage of a general noun in describing an action or process, a linguistic resource utilized for generalization that usually ‘erases or suppresses differences and obfuscate agency and responsibility of the actors’, reinforcing thus ideological predominance through implicit practices.²⁴

A certain degree of interaction between the Arctic strategies themselves, is to be expected since some extent of causal correlation is present, especially when most of the Arctic States had issued their own together with other states and international organizations (as the European Union). Also *intertextuality*, i.e. the presence of elements from other texts, will be partly taken under consideration.

²¹ Ibid, pp. 32-33.

²² For Habermas’ strategic and communicative action see ibid, pp. 110-11.

²³ Ibid, pp. 33-34.

²⁴ Ibid, p. 139 and pp. 143-44.

4.2.2 The Cartographic Reasoning in textual form

Although continuity, homogeneity and isotropy may be considered too abstract concepts to be otherwise represented, I believe it is possible to be textually operationalized thanks also to the comprehension in the discipline of geography as well of ‘time and space’ as social conceptualization²⁵. Here follows an initial categorization in textual terms, inferred specifically from Farinelli’s classifications²⁶.

Continuity, related to concept of contiguity and distance, in the state’s perspective can be seen in its most concrete form as a stressed importance of *defined borders* and *territorial integrity*. Moreover, analyzing policy papers involved in programmatic action there can be also a temporal continuity expressed in terms commitment to a precedent of future constant state’s policy, which can be more or less defined in a specific period of time.

Homogeneity, referring to the equality in kind, can be defined accordingly in the steps of the previous original categorization in material and qualitative aspects (see 3.3.2): the material aspect of homogeneity may allude to the standardization of infrastructure and bureaucratic practices; while in its qualitative aspect hints at the sense of nationhood and unity of the nation’s effort. This aspect is markedly present in the style and the semantic manner the state/nation is actually represented.

Isotropy defined as ‘the equality of the parts as regard the direction’ (see 3.3.3) has been already equated with the specific pattern of the modern state’s organization, that is *centralization*, top-down actions. General references to sovereignty could be also a reaffirmation of the state’s centrality, especially when directly referring to specific state institutions legitimized for that specific action, though on a more theoretical level, I would better see the concept of sovereignty as a result of the three conditions altogether, and in its single attributes can be referred to continuity, as the extensions of borders over the seas is the result of land sovereignty, or to homogeneity, as sovereignty may be asserted as being exerted evenly.

These characteristics are by hypothesis the cartographic expression of the modern nation-state. The main question is then to realize to what degree and how these features are reflected in the Arctic Strategies (e.g. is intergovernmental cooperation taken under consideration and to what extent; is territorial exclusivity an essential part of the state policy or are also soft-border initiatives considered; to what

²⁵ See Harvey in Fairclough, 2003, pp. 152-53. Also Unwin, 1992, pp. 203-204 for the development of the interpretation of (time-)space in geography in the last decades of the 20th century.

²⁶ Farinelli, 2009, pp. 74-79; p. 86.

extent are minorities recognized and participate in the decision-making process; are similarly local administrations and civil society?). Moreover, the aspects of temporality and ‘scale’ will be considered as they are indicative of the relation between past, present and future, or the local, national, regional and global level. In this sense, Fairclough underlines that the representations of time-space are not just the representation of time *and* space, but their interrelation with particular social relations and identities.²⁷ Keeping in mind the fact that this kind of analysis is most effective on short texts and interviews or parts of it, for the purpose of this investigation, it will be enough to point out the predominant temporal perspective and scale and their use (e.g. future-oriented? Expressed in a specific or general manner? Possible predominance of a specified time-space on the others), considering each strategy as a single act of communication in a wider dialogue between the other Arctic states and international actors.

4.3 The extension of territoriality over space: the example of the contemporary Arctic

The release of the Arctic Strategies that occurred in the last decade is then, also in linguistic terms, the “social event” that discloses a possible change in the social practices of the *order of discourse* of the territoriality of the modern nation-states, in particular its extension over the seas and the tensions between national and global interests²⁸. Moreover, the logic of the extension of sovereignty expressed in the United Nations Convention on the Law Of Seas (UNCLOS) supports the argument against Schmitt’s land-appropriation principle in favor of effective sovereignty.

Precisely after the 2nd World War, a new process of “institutionalization” and codification of the International Law took place and brought to a progressive standardization of procedures and measurements regarding the many international territorial issues, without a supranational authority as such, but rather following the precedent principle of each state’s self-limitation. The so-called “land-appropriation” has been gradually replaced by customs and conventions regrouped into a recognized procedure which defines all forms of territorial change (from occupation, to annexation, secession, merging etc.) with consequent rights and duties. In these last decades the principle guiding the territorial legal reasoning has been clearly either stemming from a previous legal title or the one of “effective sovereignty” (see par. 2.1.2). The former is utilized when determining sovereignty on land (see par. 2.3.2 with exception of

²⁷ Fairclough, 2003, pp.152-54. My emphasis. He briefly proposes the analysis of management’s global space-time as an example of highly abstract construction, able to pervasively perform on any level of scale, from the workplace space-time to one of a European Union policy document.

²⁸ see Ruggie’s discontinuity, par.3.4; and also par. 4.2.1 note 11.

the Antarctica, nowadays regulated by the regime of the Antarctic Treaty²⁹), while the latter works in the delineation of territoriality over the seas.

4.3.1 The territorial order's latest developments: Sovereignty over the sea

The codification of the Law of the Sea has a critical importance when dealing with the Arctic, because most of the international concern on the political situation of the region revolves on the territorial claims and their recognition over its maritime extensions. Already from a brief analysis of the legal framework and customs, in the development of the last decade it is possible to notice the same cartographic reasoning working also on the legal level. Indeed, the concept of sovereignty over the sea developed in a peculiar way that shows clearly how the principle of effective sovereignty slowly extended over areas previously considered a free space. In the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the sea has indeed been divided in a range of different parts that present a legal status with a decreasing level of exclusive rights as the distance from the coast increases (i.e. territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone, continental shelf). Without going too much into detail with the specific rights of each area³⁰, they all share *contiguity* with the land territory and the principle of effective sovereignty, specifically in the scope of exploitation of natural resources³¹.

A clear example is the notion of territorial sea, which developed from the original 3 nautical miles line, determined by the reach of the coastal artillery (see 2.2.4) and has been extended to 12 miles, because of the advance in contemporary military technology.³² Here the state enjoys *full sovereignty* (except for the right of innocent passage) that extends to the seabed and airspace. Likewise, also the state's jurisdiction over the 'contiguous zone' (up to 12 miles beyond the territorial sea) has the specific purpose of securing the 'peaceful exercise of state functions' (against smuggling, illegal immigration, or exter-

²⁹ Antarctica, the last continent to be explored on Earth, due to the extreme climatic conditions, has been 'territorially neutralized' with a multilateral treaty in 1959, the Antarctic Treaty, I.5778.

As stated in its introduction, the guiding principles of the treaty are the 'interest of mankind that Antarctica shall continue forever to be used exclusively to peaceful purposes and shall not become the scene or object of international discord. Art. 2 moreover states the freedom of scientific investigation to be conducted in a spirit of cooperation.

How these principles affect the territoriality in Antarctica are stated by Article 4, where 'nothing contained in this present treaty shall be interpreted as' a renunciation, diminution or constituting a prejudicial basis to any contracting party or previously asserted rights or claims on territorial sovereignty on Antarctica. None of these rights or claims can be modified in any form or new one asserted. Briefly, the situation has been frozen in the time of the redaction of the treaty, while all the activities in the continent, foremost scientific, have to be reported in advanced to the contracting parties.

³⁰ For more details see the Part II, IV and V of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 (UNCLOS).

³¹ For reference see the International Court of Justice Report on the North Sea Continental Shelf, quoted in Cassese, 2001, p. 60. The rights over the continental shelf are inherent and stem 'by virtue of its sovereignty over the land, and as an extension of it in an exercise of sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring the seabed and exploiting its natural resources'.

³² Ibid, p. 58.

nal interference). This gradual progression of territoriality is the result of a constant negotiation between the traditional notion of free sea, whose rights and principles remain unaltered in the in the Open Sea, and the technological improvements that made the exercise of sovereignty possible over these spatial extensions, in line with Elden's approach on territory as a legal-technical instrument, and once again it is possible to spot the cartographic reasoning's influence where *continuity* favors *homogenization*, e.g. equivalence in sovereign rights of territory and territorial sea, and *centralization*, expressed in the exclusivity of the rights over these portions of the sea, but especially by the *direction* of the rights stemming and extending from the land. Nevertheless, this contemporary territorial tendency favored by the nation-states, that allows exclusive exploitation in the individualistic principle of free competition³³, has been challenged by another concept that for its universal and undifferentiated resolutions has some global characteristic that might denote another shift in perspective in the dominant paradigm of territorial sovereignty.

4.3.2 The notion of Common Heritage of Humanity

The concept of the Common Heritage of Mankind is a rather new legal notion advanced by the Maltese UN Ambassador Arvid Pardo in 1967. Its rationale is a more solidaristic and community-oriented international legal regime for the exploitation of natural resources specifically of the international seabed, but that could be extended as a new general standard for any new discovery of resources to ensure the exploitation for peaceful purposes and the benefit of Mankind as a whole. Its main guidelines are:

1. the absence of the right of appropriation;
2. the duty to exploit in the interest of Mankind, meaning benefitting all countries, also the developing ones that cannot afford the costs of such activities;
3. the obligation to explore and exploit in peaceful means;
4. special regard to scientific research;
5. protect duly the environment.³⁴

Such principles were already expressed in different terms in the Antarctica Treaty (see note 3) and in the treaties codifying the exploration and use of Outer Space³⁵, responding in two independent ways the

³³ Ibid, p. 61.

³⁴ Ibid, particularly interesting is the introduction of the concept of protection of the environment, principle that will become more and more compelling especially in the Arctic due to the changing climatic conditions.

³⁵ Sovereignty over Outer Space has been regulated by the "Treaty on Principles governing the activities of the states in the exploration and use of Outer Space, including the moon and other celestial bodies", multilateral treaty signed in 1967.

need of demilitarization and simultaneously foster the international cooperation for a prohibitive scientific research to be conducted by an individual state.

This new concept has been received and assimilated in the UNCLOS (articles 136, 137, 141-5), yet its original plan for the establishment of an International Seabed Authority, with the task of managing the exploitation of these natural resources, but has been obstructed by the industrialized countries until the revision of the Convention of the 1994, where this Authority had been finally subjected to markets forces of efficiency and cost/effectiveness and minimal costs for the state members.³⁶

The 'watering down' of the concept of Common Heritage of Mankind for the sake entry into force of the UNCLOS shows clearly that the dominant reasoning of the convention is still one of exclusive sovereignty of the states. However, already Cassese pointed out that the principle of the Common Heritage of Mankind it is not actually selfless, but advanced in the interest of the developing countries, and still driven by self-interest not exactly of Mankind's. Yet, in my opinion, the Treaty on the Antarctica and the assimilation of the Heritage of Mankind in the UNCLOS were the first emergences of the importance (or necessity) of international cooperation for the advance of scientific research and in the protection of the environment, two themes that appeared and merged also in the Arctic in the beginning of the 1990s with the Rovaniemi Declaration (Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy): a non-binding multilateral agreement that started the Arctic cooperation and led to the institution of the Arctic Council³⁷. The open question is here whether, despite the territorialization of larger and larger area of the Arctic Ocean, could be possible that the individual reception by the states of the notions of environmental protection and scientific research as commons and the awareness of regional issues to be dealt cooperatively, empowering also local and indigenous communities (as the broader concept of a subnational system of the 'Europe of Regions' would suggest³⁸) would be assimilated and thus also reflected

The guiding principles stated in the introduction are the benefit of all people and cooperation among nations and people in the scientific and legal aspects of the exploration of the Outer Space in order to facilitate friendly relations. A clear statement defining the status of Outer Space is to be found in Article 1 where the Outer Space 'shall be province of mankind and free for exploration and use by all states with no discrimination whatsoever. Article 2 then develops the statement declaring that 'Outer Space is not subjected to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use, occupation or any other means'. *"Treaty on Principles governing the activities of the states in the exploration and use of Outer Space, including the moon and other celestial bodies"*, I.8843 27.Jan.1967.

³⁶ Ibid, p. 62.

³⁷ The Arctic Council is a high level intergovernmental forum to provide a means for promoting cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic States, with the involvement of the Arctic Indigenous communities and other Arctic inhabitants on common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic. Source: Arctic Council website.

³⁸ See Hömström, 2010, pp. 13-15. The somehow abstract concept of the *"Europe of Regions"* does not entail that the subnational level of local administration would override the role of the nation-states, which still determine the general policy-

in the Arctic Strategies, a sign of the discontinuity in the territorial approach of the modern nation-states that Ruggie already hypothesized, capable of blending both the logic of national sovereignty and both the global and local concerns.

making. However, through lobbying and networking they are demanding and often assuming a stronger influence also at the supra-national European level. Considering in principles some of the common patterns that occurred in the formation of the Arctic Council and the European Communities, such as the allocation of some state's prerogatives (though in the case of the Arctic Council these priorities remain in the sphere of soft security, e.g. sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic), it could be assumed that a similar empowerment of local authorities would happen also in Arctic thanks to the various cross-border initiatives and horizontal networking.

CHAPTER 5 – The Arctic States' Arctic Strategies: the cases of Norway, Russia and Finland

The publication of the Arctic States' Arctic Strategies is a rather recent event that occurred in a relatively short time-span: approximately 5 years, from the end of 2006 to the end of 2011¹. Some of the major causes for such a sudden renovated interest on the Arctic are to be found first in the 'crashing' of the myth of the Arctic as pristine and vigorous natural habitat provoked by the report '*Impacts of a Warming Arctic: Arctic Climate Impact Assessment*' in 2004², consequently the realization of the new opportunities regarding natural resources and shipping, and finally in the normalization of Arctic territorial disputes' resolution within the legal framework of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea³. Indeed, the ratification of the UNCLOS by most of the Arctic States in the same years and the following commitment expressed by the Arctic coastal states⁴, implied the acceptance of the international procedures for the determination of jurisdiction for the legitimate exploitation of resources, and brought certainly an aspect of stability in governance of the Arctic.

The Strategies are documents of various kind and form that nevertheless belong in different degrees to the same genre of policy documents, specifically a *governance genre* that reflects the states' perception of territory. An exhaustive study of whether the Arctic States still present a modern, delimited, nation-state centered conception of territory or a more networked, soft and diffused one, would have required the throughout analysis of all the eight Arctic States strategies, a work appropriate for a larger research

¹ In chronological order respectively: Norway, December 2006 (and March 2009); Russian Federation, September 2008 (though published in late March 2009); the United States, January 2009; Canada, March 2009; Finland, June 2010; Iceland, March 2011; Sweden, May 2011; Denmark, Aug 2011 (though a policy draft was published in Danish already in May 2008).

² '*Impacts of a Warming Arctic: Arctic Climate Impact Assessment*', Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme, 2004. The report was the first scientific proof that the Arctic not only is actually affected by local and global human activities, but also that it was in such an intensive way that could not recover the balance and was gradually warming up.

³ See paragraph 4.3.1 for the extension of sovereign rights over the seas.

⁴ The Arctic States ratified the UNCLOS in the following dates: Iceland, 21 June 1985; Finland, 21 June 1996; Norway, 24 June 1996; Sweden, 25 June 1996; Russian Federation, 12 March 1997; Canada, 7 November 2007; Denmark, 16 November 2004; the United States of America have yet not ratified the Convention.

The date of ratification is relevant because it finalizes the entry into force for the member state and according to UNCLOS Annex II Art. 4 "*Where a coastal State intends to establish, in accordance with article 76, the outer limits of its continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, it shall submit particulars of such limits to the Commission along with supporting scientific and technical data as soon as possible but in any case within 10 years of the entry into force of this Convention for that State.*" My emphasis.

See also the Iluissat Declaration, 28th May 2008. The Arctic coastal states, Canada, Denmark, Norway the Russian Federation and the United States, "*remain committed to this legal framework [Law of the Sea] and to the orderly settlement of any possible overlapping claims. This framework provides a solid foundation for responsible management by the five coastal States and other users of this Ocean through national implementation and application of relevant provisions. We therefore see no need to develop a new comprehensive international legal regime to govern the Arctic Ocean.*"

than this Master's thesis. Yet, even the study limited to three of them, Norway's, the Russian Federation's and Finland's Strategies, can bring forth important insights. Norway's is important not only because it has been the first country to produce such documents, presenting thus the typical characteristics of the genres, but also because the two consecutive strategy papers of 2006 and 2009, show already development of such approach in the short period. Russia's Strategy is then temporally the second strategy to be prepared (though published only six months after). Finally Finland's is relevant because it is the first of the European Union member states to have published its definitive Arctic Strategy and therefore by hypothesis could present the possible effects of European integration on the conception of territory (e.g. multilateral governance, subsidiarity, global awareness, typical of a post-modern perspective). Thus their initial analyses could be a start for a more extensive investigation on the cartographic expression of territory that, nevertheless, has to be the object of a successive work.

5.1 Norway – The Norwegian Government's High North Strategies, 2006-2009

The Norwegian Government's High North Strategy, 2006

Released in December 2006, by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *The Norwegian Government's High North Strategy* (shortened hence as the 'Strategy') is a 75-pages long pamphlet in Norwegian and in English, available also for downloading on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' website.

Author of the document is clearly the incumbent Norwegian cabinet (Stoltenberg II, 2005-2009) as it was prepared by an inter-ministerial committee aided by an external committee of experts and other local and regional organizations, and eventually signed under the name of the Prime Minister, Jens Stoltenberg.⁵ Nevertheless, as the Government is 'seeking to improve coordination and to maximize the effects of [their] effort' often it will be replaced by 'Norway' and 'Norwegian', as it states 'all this requires us to give our best as a nation'⁶.

The **genre** is definitely that of policy documents as the author states its priorities for achieving a specific goal, in this case the taking advantage of the opportunities of the High North, through lists and declarations of intentions and commitments. However, this strategy paper is something more than just a list of priorities, goal and means for achievement, since it is "more than just foreign policy, and more than just domestic policy" where the Government is committed to act as prime mover and facilitator. The last sentence of the 'Foreword' "[t]herefore this strategy is also an invitation to everyone with an

⁵ The Norwegian Government's High North Strategy, p. 6.

⁶ Ibid, p. 5-7.

interest in the Arctic” is a clear indication of the promotional aspect of the document. The presence of numerous pictures and also a map serve often the purpose of reaffirming on different level the themes proposed by the text⁷.

Beyond the seven declared priorities, and therefore political goals of the strategy⁸, the threads or the main **themes** of the Strategy are expressed in the 9 parts of the document, respectively: 1) Norwegian foreign policy; 2) Knowledge generation and competence building; 3) Issues related to indigenous people; 4) People-to-people cooperation in the north; 5) The environment; 6) The management and utilization of maritime resources; 7) Petroleum activities; 8) Maritime transport; 9) Business development. Main focuses of action throughout the strategy are indeed, energy (and petroleum activities), the environment and knowledge/know-how generation. This last aspect is described in length in part 2, the *modality* of the text is clearly in the field of necessity expressing both the lack and need of developing this capability, instrumental for the determination of jurisdiction, the management of resources and livelihood of the residents in the North, who are then the topic of the next parts (3 and 4).

Elements of **continuity** in the Strategy are the particular emphasis is put on the consistency and predictability of policy of the government and management procedures in line with Norway’s priorities, and the importance of the clear determination of jurisdiction and commitment to abide international law regarding the solution of border issues⁹. Nevertheless, there is an aspect of strategic partnership with Russia, where the rigidity of national borders is softened through the creation of specific borders zones able to foster industrial, economic and environmental cooperation (e.g. Finnmark and Murmansk Oblast), easing visa procedures and cooperation between local residents (Part 4). This is a clear effect of the priorities of the Strategy (see note 8): cooperation with Russia, people-to-people cooperation that creates almost a Norwegian-Russian axis, where the ‘exclusivity’ of territory is blurred through cross-border cooperation on all level of society.

Homogeneity is expressed then by the a clear shift in *style*, where in almost each paragraph all over the Strategy the main subject is ‘Norway’ or the collective “we” and the actual author, the Government, is

⁷ The map that introduces the thematic parts on page 12 of the Strategy and reproduced in figure 2 of the Appendix is particularly interesting. Its analysis together with the its counterpart of the following Norwegian strategy The New Building Blocks (figure 3 in the Appendix) relates almost ideally the textual and the graphic representation of the Arctic in particular and of the Earth in general. See par. 5.1.1.

⁸ Stated in the introductory ‘Summary’, the priorities in the High North are: 1) credible, consistent and predictable exercise of Government’s authority; 2) Norway’s primacy in knowledge of the area; 3) stewardship of environment and natural resources; 4) sustainability of petroleum related activities; 5) safeguarding of indigenous people’s culture and livelihoods; 6) Fostering of people-to-people cooperation; 7) Cooperation with Russia. Ibid, pp. 7-10.

⁹ Ibid, pp. 16-18.

seldom mentioned. This choice refers to the scope of mobilizing ‘the nation as a whole’, as stated in the Strategy’s Foreword. Also when relating to the indigenous people in Part 3, the safeguarding of their livelihood, culture and competences are functional for their full participation in the ‘general development of society’¹⁰. Homogeneity of procedure in the management and monitoring of resources is also stressed¹¹ together with the emphasis on new electric and transport infrastructure (Part 9), as they are lacking and essential for the balanced growth and well-being of the country.

Isotropy, or centralization is conveyed by the reassertion of sovereignty and authority through the presence of state authorities, military forces included¹², and the monitoring of resources (p.60). Yet, the main aspect is the declared direct intervention of the Government through financial investments, especially in education and infrastructure¹³ in a clear top-down pattern. Simultaneously the recognition of people-to-people cooperation on the grass roots level (Part 3, 4 and 9) could soften Norway’s centralism and empower local authorities, and the commitment on the activities regional intergovernmental forums, which presuppose a horizontal and cooperative relation, with the other member states.

Completely in line with the declaratory nature of the genre, the Strategy presents a marked *future-oriented temporality*, with a continuous use of future tenses. The concept of sustainability is also an evident where the use of resources (fish in particular) for present and future generations presupposes a long-term perspective. Connecting the assumptions and declarations, future temporality is here the sign of empowering, especially the local level. The *present* is instead the time either of the ‘imposing’ of global processes (e.g. climate change, pollution)¹⁴ or the language/modality of necessity and lacking as shows its predominance in Part 2. The *past* is then usually the temporality of historical consequence and legitimization (e.g. the ‘historical development of the Norwegian energy policy northwards’; historic responsibility to continue [sustainable fishing]; clarification on the Spitzbergen Treaty).

The co-presence of different ‘scales’ (i.e. considering variable levels of geographical areas as the local, regional and global) is already a feature of policy genres as pointed out above by Fairclough (see par. 4.3.1 ‘Recontextualization, genre mixing and intertextuality’). Nevertheless, it is interesting to notice that often the local and global level intertwined when discussing environmental and social issues, underlying the global impact of environmental threats on one side and the importance of regional and in-

¹⁰ Ibid, p. 38.

¹¹ Ibid, p. 55; but also implied in Norway’s commitment to the predictability of its policy.

¹² Ibid, p. 13 and p. 17.

¹³ Ibid, pp. 26; 32; 34; 63.

¹⁴ See paragraph 4.3.3.

ternational net-working both in the people-to-people cooperation and the safe-guarding of indigenous cultures in the Arctic. A marked 'local' scale, marked by the denomination "North Norway", is yet to be found in those parts where a incisive territorial action is required as the development of knowledge generation and know-how generation (Part 2) the infrastructures for petroleum activities (Part 6), marine transport (Part 8), of labor market and business (Part 9).

The New Building Block in the North, 2009

No later than two year after the first document, in March 2009, the Norwegian Government released another policy paper: '*New Building Block in the North. The next Step in the Government's High North Strategy*'¹⁵ (hence the Building Blocks). Admittedly an update of the 2006 Strategy, the Building Blocks is perfectly in accordance with the genre of the previous policy document: a 94-pages long pamphlet, published in English and Norwegian, and available for downloading from the same website¹⁶. Reasons for a new release have been, beside the metaphor of the 'changing world', on one hand the increased international interest and publications of Arctic Strategies by other States and international organizations (as the European Union), and on the other the practical learning in the undertaking of the 'diversity of challenges' and solutions required¹⁷.

Following these lines the structure of the document is slightly different from the previous. Divided in two main parts, the first one develops the themes that were recognized lacking in the Strategy, which reordered as found in the Building Blocks namely are: 1) Developing knowledge about Climate and the Environment in the High North; 2) Monitoring, Emergency Response and Maritime Safety Systems; 3) Sustainable Use of Offshore Petroleum and Renewable Marine Resources; 4) Promoting Onshore Business Development in the North; 5) Developing Infrastructure in the North; 6) 'Continuous exercise of Sovereignty and Strengthening of Cross-Border cooperation; 7) Safeguard of Indigenous Peoples' Cultures and Livelihood. These are the 'new building blocks' on which the Government wishes to pursue a 'dynamic policy for the High North', within a definite time-span of 10-15 years, which is nevertheless not considered as a strict deadline. The second part is definitely more promotional, and clearly defined as the "backdrop"¹⁸ of the first, displaying therefore the conditions where the priorities take place, and supposedly are the rationales leading the goals: 1) Cooperation; 2) Opportunities 3) Wealth from Oil and Gas; 4) Environment, Livelihoods and Fisheries; 5) Knowledge basis forward.

¹⁵ New Building Blocks in the North, 2009

¹⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Object of the analysis will be the English version.

¹⁷ Ibid, Foreword, p. 5.

¹⁸ Ibid, p. 3.

The *style* of the first part is dramatically different from the predominant one of the Strategy. The emphasis on the ‘nation as a whole’ is not as present anymore: while the term ‘Norway’ is still used when referring to the ‘nation’ especially in relations with other countries or the international environment (with clear moral assumptions coming from its international status, or when referring to “new identities”, e.g. ‘Norway as a coastal/shipping state/nation’¹⁹), the active subject of the document is definitely the Norwegian Government often explicitly mentioned as ‘the Government’, together or implied by the specific Ministries in their area of competence. This all is a clear sign of increased **centralization**, as top-down initiatives often budgeted and declared. The local level, ‘Northern Norway’ (NN), is equally mentioned, but almost exclusively as a place of action “in NN”, or as the passive agent of an action “*NN is now being given the opportunity*” or even in an apparently active form as “*the challenges NN is facing*”, which nevertheless means a ‘being opposite to something unavoidable’²⁰. Society and civil society are addressed as their ability “*to restructure, innovate and adapt is essential to a future knowledge-based and competitive economy*”, expressed in a generic and neo-liberal point of view. The intention of supporting and empowering local authorities, especially municipalities, could convey an interest in decentralizing, though it is an aspect of Scandinavian “redistributive regionalism” that will be discussed in more depth in the following conclusions (par 5.4).

Homogeneity in its qualitative aspect is not as present as in the Strategy in terms of nationhood, though there are some other features that connect the state/Government’s action with the principle of equality and freedom of settlement, expressed especially in part 4: “*The Government’s aim is that everyone should be free to settle where they wish, and to utilize the potential for value creation in all the parts of the country*”.²¹ Similarly, conditions for a competitive society are also desirable ‘in all the parts of the country’ and the links with other regional and rural national policies, defines the High North policy as corresponding stage in a larger national development plan. Measures for an innovative and sustainable Norway are to be developed and the same are relevant also in Northern Norway²². In order to realize such qualitative conditions, the building of a functional infrastructure is to be created and this is definitely the common thread of the first part of the document where educational, maritime, offshore and on-shore infrastructures are consequently addressed. In line with the previous ‘Strategy’ and the predominant neo-liberal economic-functional view of the ‘Building Blocks’, indigenous people are again functional for the whole Norwegian society as their knowledge “*[specialized ways of a living under mar-*

¹⁹ Ibid, pp. 13 and 15.

²⁰ All of these forms can be present in the same page with no apparent contradiction (e.g. Ibid, p. 28).

²¹ Ibid, p. 26.

²² Ibid, p. 26.

ginal conditions in a subarctic area] must be preserved and further developed in order to meet future challenges related to ecological, economic, geopolitical and other forms of social change.”²³

Continuity, is then again physically reasserted through the territorial contiguity of land and sea/seabed, and the consequent emphasis on sea and borders control and the tension in maintaining regulated and lawful flows of good and people. Temporally, evident is the continuity between the two High North Strategy papers, though, even if stated also in Building Blocks, the importance of predictability and constancy of policy is not as stated as in the ‘Strategy’. Also the emphasis on the ‘Norwegian-Russian axis’ is to some degree diminished.

Also the general *temporality* of the text has shifted from a marked pull toward the future to an almost ubiquitous present. Both past and future dimensions are still present but mostly reduced to time spans no longer than a decade, almost certainly a result of the new centralized programmatic perspective for North Norway and High North. The ‘scales’ are also adjusted with an actual focus on Northern Norway and the High North as the priorities are, like in the Strategy, clearly located on the national territory. The co-presence of different scale is also present, especially in the second part of Building Blocks, where the local level of Northern Norway is ‘positioned’ both nationally and internationally, and the whole policy is not restricted to the Norwegian territory alone²⁴, so to reframe both in causal and teleological terms (why the state action is required and why exactly in that direction, reinforcing once again Fair-clough’s insight governance genre of the policy documents as discursively connecting and recontextualizing events through the lenses and means of state’s action. See 4.3.1). Priorities and roles also extend the range of action, where for example the role of Norway as ‘steward of indigenous culture and livelihoods’ underlines the assertive statements concerning also the North Eastern parts of Russia.

5.1.1 The High North Strategies – *Between the globe and the map*

Being the forerunner of the whole specific genre of “Arctic strategies”, the Norwegian Strategies present many common aspects and some innovation. The *promotional* aspect of the specific genre, i.e. a pamphlet published in an internationally understood language, has been utilized also by almost all other Arctic countries (Finland, Denmark, Sweden) as a typical way of ‘Public Diplomacy’ to inform and influence both the domestic and international audiences about the intentions of the state on specific issues. This kind of unilateral declarations have the overt purpose of clarifying good intentions in order

²³ Ibid, p. 42.

²⁴ Ibid, p. 67 and p. 7.

to create the conditions for trustful and stable relations, an objective generally favored by all the Arctic states.

The first relevant difference could be the absence of the word ‘Arctic’ substituted here by the ‘High North’, which is stated as a quite circumscribed area, which initially coincides with the Norwegian territorial range, but then overlaps with the circumpolar North²⁵, mixing again the scales of local/national/regional. This is a clear result of the dialogue between a national strategy and the regional or global range required by environmental or socio-economic challenges, that Norway has to cope as a ‘nation’, though such emphasis was stronger in the Strategy than in the Building Blocks, where the ‘homogeneity as a nation’ has shifted towards a more marked centralization expressed by the explicit presence of the Government and its Ministries.

To this extent, the *cartographic reasoning*, it is still evidently underlying also the logic of state action, even if some important step towards a joined monitoring and management of resources is favored throughout the ‘Norwegian-Russian cooperation axis’, in such a way that traditionally sensible territorial issues, such as movements across the borders and cross-border networking at grass-roots level, attenuate the exclusivity of national territory. Similarly does also the intention for empowering local communities and civil society. The Strategy would therefore represent a state that is confident enough in its position to let go of some of its territorial prerogatives both domestically, promoting a more decentralized administrative structure²⁶, and internationally, cooperating in bilateral and multilateral cooperation initiatives, while building up at the same time a new identity as a general expert and expertise provider. This open and cooperative attitude is then almost set aside in the Building Blocks and expressed mainly in the second part of the document, while most of the emphasis is posed in the strengthening of the position of Northern Norway in the High North.

Such a shift is interestingly reflected in the two cartographic representations of the documents, two maps that in my opinion display figuratively the same change almost in a semiotic Freudian slip. In the Strategy, the map reproduced just before the thematic parts shows Norway with its land borders is loca-

²⁵ A “broad concept both geographically and politically”. Geographically it covers ‘sea and land, islands included’ northwards from Nordland county comprehended between Greenland and the Barents and Pechora Sea. Politically, mainly the administrative entities part of the Barents cooperation (Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia) overlapping with US, Canada and EU relations, through cooperation initiative and regional forums (Arctic Council); *ibid*, p. 13. See also Grindheim, 2009, pp. 11-12, for the development of the term in Norwegian political papers and the final correspondence with the Arctic: “*In international terms, the High North is in many ways synonymous with the Arctic*”. New Building Blocks in the North, 2009; p. 50.

²⁶ Though this decentralizing trend will be reversed in few years, see Hörnström, 2010, especially chap. 4.3 “Norway – regionalization with constraints”, pp. 50-55 and chap. 8.2 for the notion of ‘redistributive regionalism’, pp. 155-60.

ted centrally over a physical map curved as a globe, with the North untraditionally on the lower part of the image. It is a powerful image that reaffirms the centrality and pivotal of Norway and its sea, with an increased relevance of the northern seas (identified here as Norwegian, Greenland and Barents seas), but at the same the physic-natural, globular and global aspect of the World are clearly depicted as an attempt of conciliating the state in the awareness of the rest of the World, one and whole in its environmental aspects, represented in the geophysical features of land and seas. This is a typical post-modern awareness, that comes from the realization of the finitude and wholeness of the planet we live on (a fact usually distorted and hidden by the plane infinity of the cartographic map²⁷), that initially made me expect a less state-centered and more networking approach of Norway, and was to some extent reflected in the style and the discourses of the Strategy.

The 'Building Blocks' inverted this apparent tendency, with the same map repeated as cover of the pamphlet and before the second 'backdrop' part: in this case the map is a zenithal perspective over the North Pole, seas are dark blue, while land light blue, and Norway stands white in its landmass and islands. Sphericity could be inferred by the halo around the pole, but nevertheless I think it is more relevant the return to the graphic representation on a flat surface and the homogenization of colors: a clear sign that the nation-state reasserts again its existence with the usual cartographic terms. Norway stands therefore in-between the initial, more post-modern approach organized of a boundless finite globe and the modern defined exclusiveness of state territory.

5.2 Russia – The Foundations of the Russian Federation Policy in the Arctic until 2020 and Beyond

'The *Foundations of the Russian Federation Policy in the Arctic until 2020 and Beyond*' (hence the 'Foundations') was approved by President Medvedev the 18th of September 2008 and released for the public only in late March 2009, and it is available for downloading from the website of the Security Council of Russia and of the Rossiyskaya Gazeta²⁸.

The approximately 9-pages long policy document has been written and published in Russian. Both the style and the circumstances of the public release imply the fact that it was most certainly intended for internal administrative purposes, and only after the further publication of other Arctic Strategies²⁹ it

²⁷ See Farinelli, in paragraph 3.2.2.

²⁸ Original title "Основы государственной политики Российской Федерации в Арктике на период до 2020 года и дальнейшую перспективу". See the Bibliography for references to the document and possible translations in English.

²⁹ Namely, the Danish draft of 2008, the United States of January 2009 and the Norwegian New Building Blocks.

was eventually made public. Yet the original addressees remain supposedly the Russian Federation's administrative bodies.

The date of approval makes Russia's strategy the second in time and follows shortly the Iluissat Declaration of 28 May 2008. Differently from the other strategies there is no indication of the material **author(s)** (though it has evidently prepared by the Security Council, consultative body of the executive, composed by officers of the Russian Government's Ministries³⁰), except the signature of the President, supreme executive authority of the Federation. The extremely schematic structure of the text, typical of official resolutions, reflecting thus its programmatic and administrative character, is divided in six parts, further developed in articles and lists: 1) General Provisions; 2) National Interests; 3) Main Goals and Strategic Priorities; 4) Main Challenges and Means for Implementation; 5) Main Mechanisms for Implementation; 6) Implementation.

The main interests, and therefore the **themes** directing the Foundations are stated as: a) the utilization of the Russian Arctic Zone as a resource base for national growth; b) the preservation of the Arctic as a zone of peace and cooperation; c) the protection of the Arctic's unique ecosystem; d) the use of the North Sea Passage as a unified transport link³¹. Despite these evident themes of socio-economic development, through all over the document there is a general concern on security from 'potential threats', of natural or technical character and under various 'military and political circumstances'³², an interest stated in the very first article of the document under the 'General Provisions'.

If **homogeneity** of 'the nation as a whole' was the main emphasis of the Norwegian strategies, in the Foundations this qualitative aspect is almost neglected, or better taken for granted. No specific agent is ever stated, but all facts are presented impersonally. 'Material' homogeneity is expressed by enhancing and integrating infrastructure and administrations. **Continuity** is instead constantly asserted, almost once for each list of goals, priority, challenge or means, in terms of definition and integrity of the national borders³³. **Isotropy**, or the state's centralized structure is represented in many parts of the documents,

³⁰ See also Zysk, 2010, p. 104.

³¹ The Foundations of the Russian Federation Policy in the Arctic until 2020 and Beyond. II. National Interests of the Russian Federation in the Arctic. Art. 4.

³² Ibid. III. Main Goals and Strategic Priorities. Art. 8, a) and b).

³³ E.g. Ibid, "*protection and defense of the national boundaries of the Russian Federation*", III. Main Goals and Strategic Priorities, Art. 6 b); 'active interaction in delineating maritime boundaries' Art. 7 a) & f); "*delineation of the outer border of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation*" IV Main Challenges and Means, Art. 8 a) socio-economic challenges; "*military defense and protection of the Russian border*", "*border units*", "*optimized border control*" Art. 8 b) security challenges; "[...] research for the purpose of preparing material for delineating the border of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federa-

in particular both as background and implementation in the ‘strict accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation and its international contracts’³⁴, but also in the double direction of raw resources/ investments³⁵ displaying a clear top-down pattern, e.g. the implementation mechanism described in article 10. A pattern that reflects also in the general order of each thematic list of the Foundations: the assertion of continuity is followed by the establishment ‘material homogeneity’, and isotropy is implied in the final as role of Russia as “*the leading Arctic Power [...] strengthen her position in the Arctic, consolidate international security, and promote peace and stability in the Arctic region.*”³⁶

International cooperation is mentioned, yet it remains functional to integrated maritime security or socio-economic development and, more importantly, at the state-level through “*bilateral or multilateral [...] on the basis of international treaties and agreements to which the Russian Federation is a signatory*”³⁷ and in the last implementation part it is only generically stated as to be expanded, “*partially for the effective utilization of natural resources [...]*”³⁸ Indigenous people, their cultures and livelihoods are addressed though only in the last points of the strategic priorities and means for socio-economic development³⁹, and they somehow seem completely unrelated with the challenges to such development just listed above, as if this local dimension were only added in a second moment.

The promotional aspect of the Russian Federation policy is mentioned, but only planned through other media and not connected with the promotion of the policy document itself⁴⁰. The temporality of the text has been a ubiquitously present and the scales, in this particular case, are limited to the local, i.e. ‘the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation’, while national and regional aspects are supposed and never localized; the global is completely absent.

tion”, “*delineation of the internationally recognized exterior border of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation [...]*” VI Implementation, Art. 11 a) & b).

³⁴ Ibid. II National Interests, Art. 5. See also, V Main Mechanisms for implementation, Art. 10 a).

³⁵ This first direction periphery > center is well expressed in the national interests where the resources are functional to the national growth, ibid, Art. 4 a). But also a center > periphery is present with the direct intervention of the state in the development of the Arctic zone, e.g. “*improvement in the state management of the socio-economic development of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation*” III Goals and Priorities, Art. 7 g), (my emphasis); “*... partially by launching state programs for investigating and integrating the continental shelf*” and “*government’s support for industrial subjects active in the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation, specifically in the areas of hydrocarbon and other natural resources.*” Art. 8 a).

³⁶ Ibid, VI Implementation, Art. 11 c).

³⁷ See especially, ibid, III Main Goals and Priorities, Art. 6 e) but also Art. 7 b), c) and e) where in the last point there is an opening to public organization and not state organizations alone, but generally Civil society is seldom addressed.

³⁸ Ibid, Art. 11 a).

³⁹ Ibid, Art 7 h) and Art. 8 a).

⁴⁰ Ibid, Art. 10 d).

5.2.1 The ‘Foundations’ – *The exemplar ‘textual map’*

Russia’s perception of the Arctic has been evolving in the last decade. According to Zysk, there has been a development from a previous Arctic policy document of June 2001, where the rhetoric was markedly more focused on hard security issues, and the Foundations is an attempt to fill the lack of a coherent strategy in the Arctic⁴¹. Despite the emphasis on military issues, the commitment on stability of the area and the legal determination of maritime borders has been confirmed by the bilateral agreement with Norway signed and ratified in 2010.

In line with the cartographic characteristics, the ‘Foundations’ is an exemplar *textual map* of the ‘Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation’. Its timeless present and limitedness to a single scale, the national one, with a clear top-down perspective and direction, the impersonality of the style and the continuous emphasis on the definition and integrity of the borders (according to the framework of international law) are all features that make of the Foundation a model of the traditionally ‘modern’ conception of territory. Hints of global, cross-border or heterogeneous social elements, global demand for resources, environmental threats, international cooperation and minorities, are nevertheless present, though still re-strained in a state-centered approach. Apparently, the same style and features are to be confirmed also in the following years as they are reproduced in the new strategy paper, published in the Russian Government website on February 2013⁴², as a follow-up for the changed presidency and the realization of the second stage of the implementation process⁴³. Briefly, in its 7 parts and 39 articles, it follows the same structure and style of the ‘Foundations’, localizing even more the area of state’s intervention in the ‘Arctic zone’, and the concept of security is linked more to human security factors than just military ones.⁴⁴

⁴¹ Zysk, 2010, p. 104. Referred to as simply the “Основы государственной политики Российской Федерации в Арктике”, 14 June 2001. I was not able to retrieve it in any form.

⁴² СТРАТЕГИЯ развития Арктической зоны Российской Федерации и обеспечения национальной безопасности на период до 2020 года. “Strategy of the development of the Arctic Zone of Russian Federation and of the national security until 2020”, published in Russian the 20th February 2013.

⁴³ Vladimir Putin has been re-elected President of the Russian Federation in the election of May 2012. The second implementation stage of the “Foundations” was expected to take place in the period 2011-2015. Art. 11 b).

⁴⁴ See Strategy of the development ..., Part 3, Art. 7, where ‘the offer of military security’ is the last priority after respectively socio-economic, scientific, infrastructural development, environmental security and international cooperation; and Part 6 “*The main characteristics of the socio-economic development of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation and national security*”.

5.3 Finland – Finland's Strategy for the Arctic Region

Released in July 2010, by the Prime Minister's Office, '*Finland's Strategy for the Arctic Region*' (shortened hence as 'Finland's Strategy') is a 94 pages long pamphlet published in Finnish and in English, available also for downloading on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' website.

Beside the fact of being the first Arctic strategy paper to be officially published by a EU member state⁴⁵, Finland's strategy is a particularly interesting document because it presents some special characters that differentiate it from the other strategies, and could be considered as a further development in territorial perception and perspective. The difference is reflected in the **mixed genre**: it is not only a *policy document*, thus with a predominant declaratory modality, but also a *report*, and was prepared by a working group appointed by the Prime Minister's Office with representatives from all the Government's Ministries.⁴⁶

Having considered this, Finland's strategy presents indeed quite a peculiar *structure*: it is divided in 9 chapters, including an introductory and conclusive chapter (1 and 8). The core of the strategy is formed by Finland's objectives and interests (chap. 2 to 5; environmental frailty of the Arctic, economic activities and know-how, transport and infrastructure, indigenous people) and its means of action (chap. 6 and 7; Arctic policy tools, the EU and the Arctic Region), aided by an extensive chapter 9 with 16 appendices. Each chapter begins with a line resuming the main points, a declaration and a list of Finland's objectives concerning each area of action. The familiarity ends there, as the chapters usually continue with a broad presentation of the theme that often assumes the *style* of scientific or expert publications. There are constant changes in *scale*, from global, to regional and local level, with a changing emphasis in line with the subject. Each chapter concludes with remarks or proposals, which can also be generally addressed, except in chapter 8 'proposals for action' where Finnish governmental institutions are specifically referred to. Thus, while the declared list of objectives is typical of the policy papers, the more descriptive and informative nature of the expository part of the chapters, often enriched by abstracts in smaller tables, the continuous references to the appendices, including official documents, maps and accounts for extensive discussion on various topics, and the final proposals are more typical of the genre of reports.

⁴⁵ Denmark's draft paper is not counted here, and the Danish complete strategy was released only in August 2011. Moreover, Denmark's biggest Arctic Territory, Greenland has undertaken the process of self-determination, leading to a potential independence in the next years, and it has opted out from the European Communities already in 1985.

⁴⁶ See the introductory abstract, *Finland's Strategy for the Arctic Region*, p. 3; and also in the introduction, p. 7. "[it] will be submitted as a report to the Parliament". The generic characteristic of the report-genre will be described shortly above. See the Finland's Strategy's appendices 1a and 1b for the appointments of the working group members.

This mixed generic character of Finland's Strategy made it more difficult to spot the traditional analytical Euclidean classifications by which the previous policy papers had been overviewed. In case of Finland's Strategy they are never clearly asserted as in Norway's or Russia's strategies and they often combined⁴⁷ (e.g. an enhanced open-border policy, would not only 'soften' the boundary, but also, fostering cooperation on the public and private level on both sides, blurs the national centralized homogeneity). Physical **continuity** (i.e. borders) on the one hand is not of major concern for Finland, since it has "*no territorial claims in the Arctic*", yet it recognizes the indirect effect of the coastal states claims and reiterates the abiding of all the Arctic states to international law and its interest in "*maintaining stability and continue cooperation in the region and to keep the security situation predictable*", displaying thus some sort of temporal continuity⁴⁸. However, on the other hand, the active participation in the regional cooperation organization as the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC), Northern Dimension initiative and EU cross-border cooperation programs blurs the borders with the common objective to Finland and the EU of the "*creation of security, stability and well-being in the EU's external borders*"⁴⁹. Moreover, there is no mentioning for an improved border control derived from the Schengen Treaty's criteria as in the case of Norway.

Qualitative **homogeneity** is frequently represented by some degree of personification, with Finland 'wishing, supporting, striving' for what it considers important and of its interest, yet, not as often as in the case of Norway or Russia; certainly when affirming Finnish objectives at the beginning of each chapter, but not in almost each paragraph as the Norwegian ones, and mostly in a passive or positioning manner (e.g. Finland's interests, in Finland). The chapters where Finland has a predominant active modality are not only in economic or infrastructural issues, but especially regarding the indigenous people and the Sámi in particular, sole cases where the Government is directly cited as interlocutor and guarantor of their constitutional rights (ironically a direct effect of the recognition of their constitutional status of minority). In several occasions, Finland is asserted as 'an Arctic country' or as an 'Arctic member state of the EU'⁵⁰ and promotes its expertise in shipping and Arctic related knowledge. As material homogeneity the development of infrastructural network is highlighted as in all other strategies, yet with a slightly different approach, i.e. infrastructure to connect, as it needs and lacks good connections with the Barents area in order to benefit of foreign trade trends developing on the Northern shores

⁴⁷ As too the Euclidean characteristics are not one the effect of the other, but they simultaneously condition each other, see par. 4.3.4.

⁴⁸ Ibid, pp. 10-11. Reiteration also in the 'Means for Action', chap. 6.1, p. 35, and 6.2, p. 37.

⁴⁹ Ibid, chap. 7 The EU and the Arctic Region, p. 51.

⁵⁰ Ibid, p. 8 and p. 44.

of the Arctic seas but also as ‘[t]he European Arctic Region should be treated comprehensively and Arctic viewpoints must be taken into account in the EU policies’⁵¹. A sentence that hangs between different roles and points of views Finland acts in (see below 5.3.1)

Isotropy, or centralization, is not clearly stated, except in few occasions, as in chapter 8 ‘Conclusions: objectives and proposals for action’, where to each priority is assigned a specific Ministry in charge of the implementation⁵², and could be loosely inferred by the same fact that all the cooperative means of action imply bilateral or multilateral mechanisms, thus state-coordinated action, with the only exception of the Barents Region, where also local regional authorities are direct participants (in the Barents Regional Council) together with the intergovernmental level (Barents Euro-Arctic Council). Another aspect is the funding (chap 6.4) where Finland’s Arctic cooperation is funded by resources budgeted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other Ministries, but the major part is ‘based on joint funding by various actors (national, both public and private, and international)’⁵³. Local businesses and associations are scarcely mentioned, yet in a different way from the Norwegian strategies where the state intervenes directly to support them, while Finland recognizes their existence and vitality and point to the possibilities of networking⁵⁴.

The predominant *temporality* is again the present, with several general indication ‘in the future’ in the chapters 3 and 4 describing economic activities and infrastructure pointing to a necessary action. Otherwise, even the potential climatic change in the environment, which have a clear future time-span of decades are described in the present, in the style typical of scientific reports.

5.3.1 Finland’s Strategy – Variable styles and perspectives

It is exactly this variety in *styles* that makes ‘Finland’s Strategy’ peculiar and could approximate to Ruggie’s post-modern multi-perspectival polity (see par. 3.4). The first difference with the previous Arctic Strategies is the origins of the Finnish one. As explained in the appointment decision (appendix 1a), it has been requested by the Finnish Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee (not from an executive body) in order to chart ‘Finland’s policy for the Arctic Region’, implying thus that national policies were already taking place. Its importance is stressed by the increasing relevance in politico-economic

⁵¹ Ibid, p. 24. Quotation from p. 47.

⁵² Ibid, pp. 52-55.

⁵³ Ibid, p. 42. Beside the fact that the following note remarks “*Actions are implemented within the boundaries of the national economy based on separate decisions made according to appropriate procedures in each concrete case*”, the involvement of private and international actors is a sign of decentralization and openness.

⁵⁴ Ibid, p. 18 and p. 53.

terms, and even though the aim is ‘to focus mainly on the aspect of external relations in Arctic policy’ (emphasis visible in the continuous reference to external factors leading to the changes in environment of trade flows and the international cooperation means to coordinate), there is also an unambiguous internal/national approach when dealing with the economic or infrastructural issues. Finland’s Strategy’s main purpose is then stated in the very first paragraph of the introduction: “*to define objectives for Finland’s Arctic policy for advancing [them] nationally and in various international and regional forums, within the European Union, in Nordic cooperation and in bilateral relations.*”⁵⁵

At a single glance, regarding only external relations, Finland’s approach could bluntly be assessed in such a way that it is a only mere attempt to stay at the Arctic table of negotiation after the territorial closure of the Arctic coastal states (the Ilulissat Declaration of May 2008). Yet, the current state of international affairs is acknowledged⁵⁶, and also internal, local development issues (and therefore neatly territorial) are managed, realizing that exactly the complexity of the threats and challenges requires a mixed approach much similar to the one of the European Union, where internal and external are level are still separated, though inevitably linked in a functional sense (i.e. the socio-economic well-being of the Union depends on the ‘security, stability and well-being also on the EU’s external borders’), showing thus also signs of what Vollaard described as the possible ‘functional’ discontinuity in the political territorial logic⁵⁷. A possible counter-argument could be that the same informative style of the report is a hint to the fact that no real awareness or common Finnish national policy on the Arctic, but this very sentence is an evaluative implies a stronger intervention of the state. Suspending any judgment on the efficiency of Finland’s Arctic policy so far, it was present in a diffused form, enhanced by the various regional initiatives and organizations (Northern Dimension and Barents Euro-Arctic Council in particular), designed on the intergovernmental level but actuated on the regional one.

A definite informative scope of Finland’s Strategy is reflected in the composition itself of the working group appointed for the preparation of the report: beside the ministerial provenance of members, specialists could be consulted, and though never mentioned their more or less indirect influence is evident in the style of each chapter⁵⁸. As style is the discursual aspect of being (see 4.3.1), they are a sign of different roles that the state is assuming. Some could argue that these changes in styles could be shaped

⁵⁵ Ibid, p. 7.

⁵⁶ Ibid, pp. 10-11, p. 36 and appendix 5.

⁵⁷ Vollaard, 2009, p. 705.

⁵⁸ For example, chapter 2 of the Strategy is evidently influenced by the scientific reports on the matter, as the reference to the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment of 2004, in the table at page 10. Companies and national business organization as Finpro may have helped in the definition of “promotion of Arctic Exports” in the table at page 22.

by specific institutional cultures⁵⁹, yet the focus of the analysis is on the particular perspective issues are (re)presented. In the case of Finland's Strategy the point of view of Finland is clear in the initial objectives, but also other perspectives are simultaneously present and taken under consideration, scientific (chap. 2), business (chap. 3), logistics (chap. 4), Sámi people (chap.5), international and regional organizations (chap. 6), European Union (chap. 7), that should help not only in literally expanding the picture, but also in showing and indicating the networks and means where to act most effectively. Thus, bearing in mind the different roles Finland assumes in each situation (i.e. Member state of the United Nations; Arctic state affected by the environment and part of regional organizations; expert state in Arctic issues and technologies; guarantor of minorities/indigenous people; Arctic member state of the European Union), its Strategy is a charting of the complexity of each topic from points of view that tries to include all stakeholders. These different style are interestingly represented also cartographically in the various maps of the appendices, showing in different scales the diverse topics under consideration⁶⁰.

5.4. Findings and Reflections: the State still on the Map.

The analysis of the Arctic Strategies of Norway, Russia and Finland through the textual approach of Critical Discourse Analysis reveals that, considering them as both the territorial perceptions and the performative projections of state territory, they still display in different degrees the three cartographic Euclidean characteristics of continuity, homogeneity and isotropy, unsurprisingly confirming that the nation-state has still a predominant modern approach (i.e. bounded, uniform and centralized exercise of Power), though some discontinuity in one or more of these aspects can be separately discerned.

Such finding is not completely surprising as it was the initial hypothesis of the thesis to assume the state "as a person" as the main agent in the international scene (Chap. 1) in any forms⁶¹. The real question here would be whether nowadays the states can co-exist in other forms than just the one of individual modern nation-states, and such possible development could be Two possible ways in Arctic could have been either an *international legal regime*, as in the case of the Antarctica, or a reinforcing *intergovernmental cooperation* towards some kind of supranational governance, in the line of the European

⁵⁹ Specifically in Finland it could be argument of debate the apparent hegemony of the "*asiantuntijat*", of the experts, in most of social life.

⁶⁰ Ibid, pp. 61-63; 70-71; 73-75; 88-91. They varies from the circumpolar maps showing population density, melting of the sea ice and forecasts, regional issues [territorial claims], sea routes and potential resources deposits, to regional ones on nuclear safety in the Barents region and cross-border and regional cooperation programs.

⁶¹ I believe any pluralist objection of the governments actually speaking and declaring the Strategies priorities to be here inaccurate. The national governments here are acting as the material '*authors*' of the documents.

Communities of the second half of the 20th century. However in a time were even the epitome of the supranational way, the European Union, is facing a bitter identity crisis, the Arctic States are only asserting their territorial rights, in accordance with the current International Legal System.

Such assertion has its most evident manifestation in the so-called *Ilulissat Declaration* (2008): the final document of the international Arctic Ocean Conference organized by Denmark in Ilulissat, Greenland, by the five Arctic Coastal States: Canada, Denmark, Norway, the Russian Federation and the United States of America⁶². The need of such high level meeting was indeed to discuss ‘climate change and the melting of the ice having a potential impact on vulnerable ecosystems, the livelihoods of local inhabitants and indigenous communities and the potential exploration of natural resources’, in line with the traditional narratives on the Arctic of the 1990s and 2000s, and reassure the peaceful determination of territorial disputes after some extraordinary “flag issues”⁶³. What is new is the stated awareness of the ‘important rights and obligations’⁶⁴ provided by the law of the sea to the coastal states, and the commitment to the legal framework of the UNCLOS provisions and dispute-solving procedures, which make redundant the ‘development of a new comprehensive international legal regime for the Arctic’. Such a resolute stance and the exclusion of any representative from Finland, Iceland and Sweden could seem thus a regression from the cooperative and inclusive attitude promoted by the Arctic Council toward an individualist, competitive and exclusively national geopolitical approach. However, despite the diplomatic impoliteness, there is still the recognition of the importance of the Council and other international for a and organizations such as the International Maritime Organization and the multilateral meeting and declaration indeed support the current International Legal System and the its territorial *order of discourse* (par. 2.3.2 and 4.3). Such development is reflected in the Norwegian strategies, where the ‘Building Blocks’ seems marking a trend towards a “re-cartographicization” of territory⁶⁵. All the other Arctic strategies come after the declaration (beside the one of the United States that have not ratified the Convention yet, but are traditionally committed to the law of the sea and the principle of freedom of

⁶² The Ilulissat Declaration, 28 May 2008. All following indirect references are from the 2-pages long document.

⁶³ One is the territorial dispute between Canada and Denmark on Hans Island and the other is the evocative posting of the Russian flag on the North Pole on the bottom of the Arctic Ocean in August 2007.

⁶⁴ Among these are clearly mentioned the issues of the determination of the outer limits of the continental shelf, the protection of marine environment, freedom of navigation, marine scientific research and other uses of the sea, all subjects to the territorial rights endowed by the UNCLOS.

⁶⁵ The connection is echoed in the identification of Norway as a coastal and shipping nation/country, endowed with particular obligations. Building Blocks, 2009, pp. 12 and 15.

navigation) and even an excluded Arctic State, as Finland, recognizes and commits itself to the UNCLOS⁶⁶.

Another treaty that boosted fears of slicing of the Arctic into ‘areas of influence’ was the *Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic*, the first binding international agreement signed during the Nuuk ministerial meeting of the Arctic Council in May 2011. The same arguments pointed above are more clearly stated in this document whose objective is to “*is to strengthen aeronautical and maritime search and rescue cooperation and coordination in the Arctic*” and “*The delimitation of search and rescue regions is not related to and shall not prejudice the delimitation of any boundary between States or their sovereignty, sovereign rights or jurisdiction*”⁶⁷, reinforcing thus the general concept that, beside the apparent exclusiveness of the sovereign territorial rights extended also to the sea, the pragmatism of an effective response to challenging threats, as maritime or environmental security, requires also to the Arctic States some level of cooperative and networked action. This simultaneous occurrence of territorial assertion of the state over space and its binding into forms of multilateral cooperation is, in my opinion, paradoxical only in principle, as it is a signal of a necessity that however does not weaken the use of territory as legal-political tool both on the international and the domestic policy level.

Regarding the reinforcement of intergovernmental cooperation towards some kind of supranational governance, major steps have been taken in cross-border cooperation and a timid empowerment of regional and indigenous communities, which however remains confined in those more densely populated areas of the Arctic: the Nordic countries and the Barents region⁶⁸. Being all the countries taken under consideration part of the Barents cooperation, its importance is naturally stressed, though in the Russian strategy is assumed under the general label of “bilateral and multilateral cooperation”. Some functional aspects of the new regionalist approach are present in the Nordic countries’ strategies, such as the definition of the regions and the cooperation between them in functional terms (health care, education and culture), the realization of local solutions and potentials for the regional development and innovative

⁶⁶ See par. 5.3.1 note 57, for Finland; and The Foundations of the Russian Federation Policy in the Arctic until 2020 and Beyond, III. Main Goals and Strategic Priorities of Russian State Policy in the Arctic, Art. 7 a), b) and c) for the commitment to the law of the sea and international cooperation with Arctic States.

⁶⁷ See Art. 2 and 3.2, *Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic*, 2011.

⁶⁸ Areas that nevertheless suffer of negative demographic figures; the long distances and sparse population do not favor economy of scale, typical of the more economically developed regions of Central Europe that initiated the new regionalism concept.

networking also on the international level thanks to “para-diplomacy”⁶⁹. However, the Nordic regionalism, though heavily influenced by the European model and funding projects (which eventually follows mostly the same vertical logic of the traditional national regional policy, only on a larger scale⁷⁰), has the national state in a central role as the guarantor of equal conditions all over the country, without contradiction of having strong regions within the unitary state⁷¹. Thus, intergovernmental integration seems to be the only development actually taking place in the Arctic, under the encompassing name of Arctic governance. However, the focus and initiative remain to the states, as also the proposal by the Standing Committee of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region in the *Arctic Governance in an evolving Arctic Region* recommends a strengthening of the Arctic Council towards a full-fledged international organization and binding agreements, especially in the areas of research, education and tourism⁷².

This reassertion is also reflected in the Arctic Strategies in the use of different ‘scales’, the continuous shift from local, to national, to global perspective and vice versa. According to Fairclough the change in perspective was one of the aspects of globalization (par. 4.3.1). However, when dealing with scales one is still reasoning in cartographic terms of projection, selection and space (par. 3.2.3), exactly because it is to the scale that it has been given the nexus between local and global, “*the relentless agent of space production, the general standardization, the immediate equivalence that permits the exchange between the concrete and the abstract, at the core of the cartographic ethos and the cartographic root of modern territory*”⁷³, and therefore is one of the most important instruments by which the state tries to redefine its relation and action with territory.

In the light of this understanding, it is possible to grasp more of the Arctic states’ approach towards their territory in the Arctic. While Russia’s is mostly based on a national scale, caused apparently by the fact that its presence is not yet satisfactory (constant reference to continuity and homogeneity, i.e. delimitation of borders and establishment of infrastructure) and the perception of the Arctic as mainly a national strategic resource area, Norway and Finland shift from the local/regional to the global scale, understanding that an efficient management of the territory in all its political, economic and social as-

⁶⁹ Hörnström, 2010, pp. 22-24. This aspect is most evident in the Norwegian Strategies: see High North, Part 4, “people-to-people cooperation”, and especially Building Blocks, Part II, “1. Cooperation in the High North”, “2. The Region of opportunity”, “3. Wealth Creation from Oil and Gas”.

⁷⁰ Ibid, p. 25.

⁷¹ See Hörnström, 2010, Redistributive Regionalism – Characteristics of the Nordic Periphery, pp. 155-60.

⁷² *Arctic Governance in an evolving Arctic Region. A Proposal by the Standing Committee of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region (SCPAR)*. Presented in Akureyri, at the 1st session of the 10th Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region, 5-7 September 2012.

⁷³ Farinelli, 2009, pp. 172-73. With *ethos* Farinelli implies ‘the complex of mental models and consequent behaviors’; *ibid*, p. 164.

pects requires a comprehensive approach. Cooperation and networking are present and reaffirmed throughout all the strategies taken under investigation, though their effects are not that evident and they still are dependent on states' support and facilitation. Cross-border cooperation is the activity that most of any other smears borders and compels neighboring states to combine forces if not to share previous exclusive priorities. A good example is Finland's strategy that even changing the perspective from a state centered one, the state is still present though on the background, and all the information is nevertheless directed to Finland's priorities⁷⁴. The borders blur but the boundary remains, and each state still persists firmly on the map. Such shifts in *scale* and *content* remind me of *interactive maps*, very useful instrument for managing huge amount of information from different point of views. The material support remains, nevertheless, the *Map*, with all the cognitive implications underlined previously (see par. 3.2.3) never leaving the two-dimensional table for the globe.

⁷⁴ Fact reflected also graphically in all Finland's Strategy's maps of the appendices: all political maps that, in different scales, relate the changing content to the states still delineated on the map.

CONCLUSIONS

The strong feelings that territory creates in public discussions are already a sign of the complexity of such concept in international politics. Traditionally seen as one of the most material manifestations of political power, it has actually never been problematized, but always taken for granted as the concrete body of the nation especially in modern times. The first question of this research was therefore to enquire the social nature of this concept, avoiding any naturalist or organicist approach, which could bring to simplistic and unquestioned dynamics. The first step was the reasoned adoption of Wendt's social constructivist theory and specifically the standpoint of the state "as-a-person" that permitted the argumentation of considering it as a process, a complex system where various material and aspects (Wendt's essential state and corporate agency. See 1.2) are the preconditions for the emergence of the state's *personhood* and *intentional agency*, essential properties for the ensuing analysis.

The state "as-a-person" is a concept that developed also in the formation of the international law in the last centuries, which, for its constitutive and behavioral effects, can be also held as the International Culture where the states act as the main actors. It is thus no wonder that the first academic investigation of territory and its distribution over the Earth was made by a legal scholar, Carl Schmitt. He had some crucial insight, such as the original purpose of management and redistribution of the Earth's fruits, but afterward focused mainly on its exclusive aspects, theorizing a rather violent and pessimistic worldview. Instead of land-appropriation as the founding principle of the global geographic order, the development of the current jurisprudence regarding territory leans toward the principle of effectivity, returning thus to the functional aspects of territorial division. For these reasons, Stuart Elden's analytical approach (see 2.4) is the most appropriate manner to tackle 'territory' in International Relations: *as a 'political technology', a tool for management expressed mostly in legal and cartographic terms*. The legal aspects are immediately evident when studying the international law, as they have been lately codified in various international conventions. There is, however, a subtler logic that operates on the representational and cognitive level, with unexpected consequences. As explained by Franco Farinelli, territory has a great symbolic value that connects the individuality of places with the totality of the World through matrix of uniform space (3.1.2). This process is exemplified by the cartographic representation itself, which, through selection, projection and geometrical, pretends to represent factually the World on the map. The formal equivalence between object and representation, the World and the Map, modifies the relation into a bidirectional one: the map is not anymore a copy of the World, but it modifies it

on its cartographic terms (3.2). These conditions are the three characteristics of Euclidean space, *continuity*, *homogeneity* and *isotropy*, (3.3) that are also the three features and patterns that distinguish and structure the modern nation-state.

The categorization into these three typical attributes provided the analytical terms by which it is possible to investigate also in textual terms, whether John Ruggies's post-modern forms of political space are present in the contemporary Arctic, as the narratives on environmental issues and integrated cooperative regimes would let suspect. Critical Discourse Analysis was used as the most apt methodology for the dynamic analysis of the probable discrepancies in state's discourses on territory, and therefore if change were happening in the social practices of the *order of discourse* of the territoriality of the modern nation-states, in particular over the Arctic. Though understanding that there are innumerable ways through which language, texts and their relations can be investigated, specifically the analysis of the Arctic Strategies seemed the most appropriate for the purpose of analyzing the territorial approaches of the states for their synthetic and comprehensive content. Although a similar throughout examination on all the Arctic States Strategies could uncover many interesting aspects both on the linguistic (e.g. the relations between format, genres and styles, whether there is a regularity among the Arctic States and what does this represent), and the individual territorial approach of the Arctic States (e.g. variable degree of modernity of the approach through the cartographic characteristics), already the Norwegian, Russian and Finnish cases showed three completely different degrees of representation and confirmed at the same time the assumption of the persistence of the modern territorial perspective, visible in all the strategies in textual and surprisingly also in cartographic terms. There are hints of discontinuity in the absolute exclusivity of the sovereign modern state, where exactly the functional principle of effectivity compels the Arctic States to cooperate in those areas where the state cannot cope with alone, but these processes are still mainly state-driven and no mixed sort of multilevel networked governance is to be observed. Moreover the states still find a cartographic expression for managing the effects of global phenomena: through the systematic shifts of *scale* and *content*, that resemble the functionality of *interactive maps* (5.4). In the light of these findings, a possible direction for further research could be the how technological and graphic development could influence future territorial representations and would these be able to depict networks and globality, thus revealing the taking place of another spatial revolution. Nonetheless, at this moment, also in areas of the World where narratives would state otherwise, the state is definitely still *on the map*, determines and uses territory in an integrated way that partially softens its exclusivity, but keeps it fundamental for any domestic or international policy.

APPENDIX




Figure 2. Map of the High North in “The Norwegian Government’s High North Strategy”.
Source: The Norwegian Government’s High North Strategy, 2006; p.12.



Figure 3. Map of the High North in “The New Building Blocks in the North”.
Source: New Building Blocks in the North, 2009; cover background.

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